Born Again: Natality, Normativity and Narrative in Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition by Jacobson, Rebecca Sete
BORN AGAIN: NATALITY, NORMATIVITY AND NARRATIVE  
IN HANNAH ARENDT’S THE HUMAN CONDITION 
 
 
Rebecca Seté Jacobson 
 
 
Submitted to the University of Hertfordshire in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
June 2012
To Norm. 
For BT, BB, REL, JHT and AMGT. 
In memory of Lindie.
 Under any and all circumstances tell yourself often and mean it—I don’t believe in 
defeat. 
—Norman Vincent Peale
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
If I had my druthers, my acknowledgements would fill at least as many pages as 
those used to discuss the works of Hannah Arendt. Since that is not a possibility, I 
will name just a few faculty, friends and family members without whom I would not 
have been able to complete this dissertation. I do so, however, with the caveat that 
there are many, many more amazing people whom I love and appreciate for the 
beauty, richness and warmth they bring to my life. I will trust that they know who they 
are, and that they understand their importance to transcend any words I could ever 
put on a page. 
With that said, let me begin by offering my deepest and most profound 
gratitude to Shaun Gallagher. I marvel every single day at the fact I am mentored by 
a scholar of his renown. Not only does he possess an unparalleled intellect, which he 
employs to prolifically produce the brilliant scholarship which is reshaping the way we 
think about the mind and the body, he is also a kind and gentle man. He has 
generously given me his time and attention, calmed me in my more neurotic and 
high-strung moments, pushed me when he knew I could produce better work, always 
believed in my ability and respected my voice, and has been immeasurably generous 
in offering me amazing professional opportunities to supplement my studies. I know 
with absolute certainty that I will never be able to repay Shaun for all he has done, 
but I will strive to at least be worthy of the gifts he has given to me.  
I must also thank my other two Supervisors, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and 
Daniele D. Hutto. Both Danièle and Dan are scholars of the highest caliber, and my 
work has been greatly influenced by their attention to detail, academic rigor and 
insightful feedback. I am privileged to have had their guidance. Furthermore, this 
dissertation has benefited greatly from the involvement of Jonathan Tennis, who 
remained steadfast in his commitment to read and comment on my work even when 
the process proved itself to be a test of mental strength and endurance. Additionally, 
5 
I would like to acknowledge the copyediting and formatting skills of Lee Davidson. 
The Sixteenth Edition of The Chicago Manual of Style is 1026 pages long and, 
therefore, something I was grateful not to have to tackle without her expertise. 
Beyond the excellent academic and technical advisement I received, I simply 
would not have survived writing this dissertation without an immense amount of 
moral support and encouragement. I would like to especially acknowledge my 
parents, Stephen and Rena, who raised me to believe that the pursuit of knowledge 
and of understanding are worthy ends in and of themselves. I am also grateful to Jim 
and Anna Annarelli, and Norman Smith. Jim always took the completion of my 
dissertation to be an absolute and unquestionable given, which, in darker hours, 
provided necessary motivation. Anna unfailing made me feel as though writing this 
paper was akin to hanging the stars in the sky, and I will never cease to appreciate 
how smart and special she believes me to be. For a dozen years now, Norm has 
offered advice and encouragement at crucial decision-making points, and I shudder 
to think how lost I would be without his well-reasoned opinions.   
I would be absolutely remiss if I did not acknowledge my indebtedness to 
Sarah Kay, Liz Kicak, Angelina Garcia Tennis, Brianna Day, Jaya Eeten and Bryan 
Thompson who were, without a doubt, my front-line dissertation ground troops. Sarah 
understood with absolute clarity the power of an encouraging card, text, call or email. 
Liz possessed an uncanny ability to know just when to check in and make sure 
everything was all right, which, at the moment she would call, it almost never was. In 
the course of writing the paper, Angelina gave me a graduate education in what it 
means to be a family and, in the process, even coined the phrase, “See you later, 
dissertator!” Brianna reminded me that there is nothing more powerful than finding 
the courage to face our deepest fears in order to build a better future for ourselves. 
Jaya, as she has for the past 20 years, centered my universe, and I know without 
question how much of this project is owed to her. Finally, anything I could say about 
Bryan, my beautiful, brilliant, kind and soulful husband, would be woefully insufficient. 
6 
He is my blue sky, my best friend, my heart, my home and my reason for being. He 
sees me for “who” I am and, like a miracle, he loves me anyway. I cannot thank him 
enough for helping me fulfill my dream of becoming a doctor (although not the kind 
that helps people!).
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT i 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 
Contributions to Knowledge 4 
Structure of the Project 7 
CHAPTER 2: OUR BIO-ONTOLOGICAL NATALITY 10 
The Birth of Natality 10 
The Private Realm, Labor, and Our Bio-Ontological Natality 18 
Labor and the Fulfillment of Biological Necessity 22 
The Work of Our Hands: Building a Common World 26 
The Space of Appearance, Action and Our Existential Natality 31 
CHAPTER 3: POTENTIALITY TO ACTUALITY: OUR EXISTENTIAL NATALITY 34 
Labor Pains: Three Formulations of the Second Birth 35 
The Enacted Story and the Web of Relationships 46 
CHAPTER 4: REIFICATION, RECOGNITION AND REMEMBRANCE 54 
 Reification and Recognition 54 
 Reification and Remembrance: Honneth Meets Hannah 58 
 Spectator Judgment 64 
 From Heroes to No-Bodies 70 
CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 77 
 Social Cognition 78 
 Primary Intersubjectivity 81 
 Secondary Intersubjectivity 91 
 Participatory Sense-Making 97 
CHAPTER 6: NARRATIVE 103 
 Selfhood and the Story: Lived Narratives and Retrospective Recountings 103 
 Defining Arendtian Narratives 111 
Reified Work and Conditioning Object: The Two Functions of Arendtian 
Narratives 119 
CHAPTER 7: RUBY 122 
Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock” 122 
Observations on New Orleans 125 
Steinbeck and the Cheerleaders 132 
Rockwell Gets Real 135 
Robert and Ruby 138 
Conclusion 144 
NOTES 149 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 189 
 
 
 
i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Within the text of The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt circumscribes the concept of 
natality in ways that tend to conflate its biological, historical, institutional and 
phenomenological dimensions. This dissertation seeks to clarify this concept and the 
conceptual territory that surrounds it. Specifically, it is argued that Arendt’s 
construction of the concept of natality is inherently dual. Each person is delivered into 
a worldly environment through her primary, biological birth. As soon as she is born, 
she begins to be conditioned to the accepted normative standards of her community. 
A gap necessarily exists, however, between the person she is socio-culturally 
conditioned to be, and who she is explicitly, uniquely and authentically. When deeds 
and words are employed in service of revealing someone’s individual identity or 
essence, and thereby showing her to be more than simply a mirror of her cultural 
conditioning, it heralds a second birth, one which is existential instead of biological. 
According to Arendt, this existential natality must take place in the presence of other 
existential agents, and also may be witnessed by a spectator who then seeks to 
express the significance of what has occurred to those removed from the original 
event either by space and/or time. This expression takes the form of artifactual 
objects, including works of art, architectural monuments and various forms of 
narratives. Arendt’s theory concerning the creation of these objects contains two 
major problems that are critically addressed within this project. The first problem 
concerns the spectator’s capacity for making judgments. Works written after The 
Human Condition are shown to demonstrate Arendt’s attempts to address this issue. 
The second problem concerns the way in which Arendt portrays the issue of 
embodiment. This issue must be reconciled both by appealing to work from within 
her canon, as well as through the introduction of recent scholarship from the field of 
social cognition. The project concludes with the presentation of a concrete, historical 
example intended to be illustrative of the preceding theoretical material. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Hannah Arendt died unexpectedly of a heart attack in her New York apartment on 
December 4, 1975. Two months later, a tribute written by Hans J. Morgenthau, her 
friend and colleague at the New School for Social Research, was published in the 
journal Political Theory. Therein, Morgenthau stated that she was “propelled forward 
by a passion whose object was thinking itself. As others enjoy playing cards or the 
horses for their own sake, so Hannah Arendt enjoyed thinking. The analogy is, 
however, correct only with the important qualification that she did not play games 
with thoughts but was deadly serious about them.” He then added, “To tell the truth 
as she saw it or at least to demolish error parading as truth was for her a high 
vocation.”1 Of course, errors parading as truths are not limited to any one discipline 
or domain of thought, and it is therefore not surprising that Arendt published works of 
journalism, literary criticism, history, political theory and, of course, philosophy.2 No 
matter the subject, Morgenthau stated in summary of her work, “Familiar concepts 
and issues looked different after her mind had worked them over.”3  
In her 1958 text The Human Condition, Arendt engaged just the sort of 
familiar concepts and issues Morgenthau referenced, including what she termed 
“action.” Arendt’s formulation of the concept was, however, so complex and multi-
faceted—encompassing birth and death, words and deed, the public and private, the 
individual and the plurality—that, even before The Human Condition was published, 
she had started writing another book which would have offered needed clarification.4 
In a grant application submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation seeking support for the 
project, Arendt stated that The Human Condition “actually is a kind of prolegomena 
to the book which I now intend to write. It will continue where the other book ends. In 
terms of human activities, it will be concerned exclusively with action and thought.”5 
Arendt went on to detail how this new book, which she had tentatively titled 
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Introduction Into Politics, would contain two areas of focus: “First, a critical 
reexamination of the chief traditional concepts and conceptual frameworks of political 
thinking—such as means and ends, authority, government, power, law, war, etc.” 
Second, Arendt would provide a systematic account that was not so much concerned 
with politics per se, as with the fundamental categories of human activities from 
which anything political must start: 
Here I shall be chiefly concerned with the various modi of human plurality and 
the institutions which correspond to them. In other words, I shall undertake a 
reexamination of the old question of forms of government, their principles and 
their modes of being together: to be together with other men and with one’s 
equals, from which springs action, and to be together with one’s self, to which 
the activity of thinking corresponds. Hence, the book should end with a 
discussion of the relationship between acting and thinking, or between politics 
and philosophy.6   
Much of the material Arendt completed for Introduction Into Politics had to do 
with the first area of focus outlined in her grant proposal; those writings became part 
of Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought, which was published 
in 1961. Arendt did not, however, meaningfully reengage with many of the issues she 
intended to address in the second part of Introduction Into Politics for more than a 
decade after she wrote to the Rockefeller Foundation. At that point, it seemed as 
though Arendt intended to bring many key concepts full-circle through The Life of the 
Mind, a trilogy dedicated to explicating the faculties of thinking, willing and judging. 
These mental activities—considered in antiquity and the Middle Ages to be the 
purview of the solitary man living a life of contemplation, a vita contemplativa—were 
to stand in contrast to the pluralistic and worldly life of the vita activa that Arendt 
described in The Human Condition, a life focused on another triad: labor, work and 
action.7  
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In preparation for drafting the first volume of The Life of the Mind, Arendt 
presented material addressing the faculty of thinking at the University of Aberdeen’s 
Gifford Lectures in 1973. Material which was to provide the framework for the volume 
on willing was ready for a subsequent set of Gifford Lectures in May 1974. Arendt, 
however, suffered a near-fatal heart attack at the start of the second series of talks 
and the remainder of her presentations were rescheduled for 1976.8 Arendt would 
not, however, live long enough to return to Aberdeen. As a result of her untimely 
death in the winter of 1975, Mary McCarthy—an esteemed author and close friend, 
whom Arendt had appointed as her literary executor—took on the task of readying 
Arendt’s final works for publication.9  
The manuscript for Thinking had been written and preliminarily revised prior 
to Arendt’s passing; it was published in November and December of 1977 as a three-
part series in the New Yorker magazine. Just days before she died, Arendt 
completed an initial draft of Willing and, in 1978, it was issued together with Thinking 
in a handsome boxed set.10 As for the final volume of The Life of the Mind, Arendt 
had been working on material related to the faculty of judgment since the early 
1950s.11 Between 1964 and 1970, Arendt lectured on the topic at the New School for 
Social Research and at the University of Chicago, and intended to do so again in the 
spring of 1976. It may have been her ongoing consideration of the topic which led 
Arendt to tell friends that she expected the final volume of the trilogy to be the easiest 
of the three to produce.12 We will, however, never know if Arendt was correct in her 
assessment, because she died with the first page of Judging in her typewriter.  
According to Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, the fact that Judging was never 
completed means that The Life of the Mind fails to “make the task of comprehending 
Hannah Arendt’s oeuvre easier.”13 Young-Bruehl explains: 
Like Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, a book which can be seen in 
retrospect to mark the end of an epoch in European philosophy, Arendt’s one 
work of “proper philosophy” (as she jokingly referred to it) is missing its final, 
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third part. But Heidegger lived for nearly fifty years after his work appeared 
and he wrote many more works exploring the pathways he had laid down in 
his magnum opus. Arendt’s work must remain rough-hewn, without benefit 
even of the changes she might have made in the first volumes had her 
impatience not gotten the best of her.14   
In other words, because of Arendt’s untimely death, we are left with a very unusual 
circumstance: a prolegomena that was to be brought to fulfillment in a work which 
was never completed. While it is true that Thinking and Willing may be unable to 
provide all the necessary materials to forge Arendt’s canon into a seamless whole, I 
hope to demonstrate in the course of this project—including in the sections 
addressing deficiencies in the way Arendt represents embodiment in The Human 
Condition—that The Life of the Mind goes far in providing meaningful insight into how 
Arendt’s ideas matured and developed in the course of her career.  
 
Contributions to Knowledge 
The fact that The Life of the Mind and, therefore, aspects of The Human Condition, 
never found a final form leaves me with equal parts curiosity, sadness and gratitude. 
I am curious as to how that work would have looked if Arendt had lived long enough 
to finish it; I am sad we will never know, and I am grateful for the pure intellectual joy 
that has come from years spent trying to ferret out various nuances of meaning from 
writings which are rich, referential and fully resistant to singular interpretation. This 
project represents the culmination of my efforts thus far to better understand what 
Arendt left behind in the form of The Human Condition and will yield at least three 
important contributions to knowledge.  
First, I will offer a critical analysis of Arendtian action rooted in the conceptual 
structure of natality, normativity and narrative. I will begin my study by arguing that 
Arendt’s theory of action is grounded in the concept of natality, and that her 
construction of that concept is inherently dual. Specifically, we are each delivered 
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into a worldly environment through our primary, biological birth. As soon as we are 
born, we begin to be conditioned to the accepted normative standards of our 
community. Arendt, however, indicates that a gap necessarily exists between the 
person we are socio-culturally conditioned to be and who we are explicitly and 
uniquely. While most people will seek to subjugate any difference between who they 
are expected to be and who they are as authentic individuals, a few people will 
choose to explicate that gap through action. Action is comprised of two parts: action 
and speech, which are alternatively referred to as deeds and words.15 When deeds 
and words are employed in service of revealing someone’s individual identity or 
essence, they produce stories. These “enacted stories,” as Arendt calls them, are not 
performative recountings of events that have already occurred. Instead, they reveal 
the unique identity of the actor.16 Enacting our story where it can be seen and heard 
by others and, in the process, showing ourselves to be more than simply mirrors of 
our culture conditioning, is “like a second birth,” one which is existential instead of 
biological.17  
Scholars have largely failed to recognize the duality inherent to Arendt’s 
concept of natality. Those who do recognize the concept as encompassing more 
than a singular event still miss the mark, either through overextension or, in the case 
of Seyla Benhabib, by taking an extra-textual approach.18 Specifically, Benhabib 
claims that the mastering of our community’s natural language simultaneously 
socializes us to its accepted normative standards.19 Arendt makes no such claims; 
however, her assertion that we are conditioned solely by the man-made objects we 
encounter in the world is decidedly too limited and, therefore, is engaged and 
expanded in the course of this project.  
It will also be my contention that Arendt delineates two different types of 
narratives within the text of The Human Condition. The first is the enacted story that I 
just described. What agents disclose through the enacting of their stories will be, 
however, only ephemeral and fleeting unless they are witnessed by a spectator who 
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is moved to memorialize them in some enduring form: a monument, a work of art or, 
most important to this study, “sayings of poetry, the written page or the printed book.” 
Thus, the second type of narrative delineated by Arendt is a retrospective account 
that serves to document the context, structure and meaning of those revelatory 
words and deeds, as well as any state of affairs that arises as a result. 
My second contribution to knowledge will entail expanding Arendt’s theory of 
action by offering a more cogent account of embodiment than the one she provides. I 
will begin by examining what Arendt terms “reification,” which is the process through 
which the words and deeds of existential agents are transformed into artifactual 
objects by the spectators. While Karl Marx argued that reification was a form of 
alienation between the worker and the products of his labor endemic to modern, 
capitalist societies, Arendt reconceived it as being a deeply intersubjective process 
involving “remembrance.” Remembrance occurs when the spectators see, hear and 
commit to memory what they witnessed and then are moved to memorialize those 
words and deeds in the enduring form of a reified object. However, this construction 
reveals itself to be deeply problematic when, upon close examination of The Human 
Condition, it becomes evident that Arendt’s agents are presented as being all but 
completely disembodied, thus leading us to question how their story can be enacted 
in such a manner as to evoke the kind of response from a spectator that Arendt 
describes. I will, therefore, offer a new account and a revised interpretation of 
Arendtian embodiment that will remain grounded in the text of The Human Condition, 
while being informed by other works from her canon, as well as scholarship from the 
field of social cognition. 
Finally, I will offer something that Arendt never dares to: a concrete, historical 
example that both closely matches, and meaningfully expands, on her theories of 
action, remembrance and reification in The Human Condition. Specifically, I will focus 
on the story of Ruby Bridges, an African-American first-grader who was the sole 
black student enrolled at the William Frantz Elementary School in New Orleans, 
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Louisiana in the fall of 1960. Because Ruby had been court ordered to attend William 
Frantz with the intention of integrating it, her presence was not welcome. As such, 
her day began and ended with navigating the crowd that gathered to taunt her with 
racial slurs and threats. Her reaction to these events demonstrates how closely she 
matches Arendt’s description of an existential agent who reveals herself in ways 
which are new, unique, authentic and in contradiction to many of the normatively 
accepted socio-cultural standard of her community. I will also examine the media 
through which Ruby’s actions were memorialized, including the book Travels with 
Charley: In Search of America, written by John Steinbeck; the painting “The Problem 
We All Live With,” by Norman Rockwell; and two books about Ruby by Pulitzer Prize 
winner and psychologist, Robert Coles.   
 
Structure of the Project 
I will begin my study by arguing in chapter 2 that Arendt roots her theory of action in 
the concept of natality, and that her construction of that concept is inherently dual, 
containing a primary, biological birth and a second, existential rebirth. Furthermore, I 
will oppose the widely accepted notion that the way in which Arendt constructs her 
concept of natality is tantamount to a rejection of the work of St. Augustine, on whom 
Arendt wrote her dissertation. Instead, I maintain that Arendt was positioning herself 
in opposition to Martin Heidegger’s interpretations of human beings as Sein-zum-
Tode, beings who are existentially oriented towards death. Additionally, since Arendt 
formulates concepts in ways which tend to conflate their historical, institutional and 
phenomenological dimensions, I will undertake an exegesis of The Human Condition, 
elaborating key terms within the text including “labor,” “work,” “action,” “private realm” 
and “public realm.”  
In chapter 3, I will outline John McDowell, Seyla Benhabib and Patricia 
Bowen-Moore’s interpretations of the dual natality. I will then offer my own analysis of 
the process through which one actualizes the potential inherent in her primary, 
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biological birth and, in doing so, undertakes a second, existential natality by revealing 
herself to others as a unique individual by initiating something new and unpredicted 
in the world. Utilizing exegesis’s offered by Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, 
my focus will then shift away from the subjective experience of the existential agent, 
herself, and towards a more thorough examination of the words and deeds which 
comprise Arendtian action, as well as the intersubjective relationships between 
existential agents.  
In order to elucidate Arendt’s concept of remembrance and reification, 
chapter 4 will center on the interactions that occur between the existential agents and 
the spectators who witness the stories they enact. Remembrance is the seeing, 
hearing and recollecting of the existential agents’ second natality by the spectators. It 
is, however, more than the basic, cognitive processing of sensory input. Instead, it 
requires the engagement of a special kind of thinking which, while certainly 
imaginative, remains critical, reflective and fact-based. The enduring and artifactual 
product of this kind of thought are works of reification, objects which are 
transcendent of any use value and created by a special class of workers: artist, 
poets, historiographers and monument-builders.20 I compare Arendt’s concept of 
reification with that of Karl Marx, Georg Lukács and Axel Honneth, and then identify 
problems that arise vis-á-vis the embodiment of existential agents, as well as 
Arendt’s construction of the mechanism through which the spectators make 
judgments about the events they witness.   
In chapter 5, I will introduce research from the field of social cognition and, 
specifically, the three developmental components that comprise Interaction Theory: 
primary intersubjectivity, secondary intersubjectivity and narrative competency. I will 
utilize scholarship on primary intersubjectivity, as well as work from within Arendt’s 
canon, to construct a new understanding of embodied action as effectively and 
affectively expressive to an observer. I will then build on that discussion by 
rehearsing some of the key finding advanced in research on secondary 
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intersubjectivity concerning the inherent synergy between self, others and the things 
of the world, before relating these finding to the theory of spectator judgment found 
within the text of The Human Condition.  
In chapter 6, I will turn to the third developmental component of Interaction 
Theory, narrative competency, in order to support my assertion that the dynamic 
between the agent and the spectator is a special kind of interaction which mimics the 
basic form of a conversation, is temporally extended and situated within a broader 
socio-cultural framework. I will then posit that The Human Condition contains both an 
explicitly stated theory concerning the way in which we are conditioned to the 
accepted social customs, habits of discourse and patterns of behavior of our 
inherited tradition, as well as implicit theory concerning the means by which those 
normative standards are changed.  
Chapter 7 will center on Ruby Bridges’s integration of the William Frantz 
Elementary School, and reifications of that event by John Steinbeck, Norman 
Rockwell and Robert Coles as illustrative of the theoretical work presented in the 
preceding chapters. I will then offer a summary of the work I’ve presented, as well as 
highlighting my contributions to knowledge. I will conclude by indicating future areas 
of research. After all, as Arendt rightly notes, any ending—be it of a given historical 
period, an accepted cultural tradition, a whole civilization or, in this case, a 
dissertation—is the genesis of new beginnings through which the human mind may 
again engage “in nothing less than an interminable dialogue between itself and the 
essence of everything that is.”21       
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CHAPTER 2  
OUR BIO-ONTOLOGICAL NATALITY 
 
The Birth of Natality 
In a special 1977 issue of the journal Social Research dedicated to the work of 
Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, Arendt’s longtime friend and fellow philosopher, stated 
that “[w]ith ‘natality’, Arendt not only coined a new word but introduced a new 
category into the philosophical doctrine of man.”1 In order to fully appreciate Jonas’ 
assessment three things must be understood about Arendtian natality. First, Arendt 
did not come to the concept ex nihilo. Instead, like much else in her canon, Arendt’s 
understanding of natality finds its origin in the work of St. Augustine. Second, the 
Arendtian concept of natality is constructed in such a manner as to make it inherently 
dual. There is a primary, biological birth and a second, existential rebirth. Third, it is 
within this dual natality that a cogent account of Arendtian action must be rooted. I 
will now address each of these points in turn, being with the relationship between 
Arendt’s theory of natality and the work of St. Augustine.  
Arendt began studying Augustine’s work at the University of Berlin after being 
expelled from secondary school at age fifteen for leading a student boycott. At the 
university, Arendt took classes in Greek, Latin and Christian theology.2 The last of 
these subjects was taught by Romano Guardini, a Catholic priest, author and 
academic who was seeking to develop a comprehensive, Catholic worldview 
grounded in the “distinctly Christian” aspects of the literary, philosophical and 
biographical writings of Dostoevsky, Rilke and Dante, as well as Pascal, Kierkegaard 
and St. Augustine.3 Arendt’s exposure to these authors, as well as to Guardini’s 
process of inquiry, influenced her greatly and she chose to major in theology.4 The 
next year, when Arendt began attending Marburg University, she switched her 
course of study from theology to philosophy. She did not, however, stray too far from 
her original discipline, choosing the work of Augustine as her dissertation topic.5  
11 
Although her focus was on Augustine’s concept of love, Arendt’s dissertation 
research is where she began to understand and develop natality as not just a 
biological, but also a philosophical, category.  
In her biography, Hannah Arendt: For the Love of the World, Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl twice addresses the topic of Arendt’s dissertation and, both times, she 
comments on this development. It is important to note that within each of Young-
Bruehl brief discussions on the matter, the concept of natality is linked to Arendt’s 
early study of Augustine, but quickly reframed as having lasting meaning only 
because of her experience in Nazi Germany. In the first reference, which is found 
within the main body of the biography, but is comparatively brief, Young-Bruehl 
asserts that Arendt was concerned with  
what she would later call “natality.” She had the beginnings of an awareness 
that we are shaped fundamentally by the conditions of our births, by our 
Neighborhood, by the group we are a part of by virtue of birth. What Arendt 
learned while she wrote her dissertation—learned from living, not from 
reading—was that, by birth, she was a Jew.6 
In Young-Bruehl’s second reference to Arendt’s dissertation—which is longer, but is 
relegated to the book’s last appendix where it follows illustrations of Arendt’s family 
tree and texts of her poems in German—Young-Bruehl states: “Hannah Arendt’s 
concern for natality…emerged in her study of Saint Augustine but it was later brought 
urgently to the center of her thought by her political experiences.”7  
Since Young-Bruehl’s attempt to minimize the relationship between the 
Bishop of Hippo and the development of Arendt’s philosophical doctrine of natality is 
not an uncommon one among scholars, it is, therefore, reasonable to ask why this 
separation is sought.8 In their interpretive essay on Arendt’s dissertation, Joanna 
Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark point towards the answer. They state:  
Taking Augustine as seriously as Arendt did has not before now been an 
acceptable approach among mainstream Arendt scholars. Most demarcate 
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an “early” Arendt, who was influenced by Augustine only through the medium 
of her mentors’ German phenomenology, from a “mature” Arendt, who set 
aside the idylls of her youth for a public philosophy of word and deed 
influenced more by Aristotle, Kant, and Tocqueville than by Christian 
Existenz.9 
In other words, scholars have characterized concepts that appear both in the 
dissertation and in Arendt’s “mature” works as having been completely reformulated 
in the ensuing years in order to free them from a looming specter. This haunting 
presence is not, as one would reasonably suspect, the spirit of St. Augustine. 
Instead, it is the shadow cast by the work of Martin Heidegger. 
Arendt was deeply involved with Heidegger during her university years, 
attending many lectures in which he worked out the concepts explicated (in 
notoriously painful detail) within his magnum opus, Being and Time.10 Although she 
ultimately wrote her dissertation under the direction of Karl Jaspers, it is reflective, 
both in subject and style, of material Heidegger produced during the same period. 
Since Arendt scholars possess an almost universal fear of her work being subsumed 
by Heidegger’s legacy, they maintain an uncomfortable relationship with Arendt’s 
material from this early period, including the dissertation.11 The odd result is that 
Augustine’s influence is continually negated in service of separating Arendt from 
Heidegger. 
Of course, this begs the question of both Augustine and Heidegger’s true 
relationship to Arendt’s formulation of natality as a philosophical category, a question 
that necessitates turning to the dissertation itself. It should be noted, however, that 
studying Arendt’s dissertation is an exceptionally arduous task. In fact, in 1962, 
Arendt signed a contract with Crowell-Collier to publish a revised version. However, 
by the time the firestorm over her coverage of the trial of Adolph Eichmann for The 
New Yorker erupted in 1963, she had all but abandoned her attempts to shape the 
paper into a publishable manuscript. As a result, the version of the dissertation I used 
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was not published until 1996. It contains Copy A—which is the 1960s translation from 
German into English by E. B. Ashton, plus Arendt’s initial revisions—intermingled 
with Copy B, which is comprised of further amendments by Arendt to Copy A, some 
of which she typed and some of which she overwrote by hand. Besides the large 
amount of forensic work done by the editors in order to piece together the two texts, 
both Copy A and Copy B underwent further revision prior to publication in 1996 in 
order to enhance the grammatical and syntactical clarity, address issues with 
translation and correct errors in the footnotes.12  
In the sections from Copy A of Arendt’s dissertation on Augustine, it is clear 
that she had been studying closely with Heidegger as he worked out his formulation 
of Dasein. In the German vernacular, Dasein is most often used to mean “existence.” 
However, its literal translation, “being-there,” offers a better sense of Heidegger’s use 
of the word to indicate a human being who encounters and interprets Being (Sein) 
from his distinct, temporal position. One of the ways in which this encounter takes 
place is through Dasein’s experience as Sein-zum-Tode, a Being-towards-death: 
“Death is a way to be, which Dasein [the individual] takes over as soon as it is.” 
Heidegger then adds this quote that, strangely enough, is from a book on the 
German education system: “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough 
to die.”13  
In Copy A of her dissertation, Arendt juxtaposes the notion of the Creator 
against his “creature,” the human being. The Creator is pure Being: immutable, 
eternal, unalterable; conversely, the creature is defined in large part by the fact of 
being temporally located. Additionally, when Arendt makes implicit reference to the 
theme of natality in Copy A—”Whatever the creature is it had first to become.”—it is 
with the caveat that humans orient themselves away from that beginning and 
towards their deaths.14 While Arendt’s formulation of the concept of Being found in 
Copy A is decidedly more Augustinian than Heideggerian—since she equates Being 
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with a particular entity: God—her conception of the human being is strikingly similar 
to Heidegger’s Dasein.  
By the time Arendt wrote “What is Existenz Philosophy?” her first essay in 
English, published in 1946, she was becoming critical of Heidegger’s formulation of 
humans as beings oriented towards their deaths.  
To the question of the meaning of Being he [Heidegger] has provided the 
provisional and inherently unintelligible answer that temporality is the 
meaning of Being. This implies—and his analysis of Dasein (i.e., the being of 
man) as conditioned by death spells out—that the meaning of Being is 
nothingness.”15    
In an extended note at the end of the text, Arendt even goes so far as to question the 
relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political alignment with the Nazi 
party.16 What she had not yet begun to do in earnest, however, was formulate an 
alternative to Sein-zum-Tode. Evidence of such activity would not be found in 
Arendt’s canon until the publication of her first book-length work five years after 
“What is Existenz Philosophy?” 
Published in 1951, The Origins of Totalitarianism is Arendt’s analysis of 
Nazism and Stalinism. It was written in the midst of what Arendt identified as “the 
calm that settles when all hopes have died,” and when “all efforts to escape from the 
grimness of the present into a nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated 
oblivion of a better future, are vain.” 17 As such, the book maintains an 
understandably dark tone throughout, including when Arendt engages the issue of 
natality. Specifically, Arendt posits birth as having importance because it delivers us 
into a preexisting context—ethnically, culturally, socially, etc.—with which we are 
inextricably identified thereafter. Despite arguing that these predetermined affiliations 
often do not work in our favor, Arendt demonstrates that she is starting to consider 
an entirely different interpretation of natality. In the very last paragraph of the book, 
she returns to the work of St. Augustine and, in doing so, foreshadows the more 
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optimistic direction her writing will soon take—birth as the ontological root for other 
kinds of new beginnings: 
But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains 
a new beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only “message” that the 
end can ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the 
supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom. Initum 
ut esset homo creatus est—”that a beginning be made man was created” said 
Augustine. This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every 
man.18 
Planning a trip to Germany four years after the publication of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism to see Karl Jaspers, the man who once served as her dissertation 
advisor, Arendt’s optimism continued to grow. In anticipation of her visit, Jaspers 
wrote Arendt a letter expressing his excitement in discussing matters of philosophy 
and politics. He said, “You bring with you shared memories of a lost past. You bring 
the wide world as it is today.”19 Arendt replied, “Yes, I would like to bring the wide 
world to you this time. I’ve begun so late, really only in recent years, to truly love the 
world that I shall be able to do that now. Out of gratitude, I want to call my next book 
on political theories ‘Amor Mundi.’”20 When Arendt’s next book was published in 
1958, the title was no longer Amor Mundi, for love of the world, but The Human 
Condition.  
The Human Condition bore no dedication, but in 1960 Arendt sent a German 
translation to Heidegger with a note reading: 
Dear Martin,  
I have instructed the publisher to send you a book of mine. I would like to say 
a word about it.  
You will see that the book does not contain a dedication. If things had ever 
worked out properly between us—and I mean between, that is, neither you 
nor me—I would have asked you if I might dedicate it to you; it came directly 
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out of the first Freiberg days and hence owes practically everything to you in 
every respect. As things are, I did not think it was possible, but I wanted to 
mention the bare facts to you in one way or another. 
All the best! 21 
Despite Arendt and Heidegger being back on speaking terms by the time she sent 
the book and note, there was no response from Heidegger for five years. Arendt 
interpreted the silence as him giving her a “rap on the nose” for no longer maintaining 
her role as his eternally admiring student before abruptly putting an end to the 
charade.22  
Although undoubtedly heartfelt, I believe Arendt’s explanation of Heidegger’s 
icy reception of the book is incomplete. After all, the work that “came directly out of 
the first Freiberg days and hence owes practically everything to you in every 
respect,” is no homage. Instead, it is within The Human Condition that Arendt picks 
up where The Origins of Totalitarianism concluded, even employing the same quote 
by Augustine as she offers her most complete account of natality as a philosophical 
doctrine. Unlike in The Origins of Totalitarianism, however, Arendt makes it very 
clear that she is now working fully in opposition to Heidegger’s interpretation of 
human beings as Sein-zum-Tode.  
The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything 
human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and 
beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-
present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die 
but in order to begin.23  
When she returned to work on Copy B of her dissertation a couple of years after The 
Human Condition was published, Arendt went one step further, doing the one thing 
that she had avoided doing in that text—she addressed her former teacher by name.  
In Copy B of the dissertation, Arendt states: “it is memory [of having come into 
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existence] and not expectation (for instance, the expectation of death as in 
Heidegger’s approach) that gives unity and wholeness to human existence.”24  
Arendt’s direct attacks on the role human mortality plays in Heidegger’s 
philosophy brings us back to the question of why scholars have insisted that Arendt’s 
“mature” works are tantamount to a rejection of Augustine when, in actuality, she 
continually employs and expands on his work in order to posit birth, and not death, 
as the ultimate existential possibility. I believe the answer is strikingly simple. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, what scholars such as Young-Bruehl seem to fear 
the most is having Arendt’s intellectual legacy become little more than a footnote to 
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Needless to say, this fear may be well founded if 
one were to consider only Arendt’s earliest works, which do bear notable similarities 
in subject and style to material Heidegger produced during the same period. While 
some of Arendt’s later writing—such as The Human Condition and Copy B of her 
dissertation—do retain links to her previous works and, therefore, remain referential 
to Heidegger’s philosophy, by that point in her career, Arendt was largely a critic 
instead of apologetic.  
This perspectival shift does not, however, seem to lessen the need felt by 
many scholars to separate Arendt’s intellectual legacy from Heidegger’s. To that end, 
some have taken a direct, if not hyperbolic, approach. For instance, in the tribute 
piece published in Social Research immediately after Arendt’s death, Hans 
Morgenthau stated: “From what philosophic and political point of view did Hannah 
Arendt approach the disparate topics of her investigations? While she was trained by 
Heidegger and Jaspers and maintained close personal relations with them, one 
would have to search very carefully for direct influences traceable to these two giants 
of modern philosophy.”25 Other commentators, however, have simply turned 
Heidegger into he-who-shall-not-be-named, choosing instead to attack him through 
an unlikely surrogate: the Bishop of Hippo.  
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Of course, as I have sought to demonstrate, the problem with conflating the 
influence of Augustine and Heidegger is two-fold. First, there is nothing in Arendt’s 
canon that supports any kind of anti-Augustine claim and, second, acting as though 
there is, robs us of the fullest possible understanding of Arendtian natality by rending 
it from the context in which it was conceived. Instead, I believe we would be better 
served by acknowledging fully the influence of both Augustine and Heidegger, and 
then turning our attention to that which allowed Hans Jonas to declare Arendt’s 
concept of natality to be a new category in the philosophical doctrine of man: namely, 
that Arendtian natality is constructed in such a manner as to make it inherently dual, 
encompassing both a primary, biological birth and a second, existential rebirth.26   
In order to better understand Arendt’s dual natality, it is necessary to 
recognize that she delineates three types of human activity—labor, work and 
action—and two spaces in which those activities occur: the private realm and the 
public realm. Since Arendt circumscribes concepts in ways that tend to conflate their 
historical, institutional and phenomenological dimensions, it is now my intention to 
map the philosophical topography of the text in such a way as to clarify, as much as 
is possible, the boundaries of these key conceptual territories.  
 
The Private Realm, Labor and Our Bio-Ontological Natality 
In The Human Condition, Arendt posits a primary, biological birth and a second, 
existential rebirth. Our primary, biological birth brings us into Arendt’s “private realm,” 
a space rooted in a concrete, historical reference point: the ancient Greek oỉkía or 
home and, slightly broader, the boundaries separating one household from the 
other.27 The oỉkía was ruled by the paterfamilias, the head of the family who, through 
violence or the threat of violence, assured that the biological processes necessary for 
meeting his basic needs, as well as those of his family, were fulfilled before heading 
out into the public realm of the polis to be among his equals, the other familial 
patriarchs. Arendt builds on this specific understanding of the private realm, 
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expanding it to become a trans-historic, conceptual space that contains and 
constrains activities related to what she terms “labor.” Tasks related to Arendtian 
labor largely correlate either to our primary natality or to the monotonous effort that 
comes thereafter from the fulfillment of life-sustaining, biological necessity. I will now 
address each of these types of labor in turn. 
It is via the literal laboring of our mothers through which we are all born into 
the private realm. Despite this fact, Arendt invests little space within the text of The 
Human Condition discussing the physical realities of our arrival. In an extended 
footnote, she comments that in Latin, Greek, English, French and German, the word 
“labor” signifies the pain and effort of bodily exertion, as well as the actual pangs of 
childbirth. She also makes etymological connections between various translations of 
the word “labor” and the terms “poverty,” “neglect” and “abandonment.”28 Later in the 
text, Arendt says that it is women “who with their bodies guarantee the physical 
survival of the species.” In the ancient world, this meant that “Women and slaves 
belonged to the same category and were hidden away not only because they were 
somebody else’s property but because their life was ‘laborious,’ devoted to bodily 
functions.”29 
Given that Arendt’s representation of the acts of laboring and birthing are 
both limited in scope and negative in tone, it is not surprising that she was, and 
remains, a lightning rod for feminist theorists. According to Mary G. Dietz’s excellent 
analysis in Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, and Politics, thinkers including 
Adrienne Rich, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin and Mary O’Brien have argued that The 
Human Condition exposes Arendt as part of the lineage of thinkers who, in “failing to 
analyze the significance of reproductive consciousness,” continue to justify the 
subordination of women to men and the idealizing of that which is identified with 
maleness.30 The problem with these readings is, most minimally, that Arendt was not 
a feminist. She did, in fact, express concern about any movement that focused on 
issues endemic to a single group, be they women or, to offer another example which 
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I will discuss in the final chapter of this paper, African-Americans during the civil 
rights era.31  
Of course, I do not wish to imply that it is necessary to ascribe to any given 
ideology for it to be used to critique one’s work, nor does it mean that those who are 
doing so are completely off-base.32 However, in this case, I believe that many of 
these feminist thinkers are choosing to ignore the fact that, like much else in The 
Human Condition, biological birth is a starting point that becomes relevant as a 
philosophical category through Arendt’s conceptual broadening. As such, while 
Arendt must still acknowledged that only a woman can gestate and deliver a child, 
she devotes the most minimal attention to the grunt and groan aspects of our arrival. 
Her real interest, after all, lies in casting our biological birth as the ontological 
grounding from which springs both the possibility of living a fully human life and, as 
she emphasizes in works published after The Human Condition, guarantees the 
continuance of a shared, common world.   
For Arendt, living a fully human life—a bios, as opposed to zoë, an 
undifferentiated place within the animal species homo sapiens—means 
distinguishing one’s self as a unique individual by “beginning something new on our 
own initiative,” and doing so within a web of intersubjective relations and 
interactions.33 According to Arendt, this new beginning “is like a second birth,” a 
natality that is not biological but existential. 34 The ability to begin something new, 
however, remains inexorably linked to our biological birth.    
Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men 
take initiative, are prompted into action. [Initium] ergo ut esset, creatus est 
homo, ante quern nullus fuit (“that there be a beginning, man was created 
before whom there was nobody”), said Augustine in his political philosophy. 
This beginning is not the same as the beginning of the world; it is not the 
beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself. With the 
creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of 
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course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was 
created when man was created but not before.35 
It should be noted that this passage—as well as the one found at the end of Origins 
of Totalitarianism and writings appearing within a few years after publication of The 
Human Condition—relies solely on Augustine’s theology and fails to offer any 
meaningful phenomenological or existential justification as to why our biological 
natality holds the power to ontologically root other kinds of new beginnings.36 In the 
absence of such an explanation by Arendt, I propose that our birth is bio-ontological 
in this way because it is our original experience of differentiation.  
In short, it is my assertion that we do not choose to be conceived. Once we 
are, our prenatal experience is constrained by our mother. Not only are we 
completely dependent upon her for our continued development from fetus to neonate 
(abortion, after all, is at her discretion), what we taste, hear, see—as well as our 
exposure to more insidious elements such as environmental toxins or biochemicals 
triggered by her reactions to factors such as stress—happen in the womb without 
any element of control on our part. With birth, comes the original occurrence of 
differentiation. Of course, a neonate is very much still dependent on the caregiver, 
but this is not the same as being part of the caregiver. Instead, a baby is born ready 
and able to interact with others as others: discerning human faces from other non-
human objects in the environment, mimicking gestures and expressions on those 
faces, and responding to vocalizations.37 A neonate also responds to the worldly 
environment that she is now experiencing directly and not, literally, through her 
mother: when startled by a sound or sudden movement, a baby will throw her arms 
and legs outward, and her head back. Discomfort caused by temperature, unmet 
nutritional needs or fatigue will lead a baby to cry. A gentle stroke of the cheek 
causes a baby to respond by moving her head in ever-tightening arcs until she 
locates the object-of-touch with her mouth.  
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Although innate or reflexive, all of the actions I just described indicate a 
responsive being who is engaging actively and directly with others and with the 
world. With few exceptions, this responsiveness began with her biological birth, 
which, while not the beginning of her life, is “the fundamental leap of coming into the 
world in a new mode of existence, through which the already living organism gets a 
new being constitution.”38 This transition is our first experience of differentiation, our 
first experience of ourselves as distinct from other agents and objects, and grounds 
the possibility for other alterations of our being-constitution that will differentiate us 
even further. No degree of differentiation will, however, free us from fetters of 
biological necessity.  
 
Labor and the Fulfillment of Biological Necessity  
Although an individual moves from birth to death linearly, the biological processes 
necessary for maintaining that life are cyclical. For example, just because you ate 
lunch yesterday does not mean you can forgo eating lunch today; the activity must 
be continually repeated in order for your body to thrive. As such, “the laboring activity 
itself must follow the cycle of life, the circular movement of our bodily functions, 
which means that the laboring activity never comes to an end as long as life lasts; it 
is endlessly repetitive.”39 The second aspect of Arendtian labor has to do with these 
repetitive tasks and, specifically, the three distinct approaches Arendt delineates for 
how those tasks may be executed.    
First, the tasks of labor may be performed as an indicator of self-sufficiency. 
For illustrative purposes, Arendt uses the text of the Odyssey, citing the example of a 
king’s daughter, Nausicaä, who does the family laundry, a physically demanding and 
menial job that would not have normally been performed by a princess. Arendt 
clarifies that “No work is sordid if it means greater independence; the selfsame 
activity might well be a sign of slavishness if not personal independence but sheer 
survival is at stake.”40 Conversely, the second way in which laborious work may be 
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executed is by people who do not willingly choose to perform such tasks, but are 
instead forced to undertake them through some combination of socio-historical 
circumstances. Arendt refers to this group via a term co-opted from Karl Marx: animal 
laborans. Marx used the term in opposition to animal rationale because, in his 
estimation, it was labor and not reason that distinguished humans from other 
animals. However, Arendt uses it pejoratively—those doing the work of necessity are 
not fully human. In fact, she states quite bluntly that the “animal laborans is indeed 
only one, at best the highest, of the animal species which populate the earth.”41  
It is indeed possible to be critical of Arendt for the ways in which she 
represents the animal laborans and the tasks with which they are identified. 
However, before judging Arendt too harshly, several things must be considered. 
First, The Human Condition is a trans-historic study of key concepts; however, that 
study does depart from literal reference points that, as a rule, Arendt addresses as 
they are given historically. As such, labor—as an Arendtian category—uses ancient 
Greek slave-labor as its starting point, and draws heavily on Aristotle’s argument that 
slavery was a natural state for some people who, like beasts of burden, have 
powerful bodies but an inability to control their own instincts. Second, Arendt 
acknowledges that the animal laborans possess positive qualities that are theirs 
alone. Among these are fecundity, closeness to nature and the ability to experience 
true happiness, which she believes cannot be attained any other way except through 
the expending of bodily effort and then the immediacy of gratification that comes from 
production and consumption being so closely bound.42 Third, there is no reason to 
believe—as will be made clear in the course of this project—that Arendt assumed it 
to be impossible for an animal laboran to distinguish himself as a unique individual by 
initiating something completely new and unpredicted in the world; in other words, to 
live a fully human life. 
Should it still seem at this point that Arendt was classist, consider that the 
third way in which Arendt describes the performance of the activities of labor has to 
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do with jobholders and businessmen who, despite holding positions that often are 
regarded with great esteem within society, undertake their work with a laborious 
attitude. In other words, they toil to “make a living,” a phrase that underscores the 
relationship between wage-earning and survival. Additionally, for the jobholders and 
businessmen, the positive attributes of vitality, abundance and gratification, which 
come from a life of bodily effort, are lost.43 Instead, Arendt describes a dazed and de-
individualized form of acquiescence that evokes the dumbed-down passivity of 
barnyard animals trying to avoid being culled from the herd.44 It is not a pretty picture, 
but it is certainly one that discourages any reading of Arendt as someone who thinks 
that the white-collar elites in corner offices automatically hold a place of prestige over 
the farmer or factory worker.    
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that whatever is produced through labor is 
immediately consumed either through absorption or, if that does not take place 
quickly enough, decay. This is correct in the sense that labor produces no thing that 
is durable; however, what Karl Marx discovered and articulated, is that the 
productivity of labor does not lie in the consumptive items themselves, “but in the 
human ‘power,’ whose strength is not exhausted when it has produced the means of 
its own subsistence and survival but is capable of producing a ‘surplus,’ that is, more 
than is necessary for its own ‘reproduction.’”45 In other words, those who labor are 
able to create more of the goods of necessity than they, themselves, need. This is 
true whether it is one woman giving birth to five children—which is more than enough 
progeny to replace her and her mate when they die; Nausicaä, doing laundry for her 
entire family; a farmer growing food to feed himself and his relatives, and still sending 
goods to market; or even a single businessman handling the financial transactions of 
multiple clients. The excess in production means that other people can use the 
products of labor, but are free from producing those items for themselves. In this 
way, the consumers may be liberated from the labor-activities necessary for the 
maintenance of their individual lives.  
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What no one is ever completely free from, however, is the space where the 
activities of labor occur: the private realm, itself. Besides the processes necessary for 
the perpetuation and maintenance of human existence—some of which simply 
cannot be outsourced through the labor-power of another—the private realm also 
serves as a sheltering space, protecting the more fragile and ephemeral of human 
experiences. Included among these experiences is both birth and death. Although 
much is known about the science of these organic processes—especially in this era 
of ever-advancing reproductive technologies—they still contain an aspect of pure 
mystery. After all, as Arendt rightly notes “man does not know where he comes from 
when he is born and where he goes when he dies.”46 Thus, birth and death are 
housed in the private realm because it is the space that “harbors the things hidden 
from human eyes and impenetrable to human knowledge.”47 In addition to birth and 
death, Arendt also houses love in the private realm, because it is “killed, or rather 
extinguished, the moment it is displayed in public.”48 Additionally, good works must 
remain hidden; if they appear—and, in this instance, that even means making 
themselves known to the mind of the doer—they become acts of charity or solidarity, 
and forfeit their essential character.49 Finally, the private realm protects against 
shallowness of character, which is the outcome of a life lived entirely in the presence 
of others, where there is no escape from being seen and heard.50     
Because we are all born and die, are subject to biological necessity, 
experience friendship, pain and love, every one of us inhabits the private realm. 
Likewise, we all dwell within Arendt’s “public realm.” Much as the private realm is an 
often conflated mix of historical, institutional and phenomenological dimensions—the 
ancient Greek oỉkía, the space of labor, a needed refuge from the unrelenting glare 
of public display—the boundaries of Arendt’s public realm are also difficult to 
circumscribe. Seyla Benhabib, in her book The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah 
Arendt, describes the public realm as having “two phenomenological dimensions.” 
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These are “(a) its quality as a space of appearance and (b) its quality of being a 
common world.”51  
I will now address each of these phenomenological dimensions in turn, and 
will begin my exegesis by employing the work of analytic philosopher John 
McDowell. While McDowell and Arendt sit on seemingly opposite sides of the 
philosophical fence, their areas of inquiry overlap in interesting ways: three major 
themes identified in McDowell’s work—“(i) perceptual experience, (ii) normativity or 
rationality, and (iii) nature”—are also central to Arendt’s writings.52 Furthermore, they 
share an interest in a philosophical project which McDowell describes as such: “to 
stand on the shoulders of the giant, Kant, and see our way to the supersession of 
traditional philosophy that he almost managed, though not quite.”53 While Arendt’s 
work on Kant centers around his theory of judgment, McDowell seeks to 
conceptualize Kant’s notion of spontaneity, which McDowell argues can take a 
satisfactory form only in the context of what he terms a “second nature.”  McDowell’s 
theory of the second nature shares, as will be illustrated in this chapter, affinity with 
Arendt’s construction of our existential natality.54 These commonalities make it useful 
to place McDowell’s work in conversation with Arendt’s in order to help clarify several 
key concepts found in The Human Condition, including Arendt’s construction of the 
common world. 
 
The Work of Our Hands: Building a Common World  
In his book Mind and World, John McDowell argues that “mere animals,” by which he 
means other-than-human animals, live in an environment. Taking his definition from 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, an environment is nothing more than a series of problems 
and opportunities that present themselves as the animal attempts to fulfill its 
biological imperatives. Of course, the animal does not recognize the environment as 
such, because it does not possess the conceptual capacity to reflect on its situation. 
This formulation of the environment-dweller extends beyond other-than-human 
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animals to both neonates and to human beings who exist within what McDowell 
terms “a merely animal mode of life.”55 His description of this mode of life is similar to 
Arendt’s description of the animal laborans.  
Also in accord with Arendt, McDowell goes on to explicate a kind of dual 
natality, although he never employs such language. His formulation begins with a 
biological birth that is ontologically imbued with the possibility of future self-
determination; specifically, he states that babies are born into an environment 
because “Human infants are mere animals, distinctive only in their potential.”56 In his 
schema, “normal human maturation includes the acquisition of a second nature, 
which involves responsiveness to meaning.”57 The acquisition of this second nature 
transforms at least some of us into what McDowell terms “thinkers and intentional 
agents.” He warns that this process is not a mysterious one, but instead is the normal 
outcome of Bildung.58  
In his essay “Bildung and Second Nature,” Rüdiger Bubner seeks to 
contextualize the concept of Bildung. 
Indeed the concept of Bildung played a decisive role in classical German 
philosophy from Herder to Wilhelm von Humbolt. The original meaning of the 
word Bildung was something like “formed according to an inner picture 
(exemplar or original model).” From then on the concept signified a program 
of cultural formation and development…. Bildung takes place in the 
upbringing and civilizing of the subject, who must emerge from a state of 
being driven by instinct with intelligible and recognizable forms of social 
behavior. In relation to the subject, Bildung means the discovery of 
possibilities and capacities whereby character is shaped, not only in the 
direction of a socially fixed and pre-given idea of virtue, but in the acquisition 
of a personality.”59  
In his response to Bubner, McDowell sets his interpretation against the Aristotelian 
model, which informed the construction of the concept of Bildung in classical German 
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philosophy, and which idealized human beings who were “unreflectively excellent 
occupants of fixed social roles.”60 He takes this step in order to emphasize further the 
importance his interpretation places on “the acquisition of an individual personality,” 
which “coheres with valuing a critical individuality.”61   
McDowell’s second natality or, to use his terminology, acquisition of a second 
nature through Bildung, brings us into the “world.” According to McDowell, occupying 
a world means that we no longer experience our surroundings solely in terms of 
problems or opportunities for fulfilling biological needs but, instead, develop a 
contemplative attitude marked by intellectual freedom and distance.62 In this way, the 
difference between McDowell’s environment and world seems, at least at first brush, 
like nothing more than the difference between a non-conceptual, animal mode of 
perception, and a conceptual mode of human perception. However, McDowell goes 
on to explain that simply possessing the theoretical capacity necessary to 
understand our locale in a different way is not enough to actually build a world out of 
an environment. Instead, the transition “into the ‘free, distanced orientation’ brings 
intentional bodily action on to the scene no less than theoretical activity.”63 In other 
words, when McDowell’s agent acquires his second nature, it is not only a process 
involving the mind, but also the body.  
 McDowell elucidates the importance of intentional bodily action by turning to 
Marx’s writings on alienated labor and the concomitant reduction of human freedom. 
For Marx, this loss of freedom is found in the forfeiting of control over ones’ 
productive activities; in this way, the laborer is no longer intentionally directing his or 
her bodily action, but simply following the mandate of another. Thus, the “part of 
human life that should be most expressive of humanity, namely, productive activity, is 
reduced to the condition of merely animal life, the meeting of merely biological 
needs.”64 When we are living, according to Marx, a life free of alienation, and thus 
are fully human, our productive activities are self-directed; the result is that we will 
make-over what is naturally given into use objects, as well as create objects of art 
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that, McDowell notes, are free from the constraints of usefulness.65  Through this 
brief argument, McDowell is acknowledging that it is necessary, but not sufficient, to 
think differently about our surroundings. We must also translate our ability to theorize 
into objective reality, simultaneously conceptualizing and fabricating our environment 
into a world.  
In Arendt’s writings, the building of a world is done through the activity of 
“work” and is the responsibility of homo faber, the craftspeople and artisans.66 She 
states:  
The work of our hands, as distinguished from the labor or our bodies, 
fabricates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes 
the human artifice, the world we live in. They are not consumer goods but 
use-objects, and their proper use does not cause them to disappear. They 
give the world the stability and solidity without which it could not be relied 
upon to house the unstable and mortal creature that is man.67   
Thus, through his efforts, homo faber creates artifacts that endure past the act of 
their creation, thus expanding human effort beyond merely the navigation of 
opportunities and obstacles present within the environment—which Arendt calls “the 
earth”—and into an act of world-making. Arendt’s understanding of the “world,” 
however, is different than McDowell’s. For him, it is where we find ourselves as a 
result of acquiring our second nature, when Bildung, and especially the process of 
language acquisition, allows us to develop an orientation of freedom and distance 
that are the hallmarks of a contemplative attitude and a fully human life. While his 
world does have a thing-character, it is a secondary outcome of becoming a minded 
agent.68 Arendt’s formulation of the concept of “world” lacks a builder who has 
undergone an existential revelation or has acquired a second nature. Instead, it is 
purely a human artifact, wrought from the earth’s endless repetition of growth and 
decay.  
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Not being the by-products of an existential revelation does not mean, 
however, that the human-made world lacks importance for Arendt. Just as the 
laborer generates more goods than he, himself, needs—meaning others can use 
those consumables without having exerted themselves—homo faber also exerts his 
efforts on behalf of the many in order to build a shared, objective context that 
stabilizes the otherwise subjective nature of existence. Thus, the world is what we 
have in common. It is the part of Arendt’s public realm that we all occupy. Arendt 
explains this phenomenon as follows: 
[T]he term “public” signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of 
us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, 
however, is not identical with the earth or with nature. . . . It is related, rather, 
to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs 
which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live 
together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between 
those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit 
around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the 
same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and 
yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak.69   
It is important to note, but easy to overlook, that besides being a shared, 
objective context the common world is also related to the “affairs which go on among 
those who inhabit the man-made world together.”70 Arendt expands on this idea by 
adding that we inhabit “an environment of things that are not consumed but used, 
and to which, as we use them, we become used and accustomed. As such, they give 
rise to the familiarity of the world, its customs and habits of intercourse between men 
and things as well as between men and men.”71 Arendt is indicating that, although 
the things of the world “owe their existence exclusively to men [, they] nevertheless 
condition their human makers;” at least part of that conditioning includes the 
normatively accepted social customs, habits of discourse and patterns of behavior 
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that govern the occurrences of speech and action through which the plural aspect of 
the common world is realized.72   
 
The Space of Appearance, Action and Our Existential Natality  
Besides having the quality of being a common world, the second phenomenological 
dimension of the public realm is its quality of being a space of appearance. The 
space of appearance accommodates what Arendt terms “action.” Action is the third 
basic condition of human life; the other two, which I have previously discussed, are 
labor and work. Action is comprised of two parts: action and speech, which are 
alternatively referred to as deeds and words. Within Arendt’s system, action and 
speech are virtually inseparable. 
Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and 
specifically human act must always also answer the question asked of every 
newcomer: “Who are you?” The disclosure of “who somebody is” is implicit in 
the fact that speechless action somehow does not exist, or if it exists [it] is 
irrelevant; without speech, action loses the actor, and the doer of deeds is 
possible only to the extent that there is at the same time the speaker of 
words, who identifies himself as the actor and announces what he is doing, 
what he has done, or what he intends to do.73     
Arendt takes her distinction between “who” and “what” from the work of St. 
Augustine. She explains in a footnote in The Human Condition that, according to the 
Bishop of Hippo, the question “Who am I?” is directed internally at one’s self. She 
summarizes Augustine’s answer as “You are a man—whatever that may be.” The 
question of “What am I?” is directed towards God and is a theological inquiry about 
both the nature of man and of the deity. As such, it can be answered only by a divine 
revelation.74 Arendt revises Augustine’s definition, so that “what” I am includes 
personal qualities, talents or shortcomings of character, which I have the ability to 
display or hide at will. For instance, I know that I have a predilection to interrupt 
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others when they are talking. Since it is impolite to do so, I attempt to hide this 
shortcoming by tempering my tendency to interject. In this way, I am able to alter 
“what” I am. Conversely, “who” someone is—their unique, personal, completely 
individual identity or essence—appears clearly to others but is usually hidden from 
the person, herself. Arendt compares “who” we are to the Greek daimōn, the ancient 
spirit who, by always looking over our shoulder from behind, is outside our field of 
vision, but clearly visible to others.75 We cannot willingly choose to expose or conceal 
“who” we are; instead “who” we are is revealed through instances of action.76   
Action, understood as the words and deeds that disclose “who” someone is, 
“‘produces’ stories with or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces 
tangible things.”77 Arendt, however, is clear that these stories—“the enacted stories,” 
as she terms them—are a “living reality” and, therefore, are of an altogether different 
nature than fabricated objects.78 These stories are not performative recountings of 
events that have already occurred. Instead, they reveal the unique identity of the 
actor. Additionally, the words and deeds which produce these stories are not 
possible for an actor who is isolated. Instead, we reveal “who” we are to others, just 
as our daimōn makes itself visible to those we encounter, but not directly to us. In 
this way, one’s unique identity is disclosed within a plurality or what Arendt 
alternately terms the “web of relationships.” When the words and deeds through 
which we enact our story come into being within the web of relationships, a new 
phenomenological space comes into being in order to accommodate the event. This 
is the space of appearance, “where I appear to others as others appear to me, when 
men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance 
explicitly.”79 In this way, the space of appearance is similar to what architect and 
theorist Bernard Tschumi describes as “simultaneously being space and event” or, 
more rightly, a space that “only exists by grace of the happening of events.”80 The 
event is the intersection of two Arendtian categories: the enacted stories and the web 
of relationships.81  
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According to Arendt, when “who” someone is comes into presence within the 
space of appearance, it is “like a second birth in which we confirm and take upon 
ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance.” Arendt goes on to add 
that 
This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not 
prompted by utility, like work. It may be stimulated by the presence of others 
whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its 
impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we were 
born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own 
initiative.82      
Arendt tells us that, although all people are capable of the words and deeds 
necessary to be reborn into the space of appearance, most will not.83After all, as 
Rüdiger Bubner notes, while everyone possesses the means necessary to realize 
their second nature, “it takes a lot of effort to bring it into concrete existence.”84 Of 
course, this begs inquiry into who will and will not experience a second natality and 
for what reasons. In the next chapter I will explore the answers posed to those 
questions by three theorists, again beginning with John McDowell.  
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CHAPTER 3  
POTENTIALITY TO ACTUALITY: OUR EXISTENTIAL NATALITY 
 
Since Arendt circumscribes concepts in ways that tend to conflate their historical, 
institutional and phenomenological dimensions, my intention in chapter 2 was to map 
the philosophical topography of two key, conceptual territories found in The Human 
Condition—the private realm and the public realm—and three types of human 
activity: labor, work and action. According to Arendt, each of us enters the private 
realm through biological birth and the laboring of our mothers. Besides delivering us 
into a physical existence, our biological birth also contains the ontological grounding 
from which springs both the possibility of living a fully human life and, as Arendt 
explicates more fully in works written after The Human Condition, guarantees the 
continuance of a shared, common world.   
As noted by Seyla Benhabib, the Arendtian public realm has two 
manifestations. The first is the common world and the second is the space of 
appearance. The common world is created through the work of homo faber and is 
comprised of artifacts that endure beyond the act of their creation, as well as the 
occurrences of speech and action through which the plural aspect of the common 
world is realized. The space of appearance is constituted by the meeting of two 
Arendtian categories: the enacted story and the web of relationships.1 For Arendt, we 
distinguish ourselves as a unique individual by initiating something new and 
unpredicted in the world; this is done through the words and deeds which are the 
enactments of stories.2 We cannot, however, enact our story in solitude; doing so 
requires a plurality, a web of relationships. When the action and speech of an 
enacted story occurs within the web of relationships, the space of appearance opens 
to accommodate the event. Entering this space is “like a second birth,” one that is 
existential instead of biological.3  
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In this chapter, I will be outlining theses posited by John McDowell, Seyla 
Benhabib and Patricia Bowen-Moore, all of whom offer similar interpretations of the 
dual natality. I will then offer objections to their formulations before explicating my 
argument for the way in which one actualizes the potential inherent in his or her 
primary, bio-ontological birth and, in doing so, undertakes a second, existential 
natality. My focus will then shift away from the subjective experience of the existential 
actor, herself, and towards a more thorough examination of the nature of the words 
and deeds that are central to undertaking an existential rebirth, as well as the 
interactions occurring between those agents who are enacting their stories.   
 
Labor Pains: Three Formulations of the Second Birth  
As discussed in the previous chapter, in his book Mind and World, John McDowell 
explicates a kind of dual natality. He begins with the premise that “mere animals” live 
in an environment, by which he means that they experience their surroundings 
exclusively in terms of problems or opportunities for fulfilling biological needs. 
McDowell states that babies also are born into an environment because “Human 
infants are mere animals, distinctive only in their potential.”4 This leads to an obvious 
question: potential for doing or becoming what? According to McDowell, it is the 
potential for a second natality or, as he terms it, the “acquisition of a second nature.” 
This transformation is posited as a normal part of maturation. It occurs through 
Bildung, education and other forms of cultural conditioning, and its outcome is four-
fold. First, it results in mastery of our community’s natural language.5 Second, it 
involves “acquiring a mind” in order to become “thinkers and intentional agents.” 
Third, we no longer experience our surroundings only in terms of problems or 
opportunities for fulfilling biological needs. Instead, our conceptual agility, 
contemplative attitude and “responsiveness to meaning,” allows us to moves from 
living in a non-conceptual environment to dwelling in a “world,” which we may act 
upon to fulfill our needs and desires.6 Fourth, the acquisition of a second nature 
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comes concomitantly with the responsibility for changing—at least on the 
generational level, if not on the level of the individual—the very culture whose 
conditioning has allowed us to leave the environment inhabited by mere animals and 
enter the world.  
The feature of language which really matters is this: that a natural language, 
the sort of language into which human beings are first initiated, serves as a 
repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom. . . . The 
tradition is subject to reflective modification by each generation which inherits 
it. Indeed, a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection is part of the 
inheritance.7 
Similar to what McDowell posits, Seyla Benhabib states in her book, The 
Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, that Arendt’s concept of “action” 
corresponds to the human condition of natality. Benhabib likens Arendtian natality to 
Heidegger’s notion of being “thrown” into an already existing context, where our 
arrival is both biological and “psychic-social.” In order to successfully navigate the 
preexisting space in which he finds himself, the child must master the language of 
the community. According to Benhabib, once a child has command of the language, 
he has a concomitant grasp of cultural norms. Furthermore, she argues that we may 
define our sense of self by identifying the gap between those socio-cultural 
expectations, and who we are uniquely and distinctly. Unlike McDowell, however, 
Benhabib is not explicit about our obligation to intentionally alter the expectations of 
the community, although she does posit the introduction of novel speech and action 
as part of the process of developing a self-identity.   
The crucial point here is that in learning speech and action, every human 
child also becomes the initiator of new deeds and new words. To learn a 
language is to master the capacity for formulating an infinite number of well-
formed sentences in that language; to know how to act as a Hopi Indian, as 
an Ancient Greek as a modern American is also to know—more or less—how 
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to initiate both what is expected of one by the community and what is new, 
distinctive to the individual.8       
In her book, Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality, Patricia Bowen-Moore 
argues for the existence of a primary natality, a political natality and a tertiary natality. 
Since she ascribes Arendt’s formulation of the tertiary natality primarily to works 
written after The Human Condition, my focus will remain on the other two. According 
to Bowen-Moore, the primary natality is comprised of the “factual birth and the 
concomitant capacity to make beginnings.”9 Since the child is born into the world as a 
stranger, he must become familiar with the norms of the community of which he is 
now a part. In Bowen-Moore’s assessment, this happens through the process of 
formal education, which is imbued with “delight” as it fulfills the mandate to “cherish 
and protect the child’s capacity for beginning and renewal.”10 Yet, no matter how 
nurturing, the child must eventually leave the learning environment and all the other 
protected spaces of youth. In a chapter titled “From the Chambers of the Nursery to 
the Stage of the World,” Bowen-Moore describes this transition thusly:  
At the moment when the child leaves these protective chambers, . . . he 
enters the stage of the public world where his words and deeds will be heard 
and seen and judged by others. It is precisely at this moment that primary 
natality assumes the character of the political. It is, as it were, man’s “second 
birth.”11  
This second birth, the political natality, is where the potential for beginning and 
renewal inherent in the primary natality are actualized through action and the 
exercise of political freedom.12 The outcome of this actualization varies, but it has 
historically included the American and French Revolutions. According to Bowen-
Moore, both revolutions are examples of “new stories and new beginnings,” because 
they “reveal something about freedom’s appearance and something about the 
beginners themselves and the faculty for novelty which is their ineluctable privilege 
for initiating newness.”13    
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Although often tangled thematically,14 Bowen-Moore’s text—which, it is worth 
noting, is the only book-length work devoted to the study of natality in Arendt’s 
writings—shares insights with Benhabib and McDowell’s decidedly more refined 
analyses:   
 Birth is both an actual, biological event and one which is imbued with the 
potential for the child to undertake further acts of differentiation.     
 The child is born into a preexistent community with its own socio-cultural 
standards. Through whatever means it is achieved, gaining command of 
the inherited tradition is part and parcel of the normal maturation process. 
 Mastery of the normative standards of the community causes an 
existential awakening: a second birth or the acquisition of a second 
nature.  
 The existential rebirth actualizes the potential inherent in the first, 
biological birth.  
 The result of an individual’s existential natality will be a change in the 
standards of the community which pre-existed her arrival and into which 
she was enculturated.  
Just as there are striking similarities between all three of these analyses, there are 
also some common problems. In the work of Bowen-Moore and Benhabib, these 
issues are complicated at several critical junctures by the way in which they interpret 
Arendt’s text. In order to clarify my objections, and offer some of my own analyses, I 
am going to engage the points posited above one by one. 
 
Birth is both an actual, biological event and one which is imbued with the potential for 
the child to undertake further acts of differentiation.     
In The Human Condition, Arendt posits two natalities, the first of which is biological. 
Besides being our original emergence into the world through the laboring of our 
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mothers, our biological birth is also a philosophical egression; Arendt casts our 
biological birth as the ontological grounding from which springs the possibility of 
living a fully human life, as well as the event which guarantees the continuance of a 
shared, common world. For Arendt, living a fully human life means exercising the 
ability to distinguish ourselves as a unique individual by initiating something new and 
unpredicted in the world through the words and deeds of the stories we enact.15 
These stories are enacted within a web of intersubjective relations and interactions. 
Up to this point, McDowell’s, Benhabib’s and Bowen-Moore’s formulations are similar 
to Arendt’s and, therefore, all four also share a common problem: not one of them 
offers any explanation or phenomenological justification as to why our biological 
natality holds the power to ontologically root other kinds of new beginnings. In 
response to this deficit, in chapter 2 I contend that our primary birth is bio-ontological 
because it is the first alteration of our basic, constitutive status; in this case, the 
change is from one who is towards being-there, but isn’t yet, to one who is 
autonomously present in the world, even if that autonomy is minimal. This transition 
is our first experience of differentiation, our first experience of ourselves as distinct 
from other agents and objects—the most notable being our mother and the 
environment of her womb—and grounds the possibility for other alterations of our 
being-constitution. When we do differentiate ourselves further by initiating something 
new and unpredicted in the world, it is “like a second birth in which we confirm and 
take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance” and are 
reborn into the Arendtian space of appearance.16 
 
The child is born into a preexistent community with its own socio-cultural standards. 
Through whatever means it is achieved, gaining command of the inherited tradition is 
part and parcel of the normal maturation process. 
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For McDowell and Benhabib, enculturation happens as a result of acquiring the 
community’s natural language. For Bowen-Moore, it occurs through the process of 
formal education, which, it can reasonably be assumed, also includes a linguistic 
component. Conversely, within the text of The Human Condition, Arendt’s discussion 
of cultural conditioning does not specifically engage language mastery or 
education.17  Instead, she focuses on the artifacts of work as the source of our 
enculturation. These objects possess an inherent durability and stability which 
transcends the endlessly repetitive processes of all things natural. These processes 
include the cycles of death and birth—the death of existent community members, as 
well as “the constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as strangers.”18 
These same objects insure that those newcomers are conditioned in such a way so 
as not to remain strangers indefinitely: “The world . . . consists of things produced by 
human activities; but the things that owe their existence exclusively to men 
nevertheless constantly condition their human makers. . . . This is why men, no 
matter what they do, are always conditioned beings.”19  
This conditioning takes place on two levels. First, mundane use objects 
shape our understanding of regular, day-to-day interactions including, Arendt tells us, 
customs and discursive habits.20 Second, beyond use items, there is a whole other 
category of artifactual objects crafted by the world’s workers. These are the outputs 
of “homo faber in his highest capacity,” and consist of art, poetry, histories and 
monuments—objects that both Arendt and McDowell agree do not necessarily have 
use value but that, arguably, have an even more profound influence on our 
conditioning than mere use items; they are media especially well-suited for 
preserving and transmitting the information that knits together a community’s 
phenomenological horizon, information about things like family structure, religious 
beliefs and traditions, gender roles, and other social and cultural conventions and 
expectations.21  
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Mastery of the normative standards of the community causes an existential 
awakening: a second birth or the acquisition of a second nature.  
McDowell, Bowen-Moore and Benhabib all assert that shared expectations, 
meanings, values and beliefs are the preexisting, implicit and transparent context 
that both supports and constrains the activities of our daily existence. Through 
normal maturation, we become reflectively and critically conscious of this context. 
This awareness causes some sort of existential awakening. In McDowell formulation, 
the existential awakening is the “acquiring of a mind.” On the whole, minded agents 
are vested with the obligation to change the very socio-cultural tradition of which they 
are a part, although it does not seem as though this expectation rest equally on every 
individual: “The tradition is subject to reflective modification by each generation [as 
opposed to each individual,] which inherits it.22 For Benhabib, this awakening entails 
recognizing that which is distinctive to us as an individual, because “Socialization and 
individuation are two sides of the same coin.”23 In Bowen-Moore’s interpretation, the 
second birth occurs at the point of making oneself publically present in such a way 
that our actions can be seen, heard and judged; additionally, we will prompted to 
respond to the scrutinizing eye of the other by undertaking novel activities.   
The problem with all three of these interpretations is this: there is nothing 
within our usual life experiences—nor, for that matter, within the text of The Human 
Condition—which would encourage us to believe that mastery of the socio-cultural 
standards of the community into which we are born necessarily leads to the kind of 
critical reflection necessary to illuminate any gaps between the inherited tradition and 
a self that is unique and distinctive. Empirically, I am not implying that such a thing 
never occurs, but simply stating that the frequency is far less than McDowell, 
Benhabib and Bowen-Moore would purport. In accord with Arendt, I maintain that 
most people are conditioned to the standards of their community and will 
unquestioningly accept those normative expectations as they are given.  
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The existential rebirth actualizes the potential inherent in the first, biological birth.  
Thus far, my objection to McDowell, Benhabib and Bowen-Moore’s work has focused 
on their shared claim that an existential awakening, marked by both a critical 
awareness of socio-cultural traditions and—at least according to Bowen-Moore—a 
willingness to intentionally challenge those same standards, is the default product of 
the normal socialization and maturation process. Although I do not find sufficient 
justification in any of their writings for positing this outcome as all but axiomatic, I do 
believe that a small number of people will certainly follow the basic model they 
outline. As such, my second objection has to do with the minority of people who do 
undergo an existential natality or acquire a second nature.  
Specifically, I assert that the development of a critical awareness of an 
inherited, socio-cultural tradition, and a willingness to act in such a manner as to 
challenge those same standards, are actually two distinct activities; the former takes 
place within the mind of the agent, and the latter takes place in the world where our 
words and deeds both coincide and conflict with the actions of others. Arendt notes 
this distinction etymologically. 
In order to illustrate what is at stake here we may remember that Greek and 
Latin, unlike the modern languages, contain two altogether different and yet 
interrelated words with which to designate the verb “to act.” To the two Greek 
verbs archein (“to begin,” “to lead,” finally “to rule”) and prattein (“to pass 
through,” “to achieve,” “to finish”) correspond the two Latin verbs agere (“to 
set into motion,” “to lead”) and gerere (whose original meaning is “to bear”). 
Here it seems as though each action were divided into two parts, the 
beginning made by a single person and the achievement in which many join 
by “bearing” and “finishing” the enterprise, by seeing it through.24 
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Given this reality, a person who becomes, to borrow McDowell’s term, a minded 
agent, may, upon reflection, choose to do what’s necessary to subjugate any 
differences between who he is as a unique individual and the accepted standards of 
his community in order to avoid navigating the intersubjective aspect of the process. 
An example of just such an individual is easily identified in Arendt’s description of the 
jobholder and businessman who—despite holding positions that often are regarded 
with great esteem—undertake their work with a laborious attitude. In other words, 
they toil in order to “make a living,” a phrase that underscores the relationship 
between wage-earning and survival. In order to continue to be able to make a living, 
Arendt tells us that the jobholder or businessman must make “the only active 
decision still required of the individual.” In this case, it is the decision “to let go, so to 
speak, to abandon his individuality, the still individually sensed pain and trouble of 
living, and acquiesce in a dazed, ‘tranquilized,’ functional type of behavior.”25  
Although Arendt’s portrayal of the jobholder or businessman is indeed harsh, 
she is pointing to a basic truth about human nature that is all too easily overlooked. 
Namely, that although they posit the undertaking of a second, existential natality as 
an all but automatic result of the maturation process, many people will develop a 
critical awareness of their inherited socio-cultural tradition, and still actively decide to 
retreat into the well-worn and familiar in order to fulfill the expectations of the 
community as they are given. Those who make such a decision are refusing to 
undertake the obligation to change the socio-cultural tradition of which they are a part 
and, in doing so, forgoes the opportunity to actualize fully the potential inherent in 
their bio-ontological birth.  
For the few people who do develop a critical awareness of their socio-cultural 
traditions and who also possess a willingness to challenge those same standards by 
illuminating the space between what is personally real and what is expected by the 
community, it is my judgment that there is still no guarantee of the potential inherent 
in their bio-ontological birth being actualized through an existential rebirth. After all, 
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as Arendt rightly expresses, there are obstacles with which we must contend when 
we act; these factors do not exclude the possibility of a second, existential natality, 
but they do tell us more about the forces that thwart “the greatest achievements of 
which human beings are capable,” those that are “conceptualized in Aristotle’s notion 
of energeia (‘actuality’).”26 Arendt clarifies some of these obstacles in her discussion 
of the foreigner and slave in antiquity, and the laborer in the modern age.27 
Specifically, foreigners living in ancient Greece would not have been allowed 
to own property, which was a prerequisite for participation in the public and political 
space of the polis.28 Arendt uses this historical reference to represents those people 
who face structural or socio-cultural biases that make it exceedingly difficult to enact 
their stories; a more contemporary example would be African-American’s during the 
heyday of segregation and the Jim Crowe laws. Additionally, Arendt states that in 
order to be existentially reborn, we must not be devoting a majority of our time to 
labor, i.e.—securing basic, life-sustaining necessities. This freedom from necessity 
may be achieved in multiple ways, including usurp the excess labor-power of others. 
Accordingly, Arendt explains that we may utilize the labor power of others by 
obtaining it through some sort of exchange market: I go to the grocery store and 
purchase vegetables produced through the laboring of the farmer. It is also possible 
to co-opt that excess labor power by enslaving, or otherwise forcibly coercing, those 
people whom Arendt calls animal laborans to execute such tasks on my behalf.  
I am in complete agreement with Arendt that a person’s biological natality 
contains only the possibility or potential for a second natality, which may not ever be 
actualized either because one chooses not to act or because one encounters 
insurmountable obstacles that inhibit one from doing so. However, I do not always 
agree with the examples she offers in illustration of this point. For instance, while I 
understand Arendt’s insistence on freedom as a precursory condition for undertaking 
of a second, existential natality, I am willing to assert that—except, possibly, when 
one possesses a slavish adherence to the norms of the community—those who 
45 
experience sustained socio-structural restriction of motility or activity, or deprivation 
of their basic physical needs, may experience a greater-than-average gap between 
what is personally real and what is expected of them and, therefore, offered to them, 
by their community. Concomitantly, they have a lesser number of compelling reasons 
not to explicate the space between the two, as the risk of challenging those biases by 
asserting “who” they are may cease to seem so great. As a result, restriction of one’s 
freedom through chronic deprivation, enslavement, entrenched structural bias or the 
like may ultimately bring with it a level of sovereignty comparable to when our basic 
needs are met and we have the necessary measure of personal autonomy. It is, 
therefore, with no sense of frivolity that I quote lyrics made famous by Janis Joplin: 
“Freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose.”29   
 
The result of an individual’s existential natality will be a change to the existent 
standards of the community.  
Arendt makes the bold assertion that, in the final account, there is only one thing that 
separates those who actualize the potential inherent in their bio-ontological birth from 
those who do not. It is not freedom from labor, nor social or political standing. 
Furthermore, it is not conceptual agility, language acquisition or formal education. It 
is courage. 30 Courage is necessary for at least two reasons. First, it is not possible to 
possess prior knowledge of “who” we will turn out to be: “one discloses one's self 
without ever either knowing himself or being able to calculate beforehand whom he 
reveals.”31 Furthermore, once that revealment has occurred, the exact nature of our 
unique, personal, and completely individual identity or essence will be displayed fully 
to others while remaining outside of either our view or our control. For this reason, 
Arendt compares “who” we are to the Greek daimōn, the ancient spirit who, by 
always looking over our shoulder from behind, is outside our field of vision, but 
clearly visible to others.32 Needless to say, it takes great courage to allow ourselves 
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to be laid bare to gaze of another in this way, especially when we will never be able 
to see ourselves with the same clarity. Thus, Arendt states:   
The connotation of courage, which we now feel to be an indispensable quality 
of the hero, is in fact already present in a willingness to act and speak at all, 
to insert one’s self into the world and begin a story of one’s own. And this 
courage is not necessarily or even primarily related to a willingness to suffer 
the consequences; courage and even boldness are already present in leaving 
one’s private hiding place and showing who one is, in disclosing and 
exposing one’s self. The extent of this original courage, without which action 
and speech and therefore, according to the Greeks, freedom, would not be 
possible at all, is not less great and may even be greater if the “hero” 
happens to be a coward.33 
Second, since “who” we are, the authentic, individuated self, sits in contradistinction 
to what is expected of us as a community member—psychologically, theologically, 
sexually, legally, aesthetically, economically or so on—eschewing some aspect of 
those standards is choosing to make oneself, at least to some degree, an outsider. 
We cannot anticipate what response that status may provoke from others, what 
action or chain of reactions it may cause to commence. It is certainly possible that 
there will be no perceivable response or even some level of immediate support; 
conversely, it is not difficult to imagine such instances prompting a malevolent 
reaction. Since we are not able to anticipate the response our actions will provoke 
towards us as individuals, it follows logically that we cannot have precursory 
knowledge of whether our words and deeds will provoke a change in the existent 
standards of the community, let alone what kind of change.     
 
The Enacted Story and the Web of Relationships 
Having rehearsed McDowell’s argument concerning the development of a second 
nature through Bildung, as well as Benhabib and Bowen-Moore’s interpretations of 
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the dual natality in The Human Condition, I am now going to posit my own version of 
the process through which an existential awakening occurs. My theory is grounded in 
analysis of The Human Condition and continues to draw upon the conceptual trinity 
of natality, normativity and narrative.  
As has been discussed, we are born into what Arendt terms the “private 
realm” through the laboring of our mothers. Upon our arrival, we immediately start to 
be conditioned to the accepted social customs, habits of discourse and patterns of 
behavior of our inherited tradition by the things of the common world. These objects 
are the artifacts of work—the crib in which we are laid, the snuggly, stuffed bunny we 
are given for comfort, and so on. We are also exposed to stories, art, monuments 
and other kinds of artifactual objects that are especially well-suited for preserving and 
transmitting the normative conventions of our inherited tradition.34  
Although we are conditioned beings, Arendt is still very clear when she says 
that “each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into 
the world.”35 In other words, Arendt is indicating that a gap necessarily exists 
between the world we are born into, and the person that world conditions us to be, 
and who we are explicitly, uniquely, newly, authentically. It is my contention that most 
people will never become cognizant of this gap. Of those who do recognize it, some 
will do whatever is required to subjugate any differences between the who they are 
as unique individuals and the expectations of the community as they are given. 
Others may desire to challenge the dominant norms, but encounter insurmountable 
obstacles that prohibit them from doing so. In all of these circumstances, they will be 
limited to lives of labor and work. A few people, however, will find the courage 
necessary to reveal “who” they are.  
Just as biological necessities are met through the tasks of labor, and world-
building occurs through the activities of work, action discloses “who” someone is and 
“’produces’ stories with or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces 
tangible things.”36 This disclosure is not, however, possible for an actor who is 
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isolated: we reveal “who” we are to others within the “web of relationships.” When the 
words and deeds through which we enact our story come into being within the web of 
relationships, a new phenomenological space concomitantly comes into being in 
order to accommodate the event. Our appearance in this space constitutes our 
second natality, and actualizes the potential inherent in our first, biological birth. Just 
like as our primary natality marks an important instance of differentiation—in that 
case, it is when we first experience the worldly environment directly and not, literally, 
through our mother—our existential rebirth heralds the arrival of an individuated self 
who will live a distinctly human life, a bios, as opposed to zoë, an undifferentiated 
place within the species Homo sapiens.  
Although our second natality may seem like the end of the story, the 
completion of the narrative, like all births, it is really just the beginning. In order to 
understand what comes next, it is necessary to examine more closely the nature of 
both Arendtian action and the interactions between existential agents within the web 
of relationships. I will begin this examination by turning to Jürgen Habermas’ essay 
“Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power,” in which he states that the 
deeds and words Arendt describes in The Human Condition are a form of 
communicative action. By this, Habermas means that they are used by the existential 
agents “‘illocutionarily,’ that is, for the noncoercive establishment of intersubjective 
relations,” as opposed to ‘perlocutionarily,’ meaning “merely to instigate other 
subjects to a desired behavior.”37 The result is that Arendt’s agents enjoy what 
Habermas terms “unconstrained communication,” which allows them to reveal 
themselves as unique individuals while simultaneously recognizing others as 
constitutionally equal and able to participate reciprocally. According to Habermas, 
besides yielding “unimpaired intersubjectivity,” Arendt also posits communicative 
action as the basis for the consensus building that undergirds political power.38 
Political power, tautologically, then manifests itself in loci of reciprocal speech: “(a) in 
orders that protect liberty, (b) in resistance against forces that threaten political 
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liberty, and (c) in those revolutionary actions that found new institutions of liberty.”39 
Habermas goes on to identify those points which he considers to be weaknesses in 
Arendt’s theory, not the least of which is her failure to consider the need for other 
types of action and, specifically, strategic action. This type of action is decidedly 
perlocutionarily, as is made evident when Habermas states bluntly: “War is the 
classic example of strategic action.”40 However, it is this kind of action that, according 
to Habermas, actually does the heavy lifting in regards to maintaining and employing 
the political power that only communicative action is capable of generating. As such, 
he suggests the need to “place strategic action alongside communicative action, as 
another form of social interaction (which is, to be sure, not oriented to reaching 
agreement but to success).”41  
While I agree with much of what Habermas advances, there are some basic 
problems with his exegesis, beginning with the fact that communication between 
existential agents is not unconstrained. Instead, Arendt tells us, they extend to each 
other mutual consideration as they enact their stories. These considerations include 
the making of promises and the offering of forgiveness. Such considerations are 
necessary because of the boundlessness, unpredictability and irreversibility of words 
and deeds enacted within an intersubjective plurality: “Since we always act into a 
web of relationships,” Arendt explains, “the consequences of each deed are 
boundless, every action touches off not only a reaction but a chain reaction, every 
process is the cause of unpredictable new processes.”42 Arendt goes on to add that it 
does not matter if our actions are great in magnitude or achingly simple: “The 
smallest act in the most limited of circumstances bears the seed of the same 
boundlessness and unpredictability; one deed, one gesture, one word may suffice to 
change every constellation.”43 Thus, the entelechy of action is not the same as 
creating the artifacts of work. With action, there is no tangible product; instead, there 
is a new state of affairs, which is not subject to the categories of means and ends.  
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Besides being boundless and unpredictable, once an action-process has 
begun, it is also irreversible. If a table turns out to be wobbly or unattractive, a 
craftsperson may dismantle his work and try again. But, in the circumstances Arendt 
describes, we are not building a table. We are acting into a web of intersubjective 
relationships and, as a result, it is impossible to stop, undo or annul what has begun, 
even if the results are disastrous.44 For these reasons, Patchen Markell assert that “it 
might be better to speak of action as something that is, at various times and places, 
coming into being or passing away, as the intensity of responsiveness in a space of 
potential circulation waxes and wanes, but which never simply or definitely is.”45  
Illocutionary acts like promising and forgiving serve as the only available 
“control mechanisms built into the very faculty to start new and unending 
processes.”46 Making promises binds existential agents to certain courses of actions; 
in other words, “promising looks forward as it seeks to establish islands of security in 
an otherwise uncertain and unpredictable future.”47 Forgiveness is backwards-
looking, and offers release from the unforeseeable and unintended outcomes of 
action.48 Without it, Arendt tells us, it would be possible to remain victims of action’s 
consequences forever, “not unlike the sorcerer’s apprentice who lacked the magic 
formula to break the spell.”49 As such, while promising and forgiving are necessary, 
they are, nonetheless, constraints on the communication between existential agents.  
Building off of Habermas’ work—although not yet explicitly referencing any 
connection to Arendt’s writings—Seyla Benhabib, in her 1986 text Critique, Norm, 
and Utopia, discusses four modes of action: communicative, expressive, instrumental 
and strategic action. Benhabib’s understanding of communicative action is similar to 
Habermas’ in that its’ goal is mutual understanding. It is symmetrical and reciprocal. 
Communicative action yields collective, supportive and accommodational models of 
interaction between existential agents. Expressive action lends itself to self-
realization and self-actualization. It involves manifesting and confirming our unique 
attributes.50 Expressive action causes existential agents to strive competitively in 
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their interactions for recognition and affirmation. Instrumental action is object-
oriented and refers to making or doing; an example of instrumental action would be 
building a birdhouse. Strategic action is subject-oriented and aimed at getting others 
to fulfill designated ends; an example of strategic action would be the discourse of 
advertising or political propaganda.51  
In 1996, ten years after the publication of Critique, Norm, and Utopia, Seyla 
Benhabib applied the communicative and expressive modes of action directly to the 
text of The Human Condition. She renamed them the “narrative model of action” and 
the “agonal model of action,” respectively. These models retained all of the original 
characteristics of communicative and expressive action, but now reflected the 
specifics of the enacted story. Narrative/communicative action was described as 
contextual, embedded, expressive of an emergent self, inventive and constructive. 
Agonal/expressive action was defined as being revelatory, contrastive, discoverative 
and essentialist.52 Benhabib’s decision to apply her study of action-types to The 
Human Condition came in response to Maurizio Passerin D’Entrèves’s 1994 work, 
The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, in which he stated that Arendt’s theory of 
action rested on an unstable combination of the communicative and expressive 
modes Benhabib had originally outlined in Critique, Norm, and Utopia. According to 
D’Entrèves, this instability causes a variance in Arendt’s account of politics based on 
which category of action she seems to be emphasizing at any given point within the 
text.  
When the emphasis falls on the expressive model of action, politics is viewed 
as the performance of noble deeds by outstanding individuals; conversely, 
when her stress is on the communicative model of action, politics is seen as 
the collective process of deliberation and decision making that rests of 
equality and solidarity.53  
Just as D’Entrèves described contradictory accounts of political activity based 
on whether the communicative or expressive mode of action is fore-fronted, other 
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commentators described the existential agents themselves in opposing terms for the 
very same reasons. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin portrays Arendt’s actors as resembling 
“posturing little boys clamoring for attention (‘Look at me! I’m the greatest!’ ‘No, look 
at me!’) and wanting to be reassured that they are brave, valuable, even real.”54 
Pitkin even goes so far as to gender-identify her analysis; not only do the agents 
resemble “posturing little boys,” she adds: “Though Arendt was female, there is a lot 
of machismo in her vision.”55 Pitkin, who reads Arendt’s existential agents as 
narcissistic attention-seekers, clearly emphasizes expressive action, which, for her, 
is a masculine method of communication. Conversely, Leslie Paul Thiele says that 
the existential agents lack “self definition, autonomy, and mastery,” and that their 
agency “is not seated in a pre-existing, unified, deliberate, self-knowing subject.”56 
Theile, who reads those same agents as selves in need of social construction, in 
need of a community who will help assemble their fragmented bits of being, 
emphasizes the communicative model of action.  
Just as in the case of Habermas, there are problems with the analyses of 
Arendtian action put forth by Pitkin, Theile and D’Entrèves. In the case of Pitkin and 
Theile, they confuse the possibility of identifying various types of action with 
character traits possessed by the existential agents who are enacting those words 
and deeds. In fact, Arendt tells us very little about the nature of these people, 
asserting only that there is one trait that ultimately separates those who actualize the 
potential inherent in their bio-ontological birth by undertaking a second, existential 
natality from those who do not: courage. After the point at which they are reborn, we 
are essentially told nothing else about the character of the existential agents, nor 
does Arendt ever offer a concrete, historical example of someone who has actualized 
her potential in this way. I believe the exclusion has something to do with the fact that 
Arendt shifts her attention from the individual, existential agent to the plurality, the 
web of relationships.  
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According to Arendt, this plurality—not the individual, existential agent—has 
two defining features that cannot be considered separately: distinction and equality. 
Concerning distinction, Arendt states: “If men were not distinct, each human being 
distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither 
speech nor action to make themselves understood. Signs and sounds to 
communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough.”57 The need 
for speech and action, the call to show “who” we are, in all of our uniqueness, by 
initiating that which is new and unprecedented, is demonstrative of the revelatory, 
contrastive, discoverative and essentialist character of expressive action. 
Conversely, communicative action is exemplified in equality, which Arendt defines as 
the second characteristic of plurality. Arendt states, “If men were not equal, they 
could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for 
the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them.”58 As previously 
explained, communicative action facilitates collaboration and consensus building by 
being contextual, embedded, expressive of an emergent self, inventive and 
constructive.  
The problem with D’Entrèves’s analysis is that he is not actually discussing 
that which can rightly be defined as Arendtian action—when the potential inherent in 
our bio-ontological birth is actualized through words and deeds that reveal “who” 
someone is within a web of relationships. As such, while political activities certainly 
may contain instances of Arendtian action, as soon as that action is translated into a 
more resolute and fixed form—or, I would contend, becomes part of a process that 
seeks a predetermined end—it is transfigured into something else entirely: a 
reification.  
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CHAPTER 4 
REIFICATION, RECOGNITION AND REMEMBRANCE  
 
In chapter 3, I outlined John McDowell’s formulation of the process through which 
humans acquire a second nature, as well as Seyla Benhabib and Patricia Bowen-
Moore’s interpretations of the second natality in The Human Condition. I then offered 
objections to their formulations before explicating my argument for the way in which 
one actualizes the potential inherent in his or her primary, bio-ontological birth and, in 
doing so, undertakes a second, existential natality. My focus then shifted away from 
the subjective experience of the existential actor, herself, and towards a more 
thorough examination of the words and deeds that comprise Arendtian action, as well 
as the interactions between existential agents within the web of relationships.  
In this chapter, I am going to focus on another set of intersubjective 
relationships: those that occur between existential agents and the spectators. 
Spectators serve as witnesses to the events through which agents reveal “who” they 
are. Out of those interactions, arises occurrences of what Arendt terms 
“remembrance” and “reification.” I will explicate Arendt’s construction of those 
concepts before contrasting them against the work of Axel Honneth, who links 
reification with a theory of recognition. I will then detail two major problems with 
Arendt’s formulation, one involving the mind and the other involving the body. This 
discussion will lead into the next chapter, where I will demonstrate how work from the 
field of social cognition can enrich and inform the deficits inherent in Arendt’s 
account.  
  
Reification and Recognition 
Etymologically, the word “reification” is a neologism that first came into use in the 
1860s, and is derived from the combination of the Latin word res, meaning “thing,” 
and facere, meaning “to build or make.”1 It is a concept closely associated with Karl 
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Marx, even though the term reification (Verdinglichung) appears in Marx’s work only 
twice, and both times in the third book of Capital; it is not, as is commonly supposed, 
found in the chapter on commodity fetishism in the first book. Instead, in that often-
referenced section, there may be found only “basic elements for a theory of 
reification . . . given in a number of pregnant statements.”2  
In the three-part treatise “Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat,” from his 1923 book History and Class Consciousness (Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein), Georg Lukács expanded on Marx’s work. Lukács was a leader 
within the early twentieth-century Hungarian Communist movement, as well as a 
philosopher and literary critic loosely associated with the humanistic neo-Marxists of 
the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. He argued, in contrast to Marx, that 
reification was not solely a form of alienation between the worker and the products of 
his labor endemic to modern, capitalist societies.3 Instead, he asserted that reification 
extended beyond the economic sphere and into every aspect of life within capitalist 
societies; his analysis focused on three manifestations of reification, the first being 
closest to the original Marxist concept, while the others introduced subjective and 
intersubjective elements. According to Lukács, reification is made manifest in 
instances when  
1. objects are regarded merely as things on which one may make a profit. In 
this way, they are totally divorced from the person responsible for their 
fabrication.  
2. “fragmentation of the object of production necessarily entails the 
fragmentation of its subject.”4 In these cases, the subject begins to regard 
his or her own feelings, desires, intentions, abilities and talents as 
mechanisms for creating profit.  
3. a commodity exchange requires another with whom we transact. During 
these transactions, other people become objects, mere instruments of 
deal-making, with no intrinsic value.5  
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According to Axel Honneth, who studied under Jürgen Habermas and is the 
current Director of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, this broadening of 
the concept of reification beyond the purely economic and into the realms of the 
subjective and intersubjective, resonated in socio-political climate of early twentieth 
century Germany.6 As a result, first-generation members of the Institute for Social 
Research continued to develop theories related to reification. After World War II and 
the atrocities of the Holocaust, however, the concept of reification was ostensibly laid 
to rest as “social theorists and philosophers were instead content to analyze deficits 
of democracy and justice, without making use of concepts referring to social 
pathologies such as reification or commercialization.”7  
In a series of lectures and the book that followed, Reification: A New Look at 
an Old Idea, Honneth sought to revive a Lukácsian-inspired interpretation of the 
concept of reification by linking it with a theory of recognition. Honneth’s theory of 
recognition is founded on the primacy of intersubjective interactions wherein one is 
recognized—in the sense of being granted positive status—by another, who he or 
she recognizes in return.8 When this foundational moment of recognition is somehow 
forgotten, or when recognition is withheld by one party 
We develop a tendency to perceive other persons as mere insensate objects. 
By speaking here of mere objects or “things,” I mean that in this kind of 
amnesia, we lose the ability to understand immediately the behavioral 
expressions of other persons as making claims on us—as demanding that we 
react in an appropriate way. We may indeed be capable in a cognitive sense 
of perceiving the full spectrum of human expressions, but we lack, so to 
speak, the feeling of connection that would be necessary for us to be affected 
by the expressions we perceive.9  
The consequences of forgetting or withholding intersubjective recognition 
may be made manifest in acts of Mißachtung, “disrespect.” Honneth outlines three 
types of disrespect, thus giving the term broader meaning than we would usually 
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assign. The first kind of disrespect relates to the deprivation of bodily autonomy, as in 
instances of physical abuse, torture or rape. The physical pain of these acts is 
combined with the mental anguish of being at the mercy of another. The result is a 
loss of trust both in the reliability of the social world, as well as a collapse of 
confidence in one’s self. The second type of disrespect is related to being structurally 
excluded from possessing a valid rights-claim, either socially or legally. This 
inequality—both under the law and as a reciprocating moral agent—brings with it a 
concomitant loss of self-respect.10 The final form of disrespect has to do with the 
creation of a value-hierarchy, which Honneth explains as follows: 
If this hierarchy of values is so constituted as to downgrade individual forms 
of life and manner of belief as inferior or deficient, then it robs the subjects in 
question of every opportunity to attribute social value to their own abilities…. 
For individuals, therefore, the experience of the social devaluation typically 
brings with it a loss of personal self-esteem, of the opportunity to regard 
themselves as beings whose traits and abilities are esteemed. Thus, the kind 
of recognition that this type of disrespect deprives a person of is the social 
approval of a form of self-realization that he or she has to discover, despite all 
hindrances, with the encouragement of group solidarity.11           
In other words, this last form of disrespect inhibits one from realizing his potential, 
because of the internalization of the myriad of direct and indirect messages 
concerning his inherent inferiority.  
The loss of the antecedent moment of recognition, no matter how it occurs, 
and the emotional and behavior consequences that follow, are what Honneth 
understands as reification. The only way to avoid reification is to find a means 
through which to recover the lost or forgotten moment of foundational recognition. 
This solution has proved problematic for Honneth since, according to Alexander 
Garcia Düttman, “Honneth rigs the outcome of the struggle for recognition in advance 
by positing an ideologically idealized norm of anticipated and desirable 
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reconciliation.”12 Kelly Oliver has expanded on Düttman’s critique, as well as similar 
ones offered by other scholars.13 Oliver argues that while Honneth’s theory of 
recognition entails the intersubjective construction of identity, the people participating 
in the interaction possess seemingly unequal levels of authority. This allows one 
participant to exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the identity formation 
of the other.14 Given this imbalance of authority, Honneth’s theory of recognition 
unwittingly continues to legitimize much of what Karen J. Warren terms the “logic of 
domination, i.e., a structure of argumentation that leads to a justification of 
subordination.”15 Typically, this structure is marked by value dualisms, “disjunctive 
pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional (rather than complementary), 
and exclusive (rather than inclusive), and which place higher value (status, privilege) 
on one disjunct rather than the other.”16 These dualisms have traditionally included 
white/colored, man/woman, wealthy/poor, educated/unschooled and 
heterosexual/homosexual. Within this dynamic, marginalized people—those who 
hold the secondary position within each disjunctive pair—seek validation from those 
in the dominant position. According to Oliver, this creates a “pathology of 
oppression”: the oppressed seeks recognition from the oppressor, who is least likely 
to recognize those being oppressed; after all, what reason would the master have for 
extending recognition to his slave? Thus, even if reconciliation is ideologically 
idealized, anticipated and desired, it is improbable. Furthermore, according to Oliver, 
the receipt of a null or negative response may cause those who are in the inferior 
position to internalize the rightness of their deflated status and/or leave them with 
“the sense that they are lacking something that only their superior dominators have 
or can give them.”17    
 
Reification and Remembrance: Honneth Meets Hannah 
Fifty years before Honneth argued that the time had come for the concept of 
reification to be resurrected, Hannah Arendt had done just that within the pages of 
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The Human Condition, all while avoiding many of the pitfalls Honneth encounters. 
Much of her success is due the fact that Arendt’s interpretation of reification stands in 
direct contradiction to Honneth’s in at least three noteworthy ways. First, for Honneth, 
reification occurs when the antecedent moment of intersubjective recognition is lost 
or forgotten. In those instances, we “lose the ability to understand immediately the 
behavioral expressions of other persons as making claims on us—as demanding that 
we react in an appropriate way.” This is not a cognitive deficiency, as we still 
perceive the full spectrum of their expression. What we lack is “the feeling of 
connection that would be necessary for us to be affected by the expressions we 
perceive.”18 Conversely, instead of arguing that reification results from a damaged 
experience of recognition, Arendt suggests a positive relationship between reification 
and intersubjectivity via what she terms “remembrance.” Remembrance occurs when 
the speech and action of existential agents is seen, heard and recollected. It is, 
however, more than the basic, cognitive processing of sensory input; instead, it is a 
call to be fully present in witnessing the stories that others enact in order to translate 
them into worldly objects: works of reification.19  
Second, in The Human Condition, reifications produced in the fulfillment of 
remembrance are the products of homo faber, who crafts the enduring artifacts that 
offer human existence a shared, stable, objective context. As discussed, these 
artifactual objects usually serve as buffers against the endless cyclicality of nature. 
They forge a common world out of the organic environment as it is given, a world 
largely comprised of mundane use-objects: tables, tennis shoes and teddy bears. 
However, in instances where reifications are created in fulfillment of remembrance, 
Arendt seeks the fabrication of something special, something beautiful.20 These 
special objects require Arendt to delineate a new class of workers whose 
craftsmanship transcends the basic use-objects that homo faber would typically 
create; she states: “acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his 
highest capacity, that is, the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of 
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monument-builders or writers, because without them the only product of their activity, 
the story they enact and tell, would not survive at all.”21 Being part of this select 
group of workers comes, however, at a price. In order to serve as spectators charged 
with remembrance and reification, these artisans may not be existential actors, 
themselves.22 Throughout course of her canon, the Arendt offers various reasons for 
this, including that a level of personal disinterest is required in order to be able to 
assess the meaning of an event, and that the process of crafting the reified objects is 
a solitary one requiring a retreat from the public realm and into the private realm.23       
Finally, since remembrance and reification remain intertwined, there can 
simply be no “loss” of the antecedent experience of recognition that could lead, as 
Honneth posits, to disregard for bodily integrity, legal inequality or devaluation of 
certain ways of life. Furthermore, without an imbalance of relational authority, in 
which one party—in this case, either the existential agent or homo faber—may 
exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the identity formation of the other, 
there is a limited possibility of inadvertently advancing a pathology of oppression.  
Since Arendt’s work, like Honneth’s, links reification with intersubjectivity, and 
managed to do so fifty years earlier and without the problems inherent to his theory, 
it is worth asking why he sought neither to co-opt nor to rebut her ideas in his quest 
to resurrect reification from what he asserts was its place in the dustbin of history. 
The answer may be rooted, surprisingly enough, in Honneth’s bias concerning 
Arendt’s construction of the concept of work. Specifically, The Human Condition was 
one of three books that Hannah Arendt published between 1958 and 1962, all of 
which were unintended by-products of a project originally conceived to fill in what 
Arendt described as the “most serious gap” in The Origins of Totalitarianism.24 
Published in 1951, The Origins of Totalitarianism contained Arendt’s analysis of 
Nazism and Stalinism. According to Arendt, what the volume lacked was an 
“adequate historical and conceptual analysis of the ideological background of 
Bolshevism.” Arendt asserted the omission was one she made deliberately.  
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The shocking originality of totalitarianism, the fact that its ideologies and 
methods of government were entirely unprecedented and that its causes 
defied proper explanation in the usual historical terms, is easily overlooked if 
one lays too much stress on the only element which has behind it a 
respectable tradition and whose critical discussion requires a criticism of 
some of the chief tenants of Western political philosophy—Marxism.25 
With The Origins of Totalitarianism in print, Arendt planned to write a companion 
piece tentatively titled Totalitarian Elements in Marxism. Much of the material 
intended for eventual inclusion in that text was delivered in a series of lectures, and 
the manuscript pages bespeak their beginning: “they are disordered, cut up and 
pasted together for the various lectures, and for that reason also at times 
repetitive.”26 Arendt, herself, was having little success making order out of the chaos 
she had created and in 1954 she expressed her frustration with the project in a letter 
to her former teacher, Martin Heidegger: “I cannot make it concrete without it 
becoming endless. I got into these matters, in a way, when I had time to pursue 
issues that were already bothering me throughout the writing of the book on 
totalitarianism—and now I cannot quite escape them anymore.”27  
Although Arendt would eventually abandon Totalitarian Elements in Marxism, 
she was correct about the inescapability of the issues raised in the course of her 
research and writing. For example, in the spring of 1956, Arendt delivered the 
Walgreen Foundation lectures at the University of Chicago; there, “she presented the 
reflections on labor, work, and action that represented the first draft of The Human 
Condition.”28 As she explained in a letter to Henry Allen Moe at the Guggenheim 
Foundation, the material for the lectures had grown out of her conceptual analysis of 
Marxism: “I concentrated on the theory of labor, philosophically considered, as 
distinguished from work. By this I mean the distinction between man as homo faber 
and man as animal laborans; between man as a craftsman and artist (in the Greek 
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sense) and man as submitted to the curse of earning his daily bread by the sweat of 
his brow.”29 In Arendt’s opinion, Marx conflated the two, so that  
he actually understood history in terms of processes of production and 
consumption much closer to animal life—labor, in fact. His vision of human 
history as a predictable process is a story not of unique, mortal individuals but 
of the collective life-process of a species. While he was in Arendt’s view quite 
wrong to suppose that this process could lead through revolution to “the 
realm of freedom,” she was struck by his picture of individuality submerged in 
the collective life of a human species, devoted to production and consumption 
and moving inexorably on its way. She found this a revealing representation 
of modern society, in which economic concerns have come to dominate both 
politics and human self-consciousness.30 
Despite Arendt clearly being concerned about the rise of a society dedicated 
to labor, with its sacrifice of the unique identity of the individual to the needs of the 
collective, Honneth insists that Arendt was attempting to do nothing less than to 
“dispute and dismantle by various means the special, emancipatory status of the 
19th-century concept of work.”31 In his essay “Work and Instrumental Action,” in 
which he offers his most extensive treatment of Arendt’s writing, Honneth attempts to 
support this assertion by stating that, according to Arendt, the activities of work are 
the means through which the necessities of biological life are secured, while labor 
“creates from the materials of the natural world an enduring but nonetheless artificial 
environment.” 32 He goes on to charge that Arendt “waters down the category of work 
to the merely mechanical expenditure of reproducible labor power.”33 The problem 
with Honneth’s analysis is that he transposes the meaning of Arendtian labor and 
Arendtian work—it is, of course, labor that Arendt links to the fulfillment of necessity 
and work that Arendt posits as the activity that fabricates an artificial/artifactual world. 
As a result, everything that Honneth claims to be part of Arendt’s definition of work is 
actually found in her definition of labor, and vice versa.   
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Given the challenging nature of Arendt’s writing, it is difficult, but not 
impossible, to believe that even a scholar of Honneth’s standing could be confused 
by the delineation she draws between the concept of work and concept of labor. 
However, a point comes at which one wonders if there might not be a level of 
convenience in conflating the two concepts in order to support the axiomatic 
assertion that Arendt was seeking to dismantle the special, emancipatory status of 
work. That point comes when Honneth asserts that, for Arendt, “the possibility of truly 
experiencing oneself” comes about “through direct contact with the results of one’s 
own labor.”34 He substantiates this position by quoting a passage from The Human 
Condition which states that only labor “can provide self-assurance and satisfaction, 
and can even become a source of self-confidence throughout life.” He offers this 
quote with the intention of juxtaposing Arendt’s supposedly anti-work position against 
that of Karl Marx, who included self-discovery through fabrication “in the meaning-
realm of his concept of work.” 35 It is at this point that it becomes difficult to accept a 
mere terminological mix-up. After all, if Honneth had included just a little bit more of 
the quote from The Human Condition, then his readers would have been able to see 
that Arendt names work, and not labor, as  
the most elemental experience of human strength and, therefore, the very 
opposite of the painful, exhausting effort experienced in sheer labor. It [work] 
can provide self-assurance and satisfaction, and can even become a source 
of self-confidence throughout life, all of which are quite different from the bliss 
which can attend a life spent in labor and toil or from the fleeting, though 
intense pleasure of laboring itself which comes about if the effort is co-
ordinated and rhythmically ordered, and which essentially is the same as the 
pleasure felt in other rhythmic body movements.36  
Given the entirety of the quote for context, it becomes clear that Arendt is not 
devaluing, but elevating, the concept of work. The importance Arendt assigned to 
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work is crystallized further when it is placed in the context of action, remembrance 
and reification.  
In “Work and Instrumental Action,” Honneth rightly notes that the words and 
deeds of the stories enacted by existential agents are inherently meaningful. 37 After 
all, they are the means through which existential agents reveal themselves as unique 
individuals by initiating something completely new, unprecedented, improbable and 
unpredicted in the world. Honneth is also correct in his assertion that action produces 
no product.38 Instead, since words and deeds are enacted within an intersubjective 
plurality, “every action touches off not only a reaction but a chain reaction, every 
process is the cause of unpredictable new processes.”39 If, therefore, the actions of 
existential agents are to attain a level of permanence and public visibility that is 
enduring, those actions must be transformed into a tangible, objective form. These 
objects express the significance of an action to those removed from its point of 
origination, either by space and/or time and are produced by spectators. These 
spectators are engaged by what they witness, but not directly involved in the 
intersubjective dynamic between actors. Within the text of The Human Condition, it is 
homo faber who serves in the role of the witnessing spectator and, through 
remembrance and reification, produce something tangible out of the fleeting 
ephemera of action. Of course, to acknowledge that a reified work, born out of the 
experience of remembrance, plays such a crucial role in Arendt’s theory would have 
undermined Honneth’s argument concerning the instrumentality of Arendtian action, 
as well as his assertion that she degrades the concept of work. Furthermore, it would 
have also challenged his whole construction of reification as something that comes 
about as the result of a damaged experience of recognition.  
 
Spectator Judgment 
Although I question the validity of the critique Honneth offers concerning Arendt’s 
concept of work, as well as his concomitant decision not to engage her theory of 
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reification and remembrance, it does not mean that I find her construction to be 
flawless. In fact, there are two major problems that need to be addressed. The first 
concerns homo faber’s capacity for making judgments, while the second issue 
involves the embodiment of existential agents. I will address these issues in turn, 
beginning with Arendt’s theory of judgment. 
Arendt derives her theory of judgment from a creative appropriation of key 
concepts found within Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and especially his 
writings on aesthetic judgment. One concept Arendt appropriates is that of the 
sensus communis, the public or common sense. In Kant’s formulation, “enlarged 
thought” or “broadened mind” is employed in order to transcend merely subjective, 
personal opinion by “weighing the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with 
the merely possible, judgments of others and putting ourselves in the position of 
everyone else.”40 Kant’s assumption is that this reflective act will bring us in line with 
“common sense,” which aligns a given particular with an a priori universal. This 
experience of aesthetic judgment is nicely summarized in a passage from Eleanor 
Catton’s novel The Rehearsal, wherein the young protagonist attends a jazz 
performance and reflects on the experience of forming a sensus communis about the 
music: 
Isolde thinks how strange it is, that every person in the auditorium is locked in 
their own private experience of the music, alone with their thoughts, alone in 
their enjoyment or distaste, and shivering at the vast feeling of intimacy that 
this solitude affords, already impatient for the interval when they can compare 
their experience with their neighbor’s and discover with relief that they are the 
same.41  
In a nod to Kant, Arendt proposes her own version of “common sense,” which 
she names as “the sixth and the highest sense.”42 In her version, common sense is 
when “things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their 
identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in 
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utter diversity.”43 It is in these instances that “worldly reality truly and reliably 
appear.”44 Also in accord with Kant’s writings on aesthetic judgment, Arendt 
advocates making judgments through the engagement of what she terms an 
“enlarged mentality.” However, in opposition to Kant, enlarging one’s mentality is not 
about weighing personal experience against the actual and/or possible judgments of 
others, as if every one of those against whom I make my comparison shares in a 
unity, a golden mean, of aesthetic taste. Instead, it is about training one’s imagination 
to “go visiting.”45  
Visiting entails “constructing stories of an event from each of the plurality of 
perspectives that might have an interest in telling it and imagining how I would 
respond as a character in a story very different than my own.”46 In this way, a visitor 
seeks to inhabit unfamiliar perspectives, without standing apart from, nor attempting 
to make familiar, these new positions. Instead, to paraphrase Arendt, the visitor 
attempts to be and to think from where she is not in order to seek that which is 
specific to discreet standpoints. Thus, the goal of visiting is not to align with an a 
priori universal; instead, when Arendt advocates for the engagement of an enlarged 
mentality, it is in service of seeking multiperspectivalism. A variety of perspectives 
are necessary because the “more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind… 
and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think in their place, the stronger will 
be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, 
my opinion.”47 Arendt’s use of the word “opinion” is important because she is 
ultimately interested in arriving at a judgment that yields just that, a valid opinion, not 
a universal truth. Additionally, this opinion does not concern aesthetics—although the 
creation of something beautiful is central to her theory—but, instead, meaning.   
In order to understand the way in which Arendt delineates truth and opinion, 
as well as the role the latter plays in the meaning-making process, we must first 
consider her assertion that “[a]ll truths . . . are opposed to opinion in their mode of 
asserting validity.”48 Truth possesses an objective facticity. However, where the 
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nature of physical reality is ascertained through an intersubjective process—in the 
form of Arendt’s a sixth, or common, sense—neither the subjective nor the 
intersubjective plays any role in verifying what is true. That’s because truth is outside 
agreement or dispute, opposition or consent; its veracity is not influenced by the 
number of people who assent to it. For example, it is the truth that Hannah Arendt 
was born on 14 October 1906. This statement remains true even if a million people 
sign a petition to the contrary. While truth is viewed by Arendt as being absolute and 
irrefutable, it is not inherently meaningful. Instead, truth gains significance and 
meaning when it is within an interpretive context, when it goes through the visiting 
process necessary for it to become opinion. With that said, however, Arendt is still 
very specific when she asserts that opinion, and the truth that sparked it, need to not 
part company: “Facts inform opinions, and opinions, inspired by different interests 
and passions, can differ widely and still be legitimate as long as they respect factual 
truth.”49  
The legitimacy, the validity, of my opinion is dependent upon my ability to 
“visit” a multitude of viewpoints, even if doing so is a process that occurs entirely 
within my own mind. Arendt states that “even if I shun all company or am completely 
isolated while forming an opinion, I am not simply together only with myself in the 
solitude of philosophical thought. I remain in this world of universal 
interdependence.”50 This is a unique kind of participatory sense-making, where the 
physical presence of others is not a necessity, but the ability to form judgments 
through the engagement of an enlarged mentality—to inhabit unfamiliar perspectives 
without standing apart from, nor attempting to make familiar, the new position—is a 
requirement.   
Within the text of The Human Condition, it is homo faber who serves in the 
role of the spectator.51 The spectator is engaged by the enacted stories of the 
existential agents, but not directly involved in the intersubjective dynamic occurring 
between those agents. Yet, through remembrance and reification, the spectator is 
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expected to craft enduring objects that make present the significance of those words 
and deeds to people removed from their point of origination, either by space and/or 
time. In order to meet this task, excellent judgment, the ability to enlarge one’s 
mentality, surely would be necessary. The problem with Arendt’s construction of this 
process is that homo faber seems to lack the abilities necessary to do what is asked 
of him, since he is portrayed throughout the text of The Human Condition in a dull 
and unflattering light. She lists the following as the defining attitude of homo faber:  
instrumentalization of the world, his confidence in tools and in the productivity 
of the maker of artificial objects; his trust in the all-comprehensive range of 
the means-end category, his conviction that every issue can be solved and 
every human motivation reduced to the principle of utility;…. his equation of 
intelligence with ingenuity, that is, his contempt for all thought which cannot 
be considered to be “the first step . . . for the fabrication of artificial objects, 
particularly of tools to make tools, and to vary their fabrication indefinitely”; 
finally, his matter-of-course identification of fabrication with action.52 
The result is that “Homo faber, in so far as he is nothing but a fabricator and thinks in 
no terms but those of means and ends which arise directly out of his work activity, is 
just as incapable of understanding meaning as the animal laborans is incapable of 
understanding instrumentality.”53 Although Arendt elevates a certain subset of homo 
faber to a more esteemed position—the artists, poets, historiographers and 
monument-builders—this same basic set of characteristics apply, thus making it hard 
to imagine they would be at all skilled at “going visiting.” This forces one to wonder 
where these workers, who value the principle of utility above all else, would derive 
the sensitivity of judgment necessary to practice remembrance, and then reify what 
they witness into objects of beauty that express the meaning and significance of the 
fleeting words and deeds they witness.  
Nowhere in the text of The Human Condition does Arendt offer any insight 
into the process of judgment-formation as related to homo faber. The omission is at 
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least partially due to the fact that the book is limited to discussions of labor, work and 
action—those tasks that are expressly bodily in nature, even though the construction 
of the body will end up being quite problematic in and of itself. As discussed in 
chapter 1, mental activity was to be addressed in a subsequent, three-volume work 
collectively titled The Life of the Mind. Arendt completed the first two volumes—those 
addressing “thinking” and “willing”—but died with the first page of the text on 
judgment in her typewriter.54 While this penultimate text is missing, there are 
discussions on the issue of judgment spread throughout a multitude of Arendt’s other 
writings, including Origins of Totalitarianism (1951); “Understanding and Politics” 
published in Partisan Review (1953); “The Crisis in Culture” and “Truth and Politics” 
in Between Past and Future (1961); lectures given at the New School on Immanuel 
Kant’s theory of judgment (1970, but published posthumously in 1982 in the volume 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy); “Thinking and Moral Consideration: A 
Lecture” (1971; reprinted in 1984); and, of course, Thinking and Willing. 
When examined chronologically, these writings reveal is an interesting shift in 
her consideration of the topic. Specifically, when Arendt addresses the topic in her 
earlier works, then judgment is a faculty inherent to agents who make decisions 
based on actualizing their personal telos. In her later works, judgment becomes the 
purview of the spectators who are witnessing the actions of the existential agents.55 
Even though The Human Condition belongs to the earlier part of Arendt’s canon, it is 
already possible to see the beginnings of this shift in the locus of judgment. However, 
what is not yet obvious is how this change will affect the way Arendt conceives of 
homo faber’s basic nature.  
As Arendt’s work progresses, homo faber becomes increasingly driven by 
mental activity and divorced from his more utilitarian, and bodily, form as the maker 
of artifactual objects whose durability and stability transcends the endlessly repetitive 
processes of all things natural. Instead, homo faber in his role as the spectator, 
becomes focused on preserving the meaning of the enacted stories he witnesses. 
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This shift in the nature of homo faber will necessitate a concomitant change in the 
existential agent, as he must now conduct himself “in accordance with what the 
spectator expects of him… [since] the final verdict of success or failure is in their [the 
spectators’] hands.”56 In this way, as Arendt’s canon progresses, both the importance 
of revealing “who” one is, and the subsequent recording of those words and deeds 
“are mutually entailed by Arendt’s concept of action;” this mutual entailment “should 
not obscure the fact, however, that the prime object of concern has shifted from the 
self-revelatory to the world-sustaining pole of action.”57 While it may seem on the 
surface as though this shift brings her closer to a notion of reification as 
commodification, it must be remembered that Arendt’s construction still avoids any of 
the negative personal or interpersonal consequences found in Lukács’s or Honneth’s 
work. 
 
From Heroes to No-Bodies 
By appealing to the full canon of Arendt’s work, it is possible to see how she attempts 
to address the problem of spectator judgment found in The Human Condition. There 
remains, however, a second issue related to how Arendt constructs the relationship 
between existential agents and witnessing spectators which must still be addressed: 
embodiment. In order to frame this issue, allow me to begin with an article from The 
International Journal of Press/Politics that caught the attention of the American 
media. It concerned the television show The Colbert Report, which satirizes the 
punditry of some heavily-editorialized programs shown on major news stations. The 
article summarized the results of a study that demonstrated that the political ideology 
of a viewer influenced how he or she processed the content of the comedy show. 
Those who identified themselves as being politically liberal, tended to report that the 
show’s host, Stephen Colbert, was expressing a completely satirical viewpoint, slyly 
poking fun at those on the political right. Conversely, conservatives believed that 
Colbert disliked liberalism and actually ascribed to the traditionalist values he 
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espoused on-air. The difference in interpretation, according to the researchers, was 
due to each group engaging in biased processing. Biased processing “concerns itself 
with a type of precognitive, unintentional information processing that occurs as a 
means of creating self-enhancing benefits. Thus, . . . individuals actually see and 
hear different information depending on whether that information will help or hinder 
their personal goals.”58 Evidence of biased processing often is identified easily in 
peoples’ reactions to material with a political slant, especially if that material contains 
ambiguous content.  
I offer this study as an introduction to the Arendtian body as presented within 
The Human Condition, because the text does contain a preponderance of material 
with political content and is, additionally, ambiguous in the presentations of many 
concepts. As such, it lends itself to biased processing, a fact that becomes obvious 
when the object in question is the human body; interpretations offered by various 
scholars on the topic become so variant, that it begins to seem as if they have each 
read completely different texts. For instance, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin asserts that 
human bodies are only found in Arendt’s private realm. The fact that there are no 
bodies within the public realm is part of the reason Pitkin believes the existential 
agents come to resemble “posturing little boys,” needing to be reassured that they 
are brave, valuable and even real; they suffer from a deep insecurity partially rooted 
in the fact that they have no corpus.59 Conversely, Linda Zerilli, in her piece “The 
Arendtian Body,” states that Arendt refuses “to embrace an abstract, transcendental 
subject who is nobody and who has no body.”60 According to her interpretation, there 
are indeed bodies in the public realm, even ones that serve as a source of pleasure; 
it is just that Arendtian agents, in their role as existential actors, are prohibited from 
speaking about their embodiment. 61 In this way, Zerilli asserts the existence of a 
dichotomy between the mute body and the speaking subject. Julia Kristeva, on 
whose work Zerilli draws heavily, excludes the body from the public realm, casting it 
exclusively as an object of labor, and incapable of any form of sensation or 
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perception. When Kristeva revises this position, it is to declare that the Arendtian 
body is capable of experiencing sensation, but only those that are painful. She goes 
on to state that Arendt severely limited the role of the body in order to avoid engaging 
with psychology or psychoanalysis, which Arendt supposedly fears.62 Kristeva’s 
position, however, is not as negative as the one presented by Thomas F. Tierney. 
Tierney claims that, on a personal level, Arendt viewed the human body with 
contempt and disgust, and that her philosophy of natality—the possibility of 
transcending base, biological concerns in order to engage in higher-order inquires 
and activities—demonstrated her hope for humanity to free itself from the shackle of 
embodiment.63  
It is to this discordant chorus that I add my own interpretive voice, and begin 
by echoing an insight from Linda Zerilli. She notes that the difficultly in being a 
woman attempting to talk about the body lies in how difficult it is to not immediately 
become the issue or, as Zerilli phrases it, “to make oneself a spectacle;  . . . to lose 
one’s symbolic placement by walking through the wrong restroom door.”64 In other 
words, to be a female theorizing about embodiment makes it seem as though 
whatever one writes is really about one’s self and that the disclosure may carry with it 
a level of embarrassment concerning the exposure.  
Whether Arendt, penning her philosophy more than 50 years ago, would have 
agreed with Zerilli’s assessment is unclear. However, this does not diminish Arendt’s 
acute awareness of her sex. In a letter to Gershom Scholem concerning her analysis 
of the Eichmann trial, Arendt asserts “a basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; 
for what has been given and was not, could not be, made; for things that are physei 
and not nomǭ.”65 She is speaking of the fact of her Jewishness, but illustrates the 
point not by indicating something cultural or religious, but instead equating it with 
another “given,” her feminine body: “The truth is that I have never pretended to be 
anything else or to be in any way other than I am, I have never even felt tempted in 
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that direction. It would have been like saying that I was a man and not a woman—
that is to say, kind of insane.”66  
This was not the first time Arendt had drawn a parallel between her 
experience of being a Jew and being a woman. Prior to the Eichmann trial, Arendt 
had been the first woman invited by Princeton University to give a series of lectures 
as part of the prestigious Christian Gauss Seminars in Criticism. Several years later, 
she returned to Princeton as the first woman to hold the rank of full professor. In both 
instances, Arendt expressed concern about being cast as the “exception woman,” a 
phrase meant to evoke “exception Jews,” German Jews who, due to wealth, 
education or the like, were granted unusual levels of social or political access. Arendt 
was uneasy about people who had willingly accepted such standing, and wished to 
avoid being similarly distinguished.67 As such, she even went so far as to threaten to 
refuse the appointment at Princeton after a 145-word announcement in the New York 
Times twice mentioned that she was the “only woman” to hold such an appointment 
at the university.68      
Even though Arendt saw similarities between being Jewish and being a 
woman, the way she approached these issues in her work is quite different; 
throughout her canon, the former is addressed head-on, while the latter is addressed 
more circumspectly. For instance, she begins The Human Condition by stating that 
she is not going to discuss thinking, which she names as “the highest and perhaps 
the purest activity of which men are capable.”69 Instead, she says, she will limit the 
discussion to labor, work and action, all of which she asserts are activities of the 
body, as opposed to the mind.70 Arendt situates these three activities in such a 
manner that some take place within the private realm, while others occur within the 
public realm. As has been discussed, we enter each of these realms through birth. 
Our arrival into the private realm is via our biological birth. Given that it is women 
who gestate and deliver children, it would seem as though Arendt would have been 
forced to address the issue of embodiment and, specifically, female embodiment. 
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However, she side-steps this issue by devoting little space to the physical reality of 
childbearing, and instead addresses our biological birth as a referential starting point 
that becomes relevant as a philosophical category only because it is our first 
experience of differentiation—the initial experience of ourselves as distinct from other 
agents and objects in the worldly environment. This experience serves as the 
ontological grounding for other alterations of our being-constitution that will 
differentiate us even further. In this way, our primary natality finds import not in the 
fact of being biological but, instead, bio-ontological. This shift removes the possibility 
of considering it as determinant influenced at least by sex, if not also by gender.71  
When we undertake a second, existential natality, it is through enacting our 
story, being seen and heard by others, all of which point towards that which is 
decidedly corporeal. Yet, it is at this point in the text that the already sexless human 
body all but completely disappears, since Arendt constructs this rebirth in such a way 
that revealment of who we are as a unique individual seems at odds with our very 
physicality in at least four different ways. First, as has just been discussed, our 
biological natality—our physical arrival into the world through the literal laboring of 
our mother—is only important to Arendt insofar as it contains within it the potential for 
our subsequent rebirth. Second, Arendt expands the definition of labor beyond the 
actual pangs of childbirth in order to include any form of monotonous efforts that 
comes from the fulfillment of biological necessity. Within Arendt’s system, that which 
is laborious must be overcome to order to live a distinctly human life. This means 
securing one’s basic, bodily needs, often through usurping—forcibly or through a 
commercial market—the excess labor-power of others. Third, in The Human 
Condition, and in a chapter titled “The Social Question” from On Revolution, Arendt 
constructs the body not just as something whose animal-level needs must be met as 
a precursor to the revealment of “who” one is uniquely and distinctly, she also 
formulates it as threat to the very existence of the public realm. Specifically, when the 
concerns of the body are introduced into the public realm, the result is that a hybrid 
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space is created to accommodate the intrusion. Arendt terms this space “the social 
realm” and warns that it may usurp both the public and the private realms due to the 
laboring body’s fecundity being unfettered by the balance inherent in the greater 
cycles of the natural world. If unfettered, an “unnatural growth, so to speak, of the 
natural” is unleashed, against which the private and the public realms will be 
incapable of defending themselves.72  
Arendt’s concerns about the social realm—rampant fertility destroying our 
home lives and overpowering the halls of government— may, at first blush, seem 
absurd. However, that is only until we consider that she is essentially warning of the 
consequences of once-private matters, including bodily issues, becoming collective 
concerns. Once these topics are introduced into the public realm, it begins to function 
as an enormous, collective household. The result is that all members of the 
community become one extended “family.” Like a family in Arendt’s private realm, the 
paterfamilias dictate even the most intimate aspects of life. If household members fail 
to respond with behavioral conformity, they face repercussions that are often 
disproportionate to the offense. For an example of this dynamic, one may look to 
Uganda, where the “Anti Homosexuality Bill” of 2009 sought  
to establish a comprehensive consolidated legislation to protect the traditional 
family by prohibiting (i) any form of sexual relations between persons of the 
same sex; and (ii) the promotion or recognition of such sexual relations in 
public institutions and other places through or with the support of any 
Government entity in Uganda or any non governmental organization inside or 
outside the country. 
Not only does this Bill, in and of itself, create a social realm by destroying the line 
between the concerns of the public realm and the private realm, it goes so far as to 
criminalize any attempts to reestablish that demarcation. Furthermore, for those who 
violate these prohibitions, the penalties range from seven years in prison to 
execution.73 
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Fourth and finally, besides constructing the body as an impediment to living a 
fully human life and as threat to the very existence of the public realm, Arendt also 
tells us that nothing is less common and communicable, or publically visible and 
audible, than that which is perceived by the body.74 Although she most clearly 
explicates this issue as related to pain, pleasurable sensations are also included. 
This leads me to wonder: if subjective sensory perceptions, as well as internal, 
physical states, can neither be expressed nor perceived, how is the agreement 
needed for common sense ever attained? Additionally, given these limitations, how 
can existential agents ever enact their stories in such a way that the content 
possesses sufficient affective resonance to cause the spectators to see, hear, 
remember and reify the meaning? Nowhere within the text of The Human Condition 
does Arendt find ways to address these issues. As such, it becomes necessary once 
again to supplement that text with other material from her canon, as well as to inform 
her work from the outside; in this case, with research from the field of social 
cognition.     
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CHAPTER 5 
SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 
 
In chapter 4, I focused on the interactions that occur between the existential agents 
and the witnessing spectators in order to elucidate Arendt’s concepts of 
remembrance and reification. Remembrance is the seeing, hearing and recollecting 
of the existential agents’ enacted stories by the spectators. The spectators then seek 
to express what they witnessed through works of reification, which often take the 
form of a narrative. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt summarizes this process; "To 
state this in conceptual language: The meaning of what actually happens and 
appears while it is happening is revealed when it has disappeared; remembrance, by 
which you make present to your mind what actually is absent and past, reveals the 
meaning in the form of a story.”1 Arendt’s construction of the concepts of 
remembrance and reification stands in contradiction to the work of Axel Honneth, 
who links reification with a theory of recognition. For Honneth, recognition is founded 
on the primacy of intersubjective interactions, wherein one party is recognized by 
another, who he or she recognizes in return.2 When this foundational moment of 
recognition is somehow lost or forgotten, the negative emotional and behavior 
consequences that follow are what Honneth understands as reification. Honneth’s 
theory of recognition and reification have been criticized for encouraging that which 
has been termed “a pathology of oppression,” which arises in instances when an 
oppressed person seeks recognition from his oppressor; a null or negative response 
may cause the one who is in the inferior position to internalize his deflated status as 
valid justification for continued subordination.     
Although Arendt’s work linked reification with an antecedent experience of 
intersubjectivity, and did so fifty years earlier than Honneth and without many of the 
problems inherent to his theory, he still chose neither to co-opt nor to rebut her 
writings on the subject. I maintained that the reason has to do with his assertion that 
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Arendt dismantles the special, emancipatory status of work.3 Since reification is a 
kind of Arendtian work, he could not meaningfully address her theory of reification 
without admitting that she does not denigrate the concept of work in the manner he 
asserts. Honneth’s oversight does not, however, mean that Arendt’s theory of 
reification, if addressed critically, is flawless in its construction. In fact, there are two 
major problems that needed to be addressed. The first problem concerned the 
spectator’s capacity for making judgments, while the second concerned the way in 
which Arendt portrays the issue of embodiment. Appeal to works written after The 
Human Condition did serve to demonstrate her address of the issue of spectator 
judgment via key changes in the nature of both the existential agent and the 
spectator. Problems with how she represents the human body, however, must be 
reconciled both by addressing work from within her canon, as well as from external 
sources. My aim in this chapter is, therefore, to offer a more cogent account of 
embodiment than the one offered by Arendt in The Human Condition by introducing 
insights from The Life of the Mind, as well as scholarship from the field of social 
cognition. I will then expand the discussion of spectator judgment based on this new 
account.  
 
Social Cognition 
In The Human Condition, Arendt states that the “science of economics, which 
substitutes patterns of behavior only in this rather limited field of human activity, was 
finally followed by the all-comprehensive pretension of the social sciences which, as 
‘behavioral sciences,’ aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level 
of a conditioned and behaving animal.” In such an environment, she laments, “it is a 
hopeless enterprise to search for meaning in politics or significance in history when 
everything that is not everyday behavior or automatic trends has been ruled out as 
immaterial.”4 Whether Arendt was aware of it or not, at the time she was writing those 
very words, behaviorism’s dominance was beginning to wane. Thanks to what is now 
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referred to as the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s, the bourgeoning fields of 
neuroscience, linguistics, artificial intelligence and computer science began to 
influence the study of psychology, causing it to move away from strict behaviorism 
and towards an approach that sought to inquire about mental processes that could 
not be defined solely through examination of outwardly visible behavior.5 This 
paradigmatic shift gave rise not only to the field of cognitive psychology, but also 
cognitive economics, cognitive anthropology, cognitive archaeology, cognitive 
sociology and, of course, a cognitive approach in the philosophy of mind.  
As part of their nomenclature, many of these disciplines employ the term 
“social cognition,” and do so with no constancy of meaning between them.6 Within 
philosophy of mind, social cognition aims to address that which has been termed “the 
problem of other minds.” Most philosophers recognize two aspects of this problem, 
which Shaun Gallagher explains as follows: “There are at least two questions 
involved in this problem: How do we recognize others as conscious or minded 
agents/persons, and how do we understand their specific behaviors, actions, 
intentions, and mental states?”7 Simulation Theory (ST) and the improbably named 
Theory Theory (TT) have long been the standard philosophical approaches for 
recognizing minded agents and then interpreting their actions. Although both TT and 
ST have been variously explicated, and have evolved over time to account for 
findings such as mirror neurons, they still can be broadly described.8  
TT maintains that we apply intuitive, commonsense psychological theory (or 
“folk psychology”) in order to “mindread” or “mentalize;” that is, to infer mental states 
and process and then attribute them to others.9 In ST mentalizing consists in 
modeling the other as self, without appealing to knowledge of external theories. In 
this process, I imagine myself in the situation of the other person. I resonate to that 
context, creating in my own mind the beliefs and desires, strategies and outcomes 
that would arise for me. Then I attribute the patterns identified though my simulation 
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to the person who is actually inhabiting the situation, as if she and I are same-
minded.10  
Although TT and ST are radically different in their approach, and each has 
attracted its own supporters and critics, Gallagher has identified three axiomatic 
suppositions shared by both:  
1. The problem of social cognition is due to the lack of access that we have 
to the other person’s mental states. Since we cannot directly perceive the 
other’s thoughts, feelings, or intentions, we need some extra-perceptual 
cognitive process (mindreading or mentalizing) that will allow us to infer or 
simulate what they are. 
2. Our normal everyday stance towards the other person is a third-person 
observational stance. Based on what we observe we use mindreading to 
explain or predict their behaviors. 
3. These mentalizing processes constitute our primary and pervasive way of 
understanding others.11 
Gallagher challenges these suppositions and proposes an alternative theory 
that he calls Interaction Theory (IT).  
IT is part of what has been termed the 4E (embodied, embedded, extended 
or enacted) or DEEDS (distributed, embodied, embedded, dynamical or situated) 
approach to social cognition. Although there are significant differences within the 
body of research grouped under the 4E / DEEDS umbrella, they remain unified by 
the fact that they all view “intelligent human behavior as engaged, socially and 
materially embodied activity, arising within the specific concrete details of particular 
(natural) settings, rather than as an abstract, detached, general purpose process of 
logical or formal ratiocination.”12 With IT, this core principle is made evident in the 
propositions that Gallagher has formulated in response to the three axioms shared 
by TT and ST in their address of the problem of other minds:   
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1. Other minds are not hidden away and inaccessible. The other person’s 
intentions, emotions, and dispositions are expressed in their embodied 
behavior. In most cases of everyday interaction no inference or projection 
to mental states beyond those expressions and behaviors is necessary.  
2. Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is not third-person, 
detached observation; it is second-person interaction. We are not 
primarily spectators or observers of other people’s actions; for the most 
part we are interacting with them in some communicative action, on some 
project, in some pre-defined relation; or we are treating them as potential 
interactors.  
3. Our primary and pervasive way of understanding others does not involve 
mentalizing or mindreading; in fact, these are rare and specialized abilities 
that we develop only on the basis of a more embodied engagement with 
others.13  
Gallagher goes on to assert that—as opposed to engaging psychological theories in 
order “mindread” or “mentalize,” or running simulation routines—there are three 
developmental components that build upon each other to become our ordinary 
means of social cognition. These are primary intersubjectivity, secondary 
intersubjectivity and narrative competency. The resources utilized in this account, in 
conjunction with insights from Arendt’s text The Life of the Mind, will allow us to 
construct a more cogent account of embodiment than the one offered in The Human 
Condition. Building on this new account, I will then expand on my analysis of 
spectator judgment.  
 
Primary Intersubjectivity  
In the previous chapter, I began to outline the ways in which the human body is 
presented within the text of The Human Condition. The first presentation is via the 
category of labor. Labor is defined by an intersecting duality of meaning; it is both the 
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contractions of childbirth, as well as the monotonous bodily effort required for the 
fulfillment of biological necessity. Second, Arendt offers a dichotomized view of the 
body in relationship to the undertaking of a second natality. On one hand, she posits 
any form of laborious activity as being an obstacle that must be overcome in order to 
live a fully human life. On the other hand, an agent must enact a story, which is seen 
and heard by others—all of which points to the centrality of bodily expression. Finally, 
fearing that once-private matters will become collective concerns, Arendt presents 
the body as a threat to the very existence of the space of appearance, warning that 
its presence will force the creation of what she variously terms the “social realm,” 
“society” and “mass culture.” Within this realm, absolute behavioral conformity is 
expected; such conformity would necessarily be at odds with the novelty of an 
existential agent’s words and deeds: “society expects from each of its members a 
certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 
‘normalize’ its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or 
outstanding achievement.”14 To these complicated and problematic constructions of 
the human body, Arendt adds two more. The first has to do with the relationship 
between the body and the objects that comprise the common world. The second 
occurs when Arendt goes on to elucidate how that world, and the people who 
populate it, become lost to us when we are in pain. I am going to address each of 
these two additional constructions in turn, and outline my objections to Arendt’s 
position.    
The common world is created through the work of homo faber and is 
comprised of artifacts that endure beyond the act of their creation. Besides offering a 
shared, objective context that transcends the endlessly repetitive processes of 
nature, the common world also serve to condition us to the accepted social customs, 
habits of discourse and patterns of behavior that govern ordinary occurrences and 
interactions and, through which, the plural aspect of the common world is realized.15 
In addition to these functions, Arendt indicates that the objects that comprise the 
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common world are also largely responsible for prompting awareness of where our 
bodies are located spatially. For example, I am not proprioceptively conscious of the 
placement of my arm until I am engaged in a worldly activity: I become attentive to 
the position of my arm and of my hand as I reach out to grasp my coffee cup. While 
this seems like a fairly straight-forward proposition—bodily awareness is facilitated 
by my interaction with the things of the world—there are, in fact, multiple problems 
with Arendt’s construction. The first problem has to do with the facticity of the cup, 
which cannot be reliably ascertained solely through my individual, sensory data. 
Instead, I must depend also on “common sense.” As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Arendt explicates common sense as being the sixth and highest sense. It 
occurs at the point when the things of the world are presented “to a multitude of 
spectators.”16 She continues by stating that, “Only where things can be seen by 
many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those who are 
gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality 
truly and reliably appear.”17   
This refusal to rely on individual sense data is compounded further by the 
way in which Arendt describes sensations experienced by the body as a result of 
being stimulated by some worldly object. In short, these sensations purportedly tell 
us nothing about the object that is the source of the original stimuli: “The pain caused 
by a sword or the tickling caused by a feather indeed tells me nothing whatsoever of 
the quality or even the worldly existence of a sword or a feather.”18 Following this line 
of reasoning, if my cup happens to be hot enough to burn my hand, I will have 
learned nothing about its qualities as an object nor will I have verified its existence. 
Instead, what I am perceiving is merely, to paraphrase Arendt, an irritation of my 
nerves or a resistance sensation of my body. In her formulation, this irritation or 
sensation has no necessary connection to a worldly object, be it a sword, feather or 
coffee cup.19  
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Even in its more extreme manifestations—say, for instance, a person who 
has been badly burned in a house fire—the pain still fails to offer information about 
the worldly environment. Instead, what the burn victim now endures is such an 
intense, intra-corporeal experience that it causes a disturbance, a discontinuity, as 
the pain forces his consciousness back upon itself in such a way that it is completely 
imprisoned by those physical sensations. According to Arendt, when a person is in 
this state, whatever worldly environment he occupies—be it a hospital room, a 
rehabilitation center or the home of a friend—falls away, unable to meaningfully 
engage his awareness at all; he is unable to concentrate on anything except trying to 
remain alive. This focus on sustaining biological life occurs in instances for as long 
as a person remains in intense pain, even if he is no longer in immediate peril; for 
example, a patient who is well into the process of healing from burns sustained in a 
house fire would still be unable to wrest his attention from his wounds in order to 
reengage consistently with the world.20  
Furthermore, by focusing attention exclusively on that which is occurring 
within the body, pain also causes a loss of intersubjectivity. According to Arendt, this 
loss occurs concomitantly with the state of worldlessness just described; specifically, 
because we have been conditioned to the normative standards of behavior 
associated with the everyday, worldly environments we inhabit, we use those 
contexts to help us make sense of what transpires between ourselves and other 
people.21 When those contexts lose their salience, we simultaneously lose much of 
what makes social interaction coherent and comprehensible.22 However, even if a 
person was able to disengage his attention from his wounds and reclaim his focus on 
whatever worldly environment he occupies, intersubjective communication related to 
the individual’s personal suffering could still not be regained; this is due to Arendt’s 
assertion that nothing is less common and communicable, or publically visible and 
audible, than that which is experienced as sensations within the body.23 She states: 
“the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other 
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experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same time the 
most private and least communicable of all.”24 In other words, even if I was in the 
presence of other people, and able to turn my attention towards them and our 
shared, pragmatic context, I would still be unable to communicate with them about 
the suffering I was enduring.   
At this point, it is worth asking if Arendt’s construction of worldly embodiment 
within the text of The Human Condition is correct. To that end, let me begin by 
stating that I agree with Arendt’s insight that, under normal circumstances, my 
interactions with the things of the world often prompts awareness of the position of 
my body; reaching for my coffee cup is one of the ways in which I become 
consciously aware of the placement of my arm and hand. Furthermore, I respect 
Arendt’s attempt to avoid representing the human experience as one in which each 
individuals’ subjective, sensory perceptions dictate the nature of reality. As such, her 
notion of “common sense” is inviting. At the same time, this insight is stretched 
almost to the point of absurdity. While it is true that my coffee cup would reveal itself 
to my consciousness differently in various pragmatic or social contexts, this still does 
not change the fact that I have never needed a quorum in order to be certain that 
there is a coffee cup sitting on my desk. At the very least, the cup exists, and 
continues to do so even if I am the only spectator available to perceive it. Similarly, I 
have never drunk from my cup, burned my tongue and then found myself utter 
confounded. After all, the pain caused by a scalding latte has always been sufficient 
to tell me everything I needed to know about the quality of that liquid, including the 
fact that, yes, it too does indeed exist.  
In terms of the loss of the world that occurs when we are in pain, scientific 
experimentation has shown that great bodily pain disengages us in just the way 
Arendt describes. Researchers have even argued that chronic pain should be 
redefined as chronic interruption.25 Additionally, if we assume that when Arendt 
asserts the privacy of pain, she is attempting to indicate its deeply subjective nature, 
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then she is again in accord with those who study the phenomenon with the utmost 
rigor. The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP), for example, states 
unequivocally that, “Pain is always subjective.” 26 Although Arendt’s formulation in 
The Human Condition is correct on these counts, she is simply wrong when it comes 
to her assertion that the interruptive and subjective nature of pain means that it 
beggars communicability. Without a doubt, pain is difficult to describe. The degree of 
difficulty inherent in translating the experience into words is made evident by the 
IASP, which elucidates the experience via a twenty-word definition—“An unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, 
or described in terms of such damage.”—which is immediately followed with a 249-
word explanatory note.27 However, these linguistic challenges do very little to lessen 
the communicative possibilities inherent in painful experiences, especially when we 
take into consideration the indispensible role played by nonlinguistic communicators.  
One of the most well-studied of these nonlinguistic communicators is facial 
expression. Using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) developed by Paul 
Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen in 1978, a prototypical combination of facial actions 
have been identified that seem to be specific to pain. These are: brow lowering, 
cheek raising, eye closing and lid tightening, nose wrinkling and upper lip raising. 
This “pain face” is consistent regardless of stimuli, age or cognitive ability, which 
lends credence to the possibility that it is innate behavior.28 Since the pain face is 
recognizable to an observer even in circumstances when the sufferer attempts to 
suppress his or her reflexive response, it is not surprising that facial expression of 
pain are highly salient, with observers consistently reporting that they trust these 
nonverbal expressions more than anything that can be described in the process of 
self-reporting.29 Additionally, there is strong evidence that not just pain, but also 
happiness, sadness, fear and disgust—and, possibly, excitement, awe and 
embarrassment—have distinct facial expressions that also are characterized by their 
“rapid preawareness onset, brief duration, involuntariness, and automatic appraisal 
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by observers.”30 In other words, pain is communicable, as is a whole range of 
sensory-emotional experiences that are expressed through the face in a remarkably 
consistent manner. Furthermore, we attune to these facial expressions in ways that 
are immediate, innate and enactive. As a result, when Arendt extends her argument 
concerning the incommunicability of physical sensations from those that are painful 
to those that are pleasurable—and, eventually, to all bodily experiences—she is 
clearly no less in error, since an observer would attune to those expressions as 
readily as to expressions of pain.31 
In order to begin correcting deficits in Arendt’s approach to embodiment in 
The Human Condition, it is helpful to turn to her writings on the subject in the first 
volume of The Life of the Mind, and most especially the chapter titled “Body and soul; 
soul and mind.” There, Arendt draws on the texts Signs and The Visible and the 
Invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty, who would influence later 
phenomenologists and philosophers of mind, interested Arendt because she believed 
him to be “the only philosopher who not only tried to give an account of the organic 
structure of human existence but also tried in all earnest to embark upon a 
‘philosophy of the flesh.’”32 Despite these accolades, Arendt took issue with the way 
in which Merleau-Ponty described the connection between the mind, the soul and the 
body and, therefore, sought to posit an alternative theory about the relationship. 
In Arendt’s construction, “feelings, passions, and emotions” are the purview of 
the soul. She goes on to state that every emotion occurs simultaneously with a 
somatic experience: “my heart aches when I am grieved, gets warm with sympathy, 
opens itself up in rare moments when love and joy overwhelms me, and similar 
physical sensations take possession of me with anger, wrath, envy and other 
affects.”33 These occurrences may be transmitted “by glance, gesture, [or] inarticulate 
sound.”34 Such glances, gestures and sounds are, however, “no more meant to be 
shown in their unadulterated state than the inner organs by which we live.”35 Of 
course, this begs the question of what kind of emotional expressions are meant to be 
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shown. In order to provide an answer, it is first necessary to rehearse the basics of 
Arendt’s notion of Selbstdarstllung, “the urge to self-display,” that she derives from 
the work of the Swiss zoologist and interdisciplinary theorist, Adólf Portman.36      
Arendt begins her discussion on self-display by stating: “To be alive means to 
be possessed by an urge towards self-display which answers the fact of one’s own 
appearingness. Living things make their appearance like actors on a stage set for 
them.”37 This kind of appearance—which Arendt deems as “authentic”—is perceived 
by fellow actors, as well as spectators, all of whom are endowed with sense organs 
appropriate to the task of seeing, hearing, seeing, tasting and smelling that which is 
being displayed.38 In this way, Arendt indicates that what is meant to appear, to be 
displayed to others, is given readily to the observer. Conversely, she posits that there 
are also instances of “inauthentic” appearance, “such as the roots of a plant or the 
inner organs of an animal, which become visible only through interference with and 
violation of the ‘authentic’ appearance.”39  
Although it is easily argued that glances, gestures and sounds are readily 
given to an observer, Arendt takes the position that the feelings, passions, and 
emotions which underlie such expressions “can no more become part and parcel of 
the world of appearances than can our inner organs.” 40 In this way, Arendt makes it 
clear that she considers these occurrences to be a form of inauthentic appearance. 
In order to authentically appear—to be fit to be seen and heard by others—feelings, 
passions and emotions must not only be felt in the soul, but processed in the mind 
through the “intervention of reflection and the transference into speech.”41 At that 
point, “Every show of anger, as distinct from the anger I feel, already contains a 
reflection on it, and it is this reflection that gives the emotion the highly individualized 
form which is meaningful to all surface phenomena. To show one’s anger is one form 
of self-presentation: I decide what is fit for appearance.”42  In other words, it is 
through the mind’s process of reflective thought and then articulation in speech that 
the feelings, passions and emotions of our soul may authentically appear, thereby 
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displaying something of myself to others who are readily equipped to comprehend 
my expression, and who may choose to offer their own self-displaying response. 
With Arendt’s discussion of the mind and soul in The Life of the Mind, she 
does offer some degree of correction to deficits identified in her approach to 
embodiment in The Human Condition. Specifically, she articulates an interesting 
prefiguring of the IASP’s research on the inseparability of sensory experiences from 
emotional experiences. Additionally, her description of the pre-reflective and pre-
articulated ways in which feelings, passions and emotions are transmitted in an 
immediately recognizable way certainly matches the distinct facial expressions that 
have been identified as accompanying experiences of pain, happiness, fear, 
excitement and so on. The fact that Arendt insists, however, that such immediate, 
innate and enactive responses—which have been shown to have levels of salience 
for an observer above anything that can be purposefully articulated to them about the 
same experience—are an inauthentic form of self-display on par with exposed 
viscera would certainly be at odds with contemporary research on social cognition, 
and especially embodied approaches like Gallagher’s Interaction Theory. As such, I 
will now turn briefly  to resources from that field, beginning with research on primary 
intersubjectivity, in order to further “flesh out” Arendt’s account of embodiment.           
Specifically, primary intersubjectivity, a term coined by developmental 
psychologist Colwyn Trevarthen—43 entails innate or early-developing perceptual 
and sensory-motor capabilities that are engaged in the service of direct, and often 
complex, interaction with others.44 These capabilities are put to use within the first 
few minutes after a baby’s birth and include the ability to recognize a human face as 
distinct from other objects in the environment. A neonate then will mimic certain 
movements and expressions of that face, the most common being tongue protrusion. 
This imitation, however, appears to be more than an involuntary response to stimuli. 
Instead, it may serve as a pathway to building social affiliations of exactly the quality 
endemic to Arendt’s web of relationships. This relationship-building component is 
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evident in the fact that, by six weeks of age, infants will enact of a facial gesture that 
they had previously mimicked in a bid to elicit a response-in-kind. Such a response 
will allow them to verify the identity of, and their connection to, the person they are 
reencountering.45 Additionally, when interpersonal connection via facial expression is 
withheld from infants—as in experiments where two and three-month olds are 
exposed to the still, non-expressive face of the person with whom they likely have the 
strongest relationship, their mother—they “become negative and show increased 
protest and wariness.”46  
Given the importance of this nonverbal, intersubjective communication, which 
is present virtually from the moment of our biological birth, it really cannot be 
considered an overstatement when Merleau-Ponty stressed that “I live in the facial 
expressions of the other, as I feel him living in mine.”47 As such, research on primary 
intersubjectivity allows us to correct supplement deficiencies in Arendt’s approach to 
the human body by demonstrating that, even if we limit ourselves to research on 
facial recognition, imitation and expression, it is all but impossible to find support for 
Arendt’s assertion in The Human Condition concerning the incommunicability of 
individual sensory-emotional sensations. When we take into account the fact that 
primary intersubjectivity is not limited to that which can be conveyed through the 
face, but also includes vocalizations, posture and physical orientation, gesticulation 
and more, it becomes difficult to support her argument in The Life of the Mind that 
glances, gestures, and inarticulate sounds are, at best, inauthentic means of self-
display that become authentic only once they are transformed by the mind’s process 
of reflective thought and then articulation in speech. As a result, I propose that 
Arendt’s construction is best reconsidered in light of the new understanding of 
embodied action.  
In the next section, I am going to build on this proposition by rehearsing some 
of the key finding advanced in research on secondary intersubjectivity concerning the 
inherent synergy between self, others and the things of the world. I am then going to 
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relate these finding to the theory of spectator judgment found within the text of The 
Human Condition that, while not as problematic as Arendt’s construction of worldly 
embodiment, is nonetheless strengthened by being brought into conversation with 
research on social cognition.  
 
Secondary Intersubjectivity 
I am going to begin by looking at the way in which our interactions with others are 
used to gain necessary familiarity with a variety of pragmatic contexts, a process that 
commences with the emergence of joint attention when a child is between nine and 
14 months of age. In joint attention, “the child alternates between monitoring the 
gaze of the other and what the other is gazing at, checking to verify that they are 
continuing to look at the same thing.”48 These sorts of interactions help youngsters 
learn about the world and the objects that populate it. In order for a child to be able to 
master the immense amount of practical and socio-cultural knowledge needed in 
adulthood they must, however, be able to generalize the information they receive 
during these episodic interactions with others. This generalization occurs in part 
through what Gergely Csibra and Gyӧrgy Gergely term “natural pedagogy.”49 Natural 
pedagogy recognizes that children learn through all forms of unguided observation. 
However, when children are engaged overtly and directly—and, preferably, by a 
communicator with whom the child has a preexisting, benevolent relationship—
learning patterns fundamentally change.50 This manner of engagement, which is also 
referred to as the “ostensive signal,” must be developmentally appropriate and is 
often a precursor to acts of joint attention; specifically, “infants tend to follow gaze 
shifts only when these [occurrences] are preceded by an ostensive signal such as 
eye contact or infant-directed greeting.”51  
Ostensive signaling “does not only make children pay more attention to the 
demonstration but they also see it as a special opportunity to acquire generalizable 
knowledge.”52 For example, a study involving nine month olds showed that in 
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interactions during which no ostensive signals were offered, the infants’ attention 
focused on information that was all but irrelevant for identifying an object when they 
reencountered it or for generalizing to other, similar referents; such information 
included the location of a readily movable object. Conversely, when ostensive 
communication cues were introduced, infants focused on properties of the object that 
were more relevant to future recognition and could be kind-generalized, such as 
colors, size or other aspects related to visual appearance.53 It bears stressing that in 
these experiments, a child did not once “need to rely on statistical procedures to 
extract the relevant information to be generalized because this is selectively 
manifested to her by the communicative demonstration.”54 Instead, such “a ‘short-cut’ 
to generic knowledge acquisition relies heavily on the communicative cooperation 
and epistemic benevolence of the communicative partner.”55 
Other studies have begun to illuminate how secondary intersubjectivity, 
including the ostensive signaling indicative of natural pedagogy, not only allows 
children to use instances of shared attention in order to come to a fuller 
understanding of objects in the world, but also how those object-centered 
interactions become the means through which young children gain insight into other 
minds. An experiment conducted with children fourteen months of age showed that 
when they observe another person’s expression of aversion or attraction during an 
encounter in which ostensive signals were offered, they were more likely to infer that 
the response concerned some property that was inherent to the object, and not 
simply the communicator’s subjective attitude.56 When similar experiments were 
done with eighteen month olds, the children assumed the inherence of the property 
to the referent, and readily generalized that information to other objects of the same 
kind. Furthermore, they would predict that people other than the original 
communicator would share the same reaction of attraction or aversion.57 If the same 
information was received during an encounter that lacked ostensive signaling, the 
children were likely to assume that the reaction of attraction or aversion was a 
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subjective response offered by the other person and not one that was related to a 
property inherent to the object. In short, increasing the level of direct communication 
through ostensive signaling helps children more quickly develop their expectations of 
what constitutes people’s normal, generalizable behavior in relationship to certain 
objects.   
Also around eighteen months of age, toddlers can “read below the surface 
behavior of the adult and reenact the goals, aims, or intentions of the adult.”58 This is 
evident in experiments where toddlers are “able to re-enact to completion the goal-
directed behavior that someone else fails to complete. Thus the child, upon seeing 
an adult who tries to manipulate a toy and appears frustrated about being unable to 
do so, quite readily picks up the toy and shows the adult how to do so.”59 As 
Gallagher and Jacobson suggest, “This is not taking an intentional stance, i.e., 
treating the other as if they had desires or beliefs hidden away in their minds; rather, 
the intentionality is there to be perceived in the embodied actions of others.”60 Soon 
after being able to complete the specific, goal-directed activities of another, there is 
an expansion of abilities that allows children to imitate the social roles and normative 
perspective that underlie and predict the intended actions. According to Meltzoff and 
Moore, this includes a child “[b]ehaving ‘as-if’ they were mommy, acting from a 
mommy-like perspective, and expressing mommy-like desires and beliefs, even if 
they are not the child’s own.”61  
Unlike issues related to worldly embodiment, when we compare research on 
secondary intersubjectivity to the text of The Human Condition, we find basic 
agreement between that work and Arendt’s most general claims concerning how the 
objects we encounter shape our understanding of the world:  
The world . . . consists of things produced by human activities; but the things 
that owe their existence exclusively to men nevertheless constantly condition 
their human makers. . . . This is why men, no matter what they do, are always 
conditioned beings. . . . The objectivity of the world—its object- or thing-
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character—and the human condition supplement each other; because human 
existence is conditioned existence, it would be impossible without things, and 
things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were not the 
conditioners of human existence.62 
Arendt, however, diverges from the research on social cognition when she grants 
objects an almost totemic level of power by seeming to imply that they could do their 
work of conditioning us to the accepted social customs, habits of discourse and 
patterns of behavior of our inherited tradition all on their own, without any interaction 
between the newcomer and established members of the community. In concrete 
terms, this would be akin to asserting that a toddler learns just as much in an 
instance where she finds a book of fairytales and looks at the words and pictures, as 
when a caregiver reads to the child while focusing the child’s attention on meaningful 
events in the story.     
Arendt’s discussion of “common sense” marks the place in her work where 
intersubjective interaction finally becomes a necessity. While I have criticized her 
construction, it is to her credit that some experiments involving joint attention 
substantiate that our understanding of the nature of worldly reality is shaped by the 
verification of our sense data by others. It is worth highlighting, however, that as part 
and parcel of secondary intersubjectivity such verification is an inherent and 
instantaneously understood aspect of our interactions that may be enhanced by, but 
does not require, any special forms of communication.  
Besides gaining information about the worldly environment, in instances of 
joint attention I also attain knowledge about my co-communicator: her embodied 
action within our shared, pragmatic context discloses her intentions, desires and 
beliefs as a minded agent. Arendt posits a similar kind of revealment.  
Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, 
and they retain their agent-revealing capacity even if their content is 
exclusively “objective,” concerned with the matters of the world of things in 
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which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which arise 
their specific, objective, worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the 
word’s most literal significance, something which inter-est, which lies between 
people and therefore can relate and bind them together. Most action and 
speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies with each group of 
people, so that most words and deeds are about some worldly objective 
reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent. 
Within the text of The Human Condition, this disclosure of an agent is seen and 
heard by a special class of homo faber who are expected to remember and then reify 
the fleeting words and deeds they witness. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Arendt explicates “visiting” as an integral part of this process. Visiting involves 
mentally constructing stories about what the spectator has seen and heard from each 
of the plurality of perspectives that might have an interest in telling it in order to reach 
the most valid opinion of the event as possible. For Arendt, a valid opinion must 
respect the facticity of the original event, but ultimately aims at illuminating its 
meaning or significance through the creation of something beautiful and enduring—a 
work of art, a poem, an architectural monument.  
The ability to “go visiting” would seem to have strong ties to the capacity we 
develop as part of secondary intersubjectivity to behave “as-if” in instances of 
pretend play, to inhabit the thoughts and imitate the actions of someone with a 
different social role and normative perspective than ourselves. Furthermore, Meltzoff 
and Moore have noted the relationship between being able to inhabit the viewpoint of 
another and the process of meaning making. In the final paragraph of their paper on 
imitation practices in early childhood, they state that youngsters “are only partly 
governed by the stimulus that is present in perception. Infants act to bring their 
perceptual and representational worlds into register, to ‘give meaning to’ what they 
perceive. This is one of the chief motivations and psychological functions of the early 
imitation of people.”63  
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As discussed earlier in this chapter, advocates of Simulation Theory (ST) 
indicate that the simulation involved in recognizing others as minded agents and then 
understanding their specific behaviors, actions, intentions and mental states “is 
based on either the observer's first-person experience (if they describe an explicit or 
conscious process of simulation) or on what registers in the observer's own motor 
system, which has been tuned to the kinds of actions with which the observer has 
familiarity from past experience.”64 Thus, as Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola 
explain, “In all cases, observing what other people do or feel is transformed into an 
inner representation of what we would do or feel in a similar, endogenously 
produced, situation.”65  As a result, if simulation theorists “recognize that we 
understand people who may be very different from us, they typically do not mention 
this issue, and have not explained how it is possible if in fact simulation, as they 
define it, is the default way that we understand others.”66  
Conversely, what may seem quite abstract in Arendt’s presentation of her 
theory of “visiting” turns out, in fact, to be a very natural and everyday occurrence: 
we possess an almost innate ability to assume the perspective of another person in 
order to make sense of our experiences and encounters with them. Furthermore, 
what both Arendt and proponents of IT understand—which is seemingly lost on those 
who advocate for ST—is that as we enact these processes, we seeks to inhabit 
unfamiliar perspectives without either standing apart from, nor attempting to make 
familiar, these new positions. Instead, to paraphrase Arendt, we attempt to be and to 
think from where we are not in order to seek that which is specific to a standpoint 
different than our own. As a result, I do not ordinarily, nor automatically, attribute the 
patterns identified though my visitation, through my acting “as-if,” to the person who 
is actually inhabiting the situation as if she and I are same-minded. After all, as the 
research by Meltzoff and Moore demonstrates, the child is not her mommy any more 
than the spectator is the existential agent, and both the child and the spectator 
understand that fact axiomatically.      
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Participatory Sense-Making 
The consideration and creation of meaning through social interaction is the aspect of 
secondary intersubjectivity referred to as participatory sense-making.67 According to 
Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, in order for an interaction to rightly be 
considered social it must possess two defining characteristics: coordination and 
autonomy. Coordination means “the non-accidental correlation between the 
behaviours of two or more systems that are in sustained coupling, or have been 
coupled in the past, or have been coupled to another, common, system.”68 While the 
levels of coordination can run the gambit between absolute and relative, what is 
important in social interactions is that there is some level of voluntary coordination, 
and that through that coordination interactors establish a relational domain, a space 
that is generated by, and then continues to support, what is occurring between 
participants. The relational domain is marked by its own limited form of autonomy 
that, with a certain degree of circularity, encourages or curtails the interactional 
content that continues to create it anew.  
Even though certain activities may be promoted or discouraged within the 
relational domain, the participants must still maintain a level of personal autonomy. 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo draw on the analogy of two people dancing in order to 
illustrate this point. They state that, just as in an interaction during which autonomy is 
maintained, “couple dancing involves moving each other, making each other move, 
and being moved by each other. This goes for both leader and follower. Following is 
part of an agreement and does not equate with being shifted into position by the 
other.” However, if one participant were to give up or lose her autonomy, “the couple 
dancing would end there, and it would look more like a doll being carried around the 
dance floor.”69  
In many ways, what De Jaegher and Di Paolo posit parallels Arendt’s 
description of the meaning-making which arises in the interactions between 
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existential agents:  that which occurs between those agents must give rise to at least 
a minimal level of coordination in order for the actions of one to be able to become 
the genesis of new action-processes for another. Since the outcomes of these 
various action-processes are boundless, unpredictable and irreversible, a level of 
coordination also is necessary between actors so that they may extend to each other 
mutual consideration in the form of illocutionary acts such as promising and forgiving. 
Additionally, Arendt makes it clear that when agents come together they may limit 
each other’s personal autonomy only in dire circumstances, and then for as brief a 
time as possible. Arendt formulates this expectation most succinctly in terms of 
political action: “men in their freedom can interact with one another without 
compulsion, force, and rule over one another, as equals among equals, commanding 
and obeying one another only in emergencies—that is, in times of war—but 
otherwise managing all their affairs by speaking with and persuading one another.”70  
Besides the autonomy of the participants, we must also address the 
autonomy of the relational domain. In The Human Condition, Arendt names this 
domain the “space of appearance.” When the words and deeds through which we 
enact our story come into being within the web of relationships, a new 
phenomenological space comes into being in order to accommodate the event. This 
is the space of appearance, “where I appear to others as others appear to me, when 
men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance 
explicitly.”71 In this way, the space of appearance may be described as 
“simultaneously being space and event” or, more rightly, a space that “only exists by 
grace of the happening of events.”72  In emphasizing the event quality of the space of 
appearance, on page 199 of The Human Condition, Arendt states:  
The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the 
manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal 
constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, 
the various forms in which the public realm can be organized. Its peculiarity is 
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that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive 
the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but disappears not 
only with the dispersal of men—as in the case of great catastrophes when the 
body politic of a people is destroyed—but with the disappearance or arrest of 
the activities themselves. Wherever people gather together, it is potentially 
there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever.73 
For the period during which it is brought into being, the space of appearance 
shapes the content unfolding within it. The ability to encourage or curtail certain 
content is founded on the fact that the web of relationships is not only comprised of 
the various face-to-face interactions occurring among those enacting their stories, it 
is also, Arendt tells us, the implicit, socio-cultural context that frames that which is 
unfolding.74 In other words, expectations of right behavior are part of the very thread 
of Arendt’s web of relationships. These behaviors include those things that Arendt 
outlines specifically, such as acts of promising and forgiving. It would also include 
accepted social customs, habits of discourse and patterns of behavior that would 
govern ordinary interactions. Even though some aspect of those normative patterns 
are being violated by the existential agent as she acts and speaks in ways that 
illuminate the space between what is personally real and what is expected by the 
community, the rest of those expectations would need to remain largely intact for the 
occurrence to have coherence. After all, to modify a point made by Arendt, if 
everything to which we have been conditioned were to disappear at once, we would 
experience only a jumble of unrelated action and objects, a world of nonsense.75  
Of course, the relationship I have thus far described concerns the parallel 
between De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s construction of participatory sense-making and 
Arendt’s description of the meaningful action-processes which arise through the 
interactions between existential agents. What must now be considered is that which 
occurs when, to play off of De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s analogy, I am not a direct 
participant in the couple dance but, instead, I am interestingly engaged in watching 
100 
others dance the tango, waltz or foxtrot. In such instances, am I still involved in a 
kind of social interaction sufficient for the consideration and creation of meaning 
which is the hallmark of participatory sense-making? Arendt’s work on remembrance 
and reification suggests the possibility that I am. 
As discussed in chapter 4, remembrance occurs when the speech and action 
of existential agents is seen, heard and recollected via a process Arendt terms 
“remembrance.” Remembrance is, however, more than the basic, mental processing 
of sensory input; instead, there is an expectation that the spectator be fully engaged 
by the process of witnessing the stories others enact so that he may then translate 
those words and deeds into worldly objects: works of reification.76 Reifications 
produced in the fulfillment of remembrance are more than the usual kinds of 
mundane use-objects which typically serve as buffers against the endless cyclicality 
of nature by forging a common world out of the organic environment as it is given. In 
instances where reifications are created in fulfillment of remembrance, Arendt seeks 
the fabrication of something special, something beautiful.77 These special objects 
require Arendt to delineate a new class of workers whose craftsmanship transcends 
the basic use-objects that homo faber would typically create—a class of artists, 
poets, historiographers, and the like. Being part of this select group of workers 
comes, however, at a price: in order to fulfill their duty of remembrance and 
reification, Arendt’s artisans may not be existential actors, themselves. In other 
words, they look with interest upon that which is occurring within the space of 
appearance, but they are not direct participants.  
Throughout course of her canon, Arendt offers various reasons why the 
spectator must withdraw from active involvement. In The Human Condition, she 
emphasizes that the execution of the talents necessary for a craftsperson to produce 
an object of reification requires a retreat from the interactions of the public realm and 
into the solitariness of the private realm.78 In her essay “The Crisis in Culture,” Arendt 
argues that a level of personal distance and disinterest is required in order to be able 
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to assess the meaning of a witnessed event.79 She expands this argument in the 
chapter titled “Thinking and Doing: The Spectator” in the first volume of The Life of 
the Mind. There, Arendt states that the “nobility” of the spectators  
is only that they do not participate in what is going on but look at it as a mere 
spectacle. From the Greek word for spectators, theatai, the later philosophical 
term “theory” was derived, and the word “theoretical” until a few hundred 
years ago meant “contemplating,” looking upon something from the outside, 
from a position implying a view that is hidden from those who take part in the 
spectacle and actualize it. The inference to be drawn from this early 
distinction between doing and understanding is obvious: as a spectator you 
may understand the “truth” of what the spectacle is about; but the price you 
pay is participating in it.80   
Even though the spectator is not directly involved in the dynamic occurring 
between existential agents, it is my contention that what Arendt describes constitutes 
a special type of intersubjective occurrence. This occurrence arises out of the fact 
that, when one of those agents finds the courage to expose and disclose herself 
though the words and deeds of the story she enacts, she shows “who” she is, and 
thus actualizes the potential that is bio-ontologically rooted within her. As Patchen 
Markell rightly states, once the move occurs from  
possibility to actuality—regardless of how probable or improbable we may 
have taken it to be while it was still only a possibility—something changes in a 
different register; namely, the register in which happenings are not only 
caused state of affairs but also meaningful events, features of a world, and, in 
particular, occasions for response.81  
In other words, when a second, existential natality occurs for the actor, others within 
the web of relationships may respond by initiating their own new and unpredictable 
action-processes. Additionally, an invitation is issued to the spectators who also now 
have the ability and, in my judgment, the expectation, to offer their own responses to 
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that which they have witnessed. These responses do not take the form of words and 
deeds but, instead, are issued via the objects of reification.  
The dynamic between the agent and the spectator, therefore, mimics the 
basic form of a conversation, with a failure on the part of the spectator to formulate 
an answer to the question posed by the existential agent causing a communicative 
and interactional breakdown analogous to what would occur if I asked my dinner 
companion a question and found myself met only by his blank stare. It must be 
noted, however, that even when the spectator does respond, the agent has no 
control, no authority, over the reply that is issued. In this way, each party retains his 
autonomy.  
This conversational dynamic suggests that even though what occurs between 
Arendt’s existential agent and witnessing spectator “is not interaction in the 
embodied immediacy of the encounter, certain kinds of observation—those which 
result in narrative, monuments, etc. could be part of an interaction over time and in a 
wider framework.”82 Furthermore, this interaction “can be such that others also join 
in;” this opens the possibility for further activities of meaning-making in instances 
where the spectator communicates significance of those words and deeds of the 
originative event to people removed from their point of origination, either by space 
and/or time.83 In order to explicate more about the temporally extended nature of the 
interaction between the agent and the spectator, the framework that supports it and 
the ways in which others may participate, I am now going to turn to the third 
developmental component of Interaction Theory, communicative and narrative 
competency.   
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CHAPTER 6 
NARRATIVE 
 
In the previous chapter, insights from The Life of the Mind and research on primary 
intersubjectivity allowed us to construct a more cogent account of embodiment than 
the one offered by Arendt in The Human Condition, especially as related to individual 
sensory-emotional perceptions and their concomitant communicability to others. 
Scholarship on secondary intersubjectivity allowed for an expanded discussion of 
spectator judgment, including the process of participatory sense-making—the 
consideration and creation of meaning through our interactions with others. Those 
who study participatory sense-making have focused on face-to-face, dyadic 
encounters which parallel Arendt’s description of the action-processes which arise 
through the interactions between existential agents. I asserted that in the case of 
Arendt’s existential agent and witnessing spectator, a third-person or observational 
stance also constituted a sufficient level of interaction for participatory sense-making 
because it is a special circumstance in which the dynamic between the agent and the 
spectator mimics the basic form of a conversation. Furthermore, it was my contention 
that this inherently conversational dynamic is enhanced by being temporally 
extended, situated within a supporting framework and constructed in such a manner 
as to invite the participation of others. In this chapter, I am going to employ 
scholarship related to communicative and narrative competency to support these 
claims.  
 
Selfhood and the Story: Lived Narratives and Retrospective Recountings  
As the third developmental component of Interaction Theory, communicative and 
narrative competency arises as we gain command of different types of narratives that 
allow for a more nuanced, sophisticated and complex understanding of self, others 
and intersubjective interactions than can be attained solely through the 
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developmental, biological or embodied aspects of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity.1 Galen Strawson states that, among proponents of this approach, 
There is widespread agreement that human beings typically see or live or 
experience their lives as a narrative or story of some sort, or at least as a 
collection of stories. I’ll call this the psychological Narrativity thesis, using the 
word “Narrative” with a capital letter to denote a specifically psychological 
property or outlook. The psychological Narrativity thesis is a straightforwardly 
empirical, descriptive thesis about the way ordinary human beings actually 
experience their lives. This is how we are, it says, this is our nature. The 
psychological Narrativity thesis is often coupled with a normative thesis, 
which I’ll call the ethical Narrativity thesis. This states that experiencing or 
conceiving one’s life as a narrative is a good thing; a richly Narrative outlook 
is essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood.2 
Of course, it is with no small sense of irony that I am commencing my discussion by 
calling on Stawson’s work. He is, after all, a predominant figure in the anti-narrative 
movement and rejects both the psychological and the ethical view, claiming they 
“hinder human self-understanding, close down important avenues of thought, 
impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities, needlessly and wrongly distress those 
who do not fit their model, and are potentially destructive in psychotherapeutic 
contexts.”3 As such, it is undoubtedly not meant as a compliment when Strawson 
names Alasdair MacIntyre as “the founding figure in the modern Narrativity camp.”4  
While I cannot claim to know if MacIntyre’s work has, as Strawson suggests, 
ever predicated a psychological schism, it has sparked much debate concerning the 
relationship between self and story: is the self constructed through a living narrative, 
so that the story constitutes the self, and/or is part of what should be understood as 
selfhood found in the ability to tell one’s life story in a narrative form that elucidates 
the context, structure and logic of our actions? In his iconic text After Virtue, 
MacIntyre answers both of these questions in the affirmative—responses that, 
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according to Allen Speight, find their “particular impetus” within The Human 
Condition.5 While I agree that Arendt’s construction of a lived narrative enacted 
through words and deeds foreshadows MacIntyre’s formulation, Arendt and 
MacIntyre hold very different views on whether we should also then be able to 
recount our lives in the form of a retrospective biography. In order to highlight the 
similarities and the difference in their work, I am going to address issues relevant to 
the lived narrative and those related to the retrospective biography one at a time.  
To begin, it is necessary to recount that within the text of The Human 
Condition, Arendt asserts that we are born into the private realm through the laboring 
of our mothers. Upon our arrival, we immediately start to be conditioned to the 
accepted norms of our inherited tradition. Arendt, however, asserts clearly that a gap 
necessarily exists between the person we are conditioned to be, and “who” we are 
explicitly, uniquely, newly, authentically. Just as biological necessities are met 
through the tasks of labor, and world-building occurs through the activities of work, 
revealment of “who” someone is happens as a result of action.  
Action, understood as the words and deeds that disclose “who” someone is, 
“’produces’ stories with or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces 
tangible things.”6 These “enacted stories,” as Arendt calls them, are not performative 
recountings of events that have already occurred. Instead, they reveal the unique 
identity of the actor.7 Additionally, the words and deeds which produce these stories 
are not expressible by an actor who is isolated. Instead, we may only reveal “who” 
we are to others. In this way, one’s unique identity is disclosed within a plurality or 
what Arendt alternately terms the “web of relationships.”  
When the words and deeds through which we enact our story come into 
being within the web of relationships, a new phenomenological space comes into 
being in order to accommodate the event. This is the space of appearance, “where I 
appear to others as others appear to me, when men exist not merely like other living 
or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly.”8 Within the space of 
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appearance, agents extend to each other mutual consideration, including the making 
of promises and the offering of forgiveness. These considerations are necessary 
because of the boundless, unpredictable and irreversible consequences that may 
follow from the stories we enact.  
Enacting our story is unpredictable because the entelechy of action is not the 
same as creating the artifacts of work; there is no tangible product produced through 
action, only a process. It is boundless because every action not only touches off a 
reaction, but a chain of reactions; every action-process may be the genesis of other 
new and unpredictable processes.9 Once an action-process has begun, by the very 
fact that it is boundless and unpredictable, it is also irreversible. Therefore, it is 
impossible to stop, undo or annul what an existential agent has begun through her 
words and deeds, even if the results are disastrous.10 The boundless, unpredictable 
and irreversible nature of Arendtian action as it unfolds within the intersubjective web 
of relationships leads her to make the following assertion about the authorship of the 
stories we enact: 
Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human world 
through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life 
story. In other words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an 
agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is 
its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but 
nobody is its author.11 
Despite the challenges inherent in enacting stories where they can be seen and 
heard by others and, in the process, showing ourselves to be more than simply 
mirrors of our cultural conditioning, one of the reasons Arendt values this process is 
because it is “like a second birth” for the individual who undertakes it, a rebirth which 
is existential instead of biological.12  
In his canonical work After Virtue, MacIntyre constructs his concept of 
narrative in such a way that it shares five commonalities with Arendt’s: it is enacted, 
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teleologically oriented, embedded within an inherited socio-historical tradition, 
influenced by others and has an unpredictable outcome. Specifically, MacIntyre 
envisions our lives as narratives that we enact through “both conversations in 
particular then and human actions in general.”13 These words and deeds are aimed 
towards a final, teleological end, which MacIntyre terms a personal “narrative quest.” 
In order to undertake this quest, I must have an adequate sense of the larger socio-
cultural and institutional framework into which I am born and in which “the story of my 
life is always embedded.”14 I must then recognize the moral limitations of that 
tradition—”Lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of relevant 
intellectual practices”—and seek to align with a universal, instead of a locally 
particular, principle that is assumed to be free of those shortcomings.15 According to 
MacIntyre, this process is part and parcel of the “historically extended, socially 
embodied argument” that serves to further the “not-yet-complete narrative” of the 
tradition in which I am embedded.16  
In accord with Stawson’s “ethical Narrativity thesis,” MacIntyre assumes that 
the outcome of my narrative quest will be that I discover “the good” both for myself 
and for the communities, institutions and traditions that provide the framework from 
which I derive my identity. However, even MacIntyre is forced to admit that shining a 
bright and unflattering light on normatively accepted socio-cultural practices—even if 
they are rooted in ignorance, injustice or the like—will add such a witch’s brew of 
“harms, dangers, temptations and distractions” to my narrative quest that it changes 
the authorship of the story I enact.17 MacIntyre states:  
we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own 
narratives. Only in fantasy do we live what story we please. In life, as both 
Aristotle and Engels noted, we are always under certain constraints. We enter 
upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part of an action 
that was not our making. Each of us being a main character in his own drama 
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plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama constrains 
the others.18  
This lack of authoritative control leads MacIntrye to assert that, after being 
teleological, the “second crucial characteristic of all lived narratives” is 
unpredictability.19 The unpredictability of the lived narrative brings us to an often-cited 
problem with MacIntyre’s work: insistence on narrative unity.  
MacIntyre argues that there is a tendency in existentialism and analytic 
ethical theory towards being episodic and non-contextual. In contradistinction, 
MacIntyre envisions his “enquiry into the nature of human action and identity” as 
creating a unity that links “birth to life to death” in exactly the same way any literary 
narrative ties the “beginning to middle to end.”20 However, as Paul Ricoeur rightly 
notes, one thing that differentiates literature from life is that, although a literary 
narrative may commence at any temporal point in relation to the present moment, the 
structure of the work dictates where it starts and where it ends; the first sentence is 
the beginning of the narrative and the last sentence is the conclusion.21 Conversely,  
there is nothing in real life that serves as a narrative beginning; memory is 
lost in the hazes of early childhood; my birth and, with greater reason, the act 
through which I was conceived belong more to the history of others–in this 
case, to my parents–than to me. As for my death, it will finally be recounted 
only in the stories of those who survive me. I am always moving toward my 
death, and this prevents me from ever grasping it as a narrative end.22 
Echoing Ricoeur, John Lippitt states that the problem with MacIntyre’s construction 
lies in the fact that “my death is necessarily not an event in my life, I cannot grasp it 
as an episode in the story of my life. My death can be experienced only from a 
perspective outside my life: it can be an event in the lives of the descendants and 
friends I leave behind.”23  
Seeming to sense that the very criticism offered by Ricoeur and Lippitt would 
inevitably arise, MacIntyre offers a secondary construction of narrative beginnings 
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and endings that is not biological but, instead, conceptual. MacIntyre states: “there 
are many events which are both endings and beginnings,” and when we take an 
event to be definitively one or the other, “we bestow a significance upon it which may 
be debatable.”24 With the addition of this secondary construction of beginnings and 
endings, we are left to decide if our death (MacIntyre never addresses directly the 
question of our birth) constitutes the absolute conclusion of our lived narrative and, 
thereby, rightly invites the criticisms offered by Ricouer, Lippitt and others;25 or, if our 
death should be treated as an event with indefinite significance, thus making it 
difficult to justify the importance ascribed to it within the kind of unified life narrative 
for which MacIntyre advocates.  
Arendt avoids the ambiguities found in MacIntyre’s writings on narrative unity 
by addressing the beginning of our life and the beginning of our enacted story as two 
distinct, although related, events. As has been discussed, the Arendtian concept of 
natality is constructed in such a manner as to make it inherently dual. There is a 
primary, bio-ontological birth and a second, existential rebirth. Arendt offers no 
indication that she would expect us to remember, let alone narratively recount our 
physical arrival into the world. Although she never says as much, I believe a 
reasonable argument can therefore be made that she is in accord with Ricoeur that 
our conception, gestation, labor and delivery belong first to other people’s histories 
and, at best, only secondarily to each of us. What is ours alone, however, is the 
possibility of living a fully human life, the potential for which is ontologically grounded 
in our first natality. That possibility is actualized when we are existentially reborn into 
a distinctly human life. Arendt describes that event in narrative terms, naming it as 
the moment an “individual life, with a recognizable life-story from birth to death, rises 
out of biological life.”26 Unlike MacIntyre, Arendt constructs our existential rebirth in 
such a manner as to make it clear that our biological birth and the commencement of 
our enacted story occur at different times. Furthermore, everything Arendt tells us 
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about the process of undertaking a second natality indicates that, if called upon to do 
so, we should be able to remember and recount the point at which it occurred.  
Although Arendt posits a dual natality, death is a singular event that marks 
the conclusion of any story we may enact through our words and deeds. Additionally, 
it is the point at which Arendt shifts her focus towards the retrospective narration of 
our actions and experiences. Arendt asserts unambiguously that it will not be the 
existential agent who authors that tale: the “chief characteristic of this specifically 
human life, whose appearance and disappearance constitute worldly events, is that it 
is itself always full of events which ultimately can be told as a story, establish a 
biography.”27  
A biographical account of an existential actor’s life is necessary for multiple 
reasons. First, it allows Arendt to avoid the previously discussed problem of post-
mortem narration, the expectation that the existential actor will tell the story of her life 
from beyond the grave. Second, Arendt expresses concerns about the veracity of an 
autobiographic narrative offered by the existential actor, herself: “All accounts told by 
the actors themselves, though they may in rare cases give an entirely trustworthy 
statement of intentions, aims, and motives, become mere useful source material in 
the historian’s hands and can never match his story in significance and 
truthfulness.”28 Third, Arendt links personal identity directly to a unified narrative; 
within Arendt’s construction, that unity is only revealed at the point of death.  
This unchangeable identity of the person, though disclosing itself intangibly in 
act and speech, becomes tangible only in the story of the actor’s and 
speaker’s life; but as such it can be known, that is, grasped as a palpable 
entity only after it has come to its end. In other words, human essence—not 
human nature in general (which does not exist) nor the sum total of qualities 
and shortcomings in the individual, but the essence of who somebody is—can 
come into being only when life departs, leaving behind nothing but a story.  
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Finally, Arendt’s discussion of the death introduces us to a new aspect of the 
relationship between the agent and the spectator, one that is more temporally 
extended than previously described. Up to this point, we have understood the 
spectator as being present at the point of an actor’s existential natality and then, 
through the process of remembrance and reification, crafting enduring objects that 
make present the significance of those words and deeds to people removed from 
their point of origination, either by space and/or time. As a result of this construction, 
what transpires between the agent and the spectator seems to occur within a brief 
period of time. In some instances, that may very well be the case. However, unlike 
the documenting of a single, catalytic event, the crafting of someone’s life-story in a 
form that elucidates the essence of who somebody is, implies a relational dynamic 
that occurs over an extended time period.  
 
Defining Arendtian Narratives 
Whether it is a single, catalytic event or the entire life-story of an existential agent, 
Arendt indicates the acceptable media in which her words and deeds may be reified; 
these are the “sayings of poetry, the written page or the printed book, into paintings 
or sculpture, into all sorts of records, documents, and monuments.”29 At first glance, 
Arendt’s list seems straight-forward and reasonably uncomplicated. However, even if 
we set aside non-textual media, and focus only on the “sayings of poetry, the written 
page or the printed book,” scholars simply do not agree on exactly what kind of 
works should be considered. According to George Kateb, acceptable genres would 
include novels, short stories, plays, biographies, autobiographies and historical 
accounts.30 Lisa Disch argues for the inclusion of short stories and novels, as well as 
the essays Arendt wrote for The New Yorker and Commentary.31 Disch disqualifies 
polemic historical writings, first-person testimonials, arguments or examples.32 
Veronica Vasterling rules out scientific and philosophical texts, while Mel A. Topf 
argues strongly against consideration of the novel.33  
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In order to evaluate who is correct, we find ourselves engaging a question 
that is central to the narrative approach: namely, what counts as a narrative? 
According to Peter Lamarque, the conditions “are indeed minimal.” First, “a story 
must be told, it is not found.” Additionally, “at least two events must be depicted in a 
narrative and there must be some more or less loose, albeit non-logical, relation 
between the events.” Finally, there is “a temporal relation between the events, even if 
just that of simultaneity.”34 A less minimal set of conditions is outlined by David 
Herman. 
I define narrative as a mode of representation that is situated in—must be 
interpreted in light of—a specific discourse context or occasion for telling, and 
that cues interpreters to draw inferences about a structured time-course of 
particularized events (in contrast with general patterns or trends). In addition, 
the events represented are such that they introduce conflict (disruption or 
disequilibrium) into a storyworld, whether that world is presented as actual or 
fictional, realistic or fantastic, remembered or dreamed, etc. The 
representation also conveys what it is like to live through this storyworld-in-
flux, highlighting the pressure of events on (in other words, the qualia of) real 
or imagined consciousnesses undergoing the disruptive experience at 
issue.35  
While Arendt is never explicit about the criteria she employs, one may infer from a 
survey of her writings that an Arendtian narrative should meets three standards. 
First, it must be fictional. Second, it should demonstrate perspectival plurality and, 
third, it must invite on-going reinterpretation of meaning. Since these criteria are quite 
different than ones advanced by scholars such as Lamarque and Herman, it is worth 
looking at them in a bit more detail.  
To begin, Arendt states that the “distinction between a real and a fictional 
story is precisely that the latter was ‘made up’ and the former not made at all. The 
real story in which we are engaged as long as we live has no visible or invisible 
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maker because it is not made.”36 In other words, “real” stories are constituted by the 
words and deeds of existential agents as they live and act together, as well as any 
state of affairs which arises out of those occurrences; they are enacted instead of 
authored. Conversely, fictional stories are reifications created by homo faber in 
response to the witnessing of those instances of action and speech. As discussed in 
chapter 4, in order to produce these reified objects, Arendt expects that the spectator 
will train his imagination to “go visiting,” by which she means that he will attempt to 
be and to think from where he is not in order to make sense of events which are 
fleeting, ephemeral and, more often than not, unprecedented.37 It must be 
emphasized, however, that within Arendt’s construction, this kind of imaginative 
thinking is critical, reflective, fact-based and sustaining of the public world. As such, 
even when the enduring and artifactual product of this kind of thought takes the form 
of short stories or novels—genres which generally fall under the rubric of “fiction”—
there remains an expectation that the author respects the facticity of the original 
words and deeds he seeks to reify.  
Second, due in part to her encounters with totalitarianisms, Arendt feared that 
whenever there was a diminishment of human plurality in favor of a singularity of 
perspective, the accepted point of view could easily harden into what she termed 
“ideological lies” that were expected to be believed as if they were “sacred 
untouchable truths.”38 In contradiction to this notion, as Vasterling explains, 
Arendt insists that the existence of a shared world is dependent on the 
possibility of articulating many different views of the same reality. Without a 
plurality of stories concerning human actions and the consequences thereof, 
the reality of the web of human affairs will become insubstantial to the point of 
simply evaporating. The articulation of plural viewpoints is the illumination, 
from many different perspectives, of the same fragile, ephemeral, and 
contingent web of human relationships, facts, and events—making it thereby 
more solid, more objective, more real. Without a plurality of stories about 
114 
worldly matters, the world will first loose its character of commonality, then its 
meaningfulness, and finally, its reality.39  
While it seems as though Arendt ensured this plurality through her insistence 
that a spectator engage in the process of imaginative thinking in order to mentally 
“visit” a variety of perspectives, in her posthumously published lectures on Kant, she 
went one step further. In those lectures, Arendt explicitly states that the witnessing 
spectator “exists only in the plural. The spectator is not involved in the act, but he is 
always involved with fellow spectators…. [T]he faculty they have in common is the 
faculty of judgment.”40 Thus, by the end of her career, Arendt’s spectators found 
themselves enmeshed in a web of relationships with their peers analogous to the one 
that weaves together the existential agents. As a result, just as every action that an 
agent commences within that web has the potential to become the genesis of 
countless other new and unpredictable action-process, because of the nature of the 
process of “visiting,” each additional spectator who witnesses an action exponentially 
increases the points-of-view from which it will be considered.  
Third, not only must an Arendtian narrative avoid distilling the “plural 
meanings of an incident into definitive conclusions,” it should also continue 
encouraging “contestation and multiple reinterpretation of meaning.”41 This quality of 
hermeneutic openness, however, is not simply a matter of style—something more 
native to the symbolic language of poetry than the concise prose of a historiography. 
Instead, it is the result of a “transfiguration, a veritable metamorphosis in which it is 
as though the course of nature which wills that all fire burn to ashes is reverted and 
even dust can burst into flames.”42 Arendt goes on to explain that, in the case of an 
enacted story, the reified objects are the ash and dust—the cold remains of what was 
once vital and alive. Those words and deeds can, however, be reanimated, just as 
that which was reduced to ash can revert to its original form.  
We mentioned before that this reification and materialization, without which 
no thought can become a tangible thing, is always paid for, and that the price 
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is life itself: it is always the “dead letter” in which the “living spirit” must 
survive, a deadness from which it can be rescued only when the dead letter 
comes again into contact with a life willing to resurrect it.43 
With the concept of transfiguration, Arendt indicates the way in which the 
words and deeds of an existential agent can, at any moment, be reenacted for “a 
‘fresh audience’ that will draw its conclusions based on present concerns.”44 
Concerning this reenactment, Arendt reminds us that “even if the spectacle were 
always the same and therefore tiresome, the audiences would change from 
generation to generation,” and the new audience would be unlikely to arrive at the 
same conclusions about the event as those who came before.45 In other words, each 
new audience is, in effect, a new set of spectators. In this way, the conversational 
dynamic begun when an agent first revealed “who” she was through the words and 
deeds of the story she enacts may remain open in such a way that, at any point after 
the reification occurs, others may join the interaction and participate in the process of 
sense-making in order to expand the understanding of the event.  
Having explicated the three criteria of an Arendtian narrative, we can now 
return to the question of which genres could be employed acceptably in the 
reification of speech and action. First, based on her insistence that the words and 
deeds of existential agents be documented by the witnessing spectators and not by 
the agents, themselves, I agree with Kateb that Arendt would consider biographies to 
be a satisfactory form of narrative reification. However, it is for this same reason that 
I must disagree with him about the acceptability of autobiographies. While the 
argument that disqualifies autobiographies would also apply to first-person 
testimonials, Disch offers an entirely different reason for not including them. She 
states: “A testimonial is self-expressive: it asserts ‘this is the way I see the world.’ It is 
fully determined by the experience of the speaker and, as such, can inspire refutation 
or empathy but not critical engagement as Arendt defines it.”46 According to Disch, 
Arendt defines critical engagement as “telling or hearing multiple stories of an event 
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from the plurality of perspectives that it engages.” This is necessary because “testing 
one’s perspective against the perspectives of others is to take a stand in full 
recognition of the complexity and ambiguity of the real situations in which judgments 
are made.”47 Thus, for Disch, first-person testimonials fail to meet the second criteria 
of an Arendtian narrative, perspectival plurality.  
Within the text of The Human Condition, Arendt calls the novel “the only 
entirely social art form,” a designation by which she indicates that it is a product of 
mass culture and encourages behavioral conformity.48 As such, it seems as though 
one must agree Topf’s exclusion of the novel as an acceptable means of 
retrospectively narrating the words and deeds of an existential agent. However, if we 
look outside The Human Condition at the rest of Arendt’s canon, we find that she 
wrote many literary essays on novels by authors including Kafka, Dostoevsky, Kipling 
and Melville. Additionally, she employed novels extensively in a unique pedagogical 
format through which she sought to dissolve theoretical thinking in favor of being 
“confronted with direct experience.”49 For example, in her seminar “Political 
Experience in the Twentieth Century,” which she held at the New School in 1968, 
Arendt assigned  
everything from novels to drama to history, all arranged to explore the 
experience of an imaginary person, born in 1890, who might have come into 
public life, into politics, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the First 
World War. She was making, as it were, a biography of an imaginary person, 
although we [her students] always thought that there was a very specific 
referent in her husband Heinrich Bluecher, who had had political experiences 
close to the ones she was re-creating in her imagination.50  
Given her scholarly writings on novels and, more importantly, her use of novels in the 
creation of a retrospective life-story, I think a valid argument also can be made for 
the inclusion of such works. Additionally, it suggests the possibility that an existential 
agent may not have to be an actual person but can, instead, be a literary construct.  
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The suitability of short stories raise an interesting question, because Arendt 
does quote two of them in The Human Condition—”Converse at Night in 
Copenhagen” and “The Dreamers,” both of which were written by Isak Dinesen.51 
Arendt also quotes Dinesen epigraphically at the start of her chapter on action: “All 
sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them.”52 Almost 
a decade after the publication of The Human Condition, Arendt employed the same 
quote in an essay for The New Yorker titled “Truth and Politics,” and stated that 
Dinesen “was one of the great storytellers of our time but also—and she was almost 
unique in this respect—knew what she was doing.”53 According to Lynn Wilkinson, 
what Dinesen knew how to do was two-fold. First, Dinesen was able to serve as the 
exception to the Arendtian rule. She was an existential actor who was able to 
retrospectively narrate her own life-story; most of us are familiar with the opening line 
of her autobiography, Out of Africa: “I had a farm in Africa, at the foot of the Ngong 
Hills.”54 Wilkinson posits that  
What makes such storytelling possible is an experience of extreme loss, such 
as the catastrophe of Nazism and exile or Dinesen’s loss of her farm and 
lover in the early 1930s. Such catastrophes, which for both women [Dinesen 
and Arendt] also entailed a kind of linguistic exile, make it possible to double 
back and consider the meaning of a life that followed the lines of a master-
plot that resembles that of the Judeo-Christian tradition, with expulsion from 
the garden followed by various attempts at survival and even redemption.55  
Second, Dinesen’s stories “exhibit a lack of closure: they offer an experience which is 
fragmentary and dissonant, rather than a harmonious resolution at odds with the 
world of the storyteller and her audience.”56 In other words, her work is inherently 
open to an on-going reinterpretation of meaning even though it did not go through the 
process of reification and transfiguration described by Arendt. Thus, despite not 
meeting Arendt’s procedural specifications, Dinesen’s work still meets the three 
criteria of an Arendtian narrative.  
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Since she discusses the genre in positive terms multiple times within the text 
of The Human Condition, as well as utilizes excerpted dialogue in subsequent works, 
I do agree with Kateb and Disch that plays are satisfactory forms through which to 
document the words and deeds of an existential agent.57 Similarly, Arendt 
consistently speaks highly of poetry, and especially of the writings of Randall Jarrell, 
Robert Lowell, Rainer Marie Rilke, Emily Dickinson, W.H. Auden and William Butler 
Yeats. Julia Kristeva asserts that these poets were not chosen by Arendt because of 
the “virtuosity of their expression, but rather the wisdom of their blazing stories.” 
Kristeva goes on to explain that neither the technical agility of some of them “nor the 
stylistic uniqueness of others is the focus of Arendt’s attention. She is more 
interested in “narrative themes”: in brief narrative sequences that condense or 
metaphorically express the eyewitness account of an historical experience.”58 
Conversely, scientific and philosophical works would not be acceptable objects of 
Arendtian reification because such writings aim at “clearing up the ambiguities, 
reducing the complexities, and explaining the phenomena by fitting them in a causal 
and consistent pattern.”59 According to Vasterling, this is problematic because 
“[s]cientific and philosophical explanation and knowledge are necessary, in so far as 
they establish and explain facts, but they are not sufficient to make sense of the 
facts, which is what a good story does.”60 Similarly, if historical writing becomes 
polemic, then it would be disregarded because it “relies on a ‘pre-articulated’ 
normative framework and functions not to initiate discussion but to settle it.”61  
In summary, while it is clear that biographies, plays and poems would be 
satisfactory genres for spectators to employ in reifying the narratives enacted by 
existential agents, and that autobiographies, first-person testimonials, and works of 
philosophy and science would be unsatisfactory, some types of literature remain 
questionable. Specifically, depending on where you look in Arendt’s canon, a case 
could be made for both including and excluding the novel. Because of Arendt’s great 
admiration for the author’s talent, short stories written by Isak Dinesen seem as 
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though they would be acceptable forms of reification; what is undetermined is 
whether the same can be said for short stories penned by other writers. In The Life of 
the Mind Arendt states that she “did not conceive of the historian as a spectator 
whose job is to preserve the past and hand it on as a tradition.” As such, works of 
history judged by Arendt to be polemical would not be allowed; however, if an 
historian is able to take a more open and reflective stance, then Arendt would accept 
his work. In the end, if one remains unsure about whether a certain text would find 
favor, it is probably best to turn to these words from Arendt: “No philosophy, no 
analysis, no aphorism, be it ever so profound, can compare in intensity and richness 
of meaning with a properly narrated story.”62  
 
Reified Work and Conditioning Object: The Two Functions of Arendtian 
Narratives 
Attempting to ferret out the criteria for an Arendtian narrative, and then using those 
standards to make decisions about which genres would be permissible for 
retrospectively narrating the words and deeds of an existential agent, is an important 
exegetical exercise. Additionally, it aids in illuminating the connection between two 
concepts central to The Human Condition: reification and conditioning. As previously 
discussed, Arendt argues that we are conditioned beings and that our conditioning 
begins as soon as we come into contact with the mundane use objects out of which 
the common world is largely constructed. Besides these objects, there is another 
category of artifacts crafted by the world’s workers that do not necessarily have use 
value but, arguably, do have an even more profound influence on our conditioning; 
they are media especially well-suited for preserving and transmitting the information 
that knits together a community’s phenomenological horizon, information about 
things like family structure, religious beliefs and traditions, gender roles, and other 
socio-cultural conventions and expectations. These items are monuments, artworks 
and most central to our study, various forms of narratives.63  
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In the previous chapter, I criticized Arendt for implying that such objects 
condition us to the accepted social customs, habits of discourse and patterns of 
behavior of our inherited tradition purely through the power of their physical 
existence; in support of my criticism, I cited research from the field of social cognition 
that demonstrated the necessity of intersubjective engagement between a child and 
a caregiver in order for much of that conditioning to occur.64 In terms of narratives, 
this means that we must acknowledge that there is a substantial difference in the 
learning that occurs when a toddler finds a book on the floor and flips through the 
pages, than when the child is actively supported by her caregiver in an age-
appropriate way. “For example, in acts of storytelling, such active support takes the 
form of children being prompted to answer certain questions and by having their 
attention directed at particular events.” 65 It is through this active, intersubjective 
engagement with narratives—and, specifically, with those kinds of stories Daniel D. 
Hutto terms “folk psychological narratives,” which are “distinguished by being about 
agents who act for reasons”—that children “learn the norms associated with social 
roles that pervade our everyday environments – shops, restaurants, homes and 
theatres.”66 Therefore, not only are narratives themselves the framework for further, 
ongoing interaction, but also, when properly employed, these stories are “an 
important source of guidance about the boundaries between what is acceptable and 
what is not” and, as they are internalized, they “make much unreflective social 
navigation possible.”67  
Although Arendt never makes the connection, it is reasonable to assume at 
least some of the narratives read to children will be works that were produced by 
homo faber in his role as the witnessing spectator. As such, those stories reify the 
words and deeds of an existential agent who has critically reflected on the prescribed 
boundaries, and then chosen to act in ways that explicate the gap between what is 
expected of her as a community member and “who” she is as an authentic, 
individuated self. As a result, the same folk psychological narratives that may further 
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entrench culturally confirmed normative standards, may concomitantly serve to 
document exemplary violations of those social mores. Through this process, certain 
violations of previously accepted norms become part of the “evaluative framework in 
the young. They also contribute to the development of a common sense of the 
obvious, the significant, and the ethical on which that understanding rests.”68 In other 
words, what was once a violation of established custom, discourse and behavior now 
becomes a model for that which is considered right, normal and acceptable. As new 
norms take hold, events that occurred previously are transfigured, i.e., reevaluated 
and reinterpreted in light of present circumstances. 
In short, Arendt presents narratives, as well as artworks, monuments and the 
like, in two completely different ways. In one presentation, these artifacts of work 
condition us to socio-cultural norms of our inherited tradition. In the second 
presentation, they are the media that document violations of those same normative 
structures. In Arendt’s construction, these are conceptual tracks that seemingly run 
parallel to each other without ever meeting. When we do allow them to intersect—by 
acknowledging that at least some conditioning narratives would have to have been 
produced as part of the process of remembrance and reification—then we find that 
The Human Condition contains an explicitly stated theory concerning the way in 
which we are conditioned to the accepted social customs, habits of discourse and 
patterns of behavior of our inherited tradition. Additionally, there arises an implicit 
theory concerning the means by which shifts in those same normative standards are 
facilitated by paintings, sculptures, poems, plays, historiographies, and biographies 
which communicate the significance of the originative event and the state of affairs 
which comes about as a result. In order to both illustrate, and expand upon, the 
theoretical work presented up to this point, I am now going to turn the story of Ruby 
Bridges and her integration of the William Frantz Elementary School.  
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CHAPTER 7 
RUBY 
 
In the previous chapter, I employed scholarship on narrative and communicative 
competency in order to further delineate and describe two different types of 
narratives presented within the text of The Human Condition. The first was the 
enacted narrative; the second was the retrospective account that serves to reify 
those words and deeds. I then advanced my argument concerning which genres 
would be permissible to use for recounting an enacted narrative. Finally, I made 
explicit a connection between those retrospective works and the artifactual objects 
that, according to Arendt, condition us to the accepted social customs, habits of 
discourse and patterns of behavior of our inherited tradition. In this chapter, I will 
present a detailed illustration intended to clarify these arguments and theories. I will 
focus on the historical events surrounding Ruby Bridges’ integration of the William 
Frantz Elementary School in New Orleans, Louisiana and reifications of those events 
by John Steinbeck, Norman Rockwell and Robert Coles. Before doing so, however, I 
will situate my study as a counter-example to a similar one offered by Arendt.     
 
Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock” 
Even when she was working on a book, Arendt tended to compose the text in 
shorter, essay-like sections.1 As is evident in The Human Condition, these sections 
were typically related to each other via some sort of conceptual trinity: “work, labor, 
and action; the private, the social, and the political; judging, thinking, and willing; all 
variations on the temporal categories of past, present, and future.”2 Arendt could, 
however, be neglectful of smoothly joining together the component parts in such a 
way that the exact nature of the relationship between these triadic concepts were 
made clear in the finished product. This ambiguity would be compounded in 
subsequent works where Arendt would draw on complex schema she had work out 
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previously without reiterating key points. “Her impatience,” Young-Bruehl states 
succinctly, “paved the way for many misunderstandings.”3  
Young-Bruehl was referring to “The Crisis in Education” and “Reflections on 
Little Rock,” two essays that were published shortly after The Human Condition and 
that drew heavily on that text. Published in 1961, “The Crisis in Education” contained 
Arendt’s argument for the importance of allowing the classroom to be a protected 
space where children may continue to learn the accepted socio-cultural norms of 
their community. This enculturation ensures both the sustainment of their inherited 
tradition and the possibility of its continued revitalization when something new and 
unprecedented is brought into the world through the words and deeds of an 
existential agent.4 Arendt summarized this argument in the final paragraph of the text 
by employing language that seems lifted straight from the pages of The Human 
Condition.  
What concerns us all . . . [is] our attitude towards the fact of natality: the fact 
that we have all come into the world by being born and that this world is 
constantly renewed through birth. Education is the point at which we decide 
whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it. . . . And 
education, too, is where we decide whether we love our children enough not 
to expel them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to 
strike from their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something 
unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a 
common world.5    
The argument Arendt made in “The Crisis in Education” was an attempt to 
illuminate the theoretical underpinning of a previously published essay that Arendt 
had been commissioned to write by Commentary magazine after the passage of the 
1957 Civil Rights Act, a piece of legislation that guaranteed all Americans the right to 
vote. However, as Arendt was drafting the essay for Commentary, her attention was 
captured by events in Little Rock, Arkansas. There, Governor Orval Faubus was 
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taking actions that violated Brown v. Board of Education, a ruling handed down in 
1954 by the Supreme Court of the United States that affirmed the unconstitutionality 
of separate public schools for African-American and white students. Governor 
Faubus had called out his state’s National Guard to block nine African-American 
students from attending Little Rock Central High School. In response, President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower federalized Faubus’s National Guard, as well as sent 1,200 
members of the Army’s 101st Airborne Division to Arkansas to escort the nine 
students through the massive mob of enraged, anti-integration protesters.  
By the time Arendt completed the commissioned essay, it addressed the 
1957 Civil Rights Act only secondarily and focused instead on the weighty 
responsibility that she perceived as having been placed unfairly on the young people 
of Little Rock, a responsibility to work out the problems associated with racial 
prejudice “which adults for generations have confessed themselves unable to solve.”6 
In order to emphasize her concerns, Arendt asked rhetorically: “Have we now come 
to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the 
world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?”7 
The editors at Commentary were shocked and angered by the content of the essay, 
which Arendt titled “Reflections on Little Rock.” As a result, it was not published until 
1959 when it ran in the aptly titled Dissent magazine. Its publication caused Arendt to 
be sharply criticized for what she had written, including her assertion that “enforced 
integration is no better than enforced segregation.”8  
While it is difficult at a distance of more than 50 years to find any agreement 
with the idea that public schools should not be desegregated, I can respect Arendt’s 
commitment to the principle that children, and the institutions responsible for 
educating them, should not be instrumentalized for political ends.9 However, I take 
issue with her failure to acknowledge that youngsters who are thrust into such 
circumstances can, and do, become heroes in the most Arendtian sense of that 
word.10  
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In “Reflections on Little Rock” Arendt describes with obvious dismay a 
newspaper photograph of “a Negro girl accompanied by a white friend of her father, 
walking away from school, persecuted and followed into bodily proximity by a jeering 
and grimacing mob of youngsters.”11 Arendt concluded that the girl in the picture 
“obviously, was asked to be a hero—that is, something neither her absent father nor 
the equally absent representatives of the NAACP [National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People] felt called upon to be.”12 As previously discussed, 
in Arendt’s nomenclature, a hero is a person who possesses “a willingness to act and 
speak at all, to insert one’s self into the world and begin a story of one’s own.”13 In 
other words, he or she is an existential agent. In Arendt’s description of the 
newspaper photograph, it is clear that while the girl was “asked to be a hero” Arendt 
does not see her as actually embodying that role. Instead, she is a minor character in 
much larger story and, as a result, the image is not interpreted as meaningfully 
memorializing of the actions she had taken or of the words she had spoken. The 
legacy that endures as a result of that picture is, according to Arendt, something else 
entirely: “It will be hard for the white youngsters, or at least those among them who 
outgrow their present brutality, to live down this photograph which exposes so 
mercilessly their juvenile delinquency.”14 As a counterpoint to Arendt’s presentation 
of the nameless high school student whose photograph was taken that historic day at 
Little Rock Central High School, I am now going to turn to the story of Ruby Bridges.  
 
Observations on New Orleans 
Ruby Nell Bridges was born on 8 September 1954. The fact of her biological natality 
is this: she was delivered by her cousin in a small cabin on the farm where her 
mother, father and paternal grandparents were sharecroppers. After her birth, her 
parents labored on the farm until 1957, when the threat of joblessness resulting from 
the shrinking rural economy caused the young couple to move to New Orleans, 
Louisiana. Ruby’s father, Abon, found work as a janitor and as an auto mechanic. 
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During the day, Ruby’s mother, Lucille, tended to her growing brood of children and 
in the evenings she made money working as a cleaning lady. Ruby helped keep an 
eye on her younger siblings and also attended kindergarten.15  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court ruling four years earlier in the case of 
Brown v. Board of Education affirmed the unconstitutionality of separate public 
schools for African-American and white students, and that the events at Little Rock 
Central High School had already transpired, schools in Louisiana were still racially 
segregated. In an attempt to continue to slow the integration process, government 
officials in Louisiana administered an exam to some African-American children. If a 
child passed the test, he or she would qualify for admission to one of the all-white 
schools. Since the material included on the test was far above their current education 
level, it was expected that no child would be successful in his or her attempt. Six 
young girls did, however, make passing grades.16 Two of the girls decided to remain 
in their segregated schools. A Federal judge assigned three others to begin classes 
the next fall at McDonogh No. 19 Elementary School; Ruby was the lone African-
American student assigned to attend the William Frantz Elementary School.  
With an expectation that the integration of the school would foster a violent 
reaction, and a lack of support for the measure from the Governor, Mayor and many 
others in positions of authority who were embarrassed that the six young girls had 
been able to pass the rigged exam, Deputy U.S. Marshals were brought to New 
Orleans to accompany the first-graders to school. On the morning of 14 November 
1960, dressed in a starched, white dress with a large bow in her hair, Ruby was 
accompanied by her mother and four of those Marshals as they navigated a large 
crowd that taunted the little girl with racial slurs, derogatory songs popular in the 
South during the American Civil War, a cross with the word “segregation” scrawled in 
red paint and a small coffin with a black baby-doll inside. Their actions were overtly 
encouraged by people such as Leander Perez, the district attorney for nearby 
Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes, who had proclaimed at a recent 
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segregationist rally: “Don’t wait for your daughter to be raped by these Congolese. 
Don’t wait until the burr-heads are forced into your schools. Do something about it 
now.”17  
Ruby may not have understood specifically that some people viewed African-
Americans as rapist and “burr-heads” and others, like one protester who continually 
threatened to poison the little girl, believed them to be filthy and slop-eating.18 
However, she was most certainly conditioned to the broader, socio-cultural view that 
African-Americans should be treated as though they were inferior to their white 
counterparts. One woman explained how she prepared her granddaughter for such 
treatment. 
They can scream at our Sally, but she knows why, and she’s not surprised. 
She knows that even when they stop screaming, she’ll have whispers, and 
after them the stares. It’ll be with her for life. . . . We tell our children that, so 
by the time they have children, they’ll know how to prepare them. . . . It takes 
a lot of preparing before you can let a child loose in the white world.19   
Ruby expressed her understanding of these normative expectations in drawings from 
the period: white people were rendered in precise detail—well proportioned, with the 
correct number of toes and fingers, and faces that often depicted bright and happy 
smiles. Conversely, African-Americans were always physically smaller than 
Caucasians. They were often depicted as missing appendages or lacking facial 
features; most notably, Ruby frequently rendered them mute by excluding their 
mouths or drawing only a thin line in its place. When they had ears, they were 
cartoonishly large.20 
Despite what she had been taught to believe about herself and about other 
African-Americans, renowned child psychiatrist and Pulitzer Prize-winning author, 
Robert Coles, stated that Ruby and others in the American civil rights movement who 
proceeded her prevailed  
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by summoning every bit of their humanity in the face of every effort made to 
deny any of it to them. In so doing they have become more then they were, 
more than they themselves thought they were, and perhaps more than 
anyone watching them can quite put to word: bearers and makers of tradition; 
children who in a moment—call it existential, call it historical, call it 
psychological—took what they had from the past, in their minds, out of their 
homes and made all those possessions something else: a change in the 
world, and in themselves, too.21 
I agree with Coles’s assessment that Ruby’s integration of William Frantz on that day 
in November did bring a change to the world. However, I disagree that it also 
heralded the kind of existential epiphany he described because, in her innocence, 
Ruby mistook the jeering mob for Madi Gras revelers. As such, Ruby did not yet 
realize that she was being called upon to become a bearer and maker of tradition. 
However, as Ruby continued to face the same crowd every morning and every 
afternoon, her understanding of the situation grew and she became cognizant that 
her actions were exposing a gap between the social roles that African-Americans 
were expected to embody and who she, and other members of her community were, 
as individuals.  
At first, Ruby wanted to subjugate any differences between the socio-cultural 
expectations and her lived experience, but she quickly came to a place where she 
was confident explicating the space between the two. At age eight, Ruby reflected on 
this change.  
Maybe because of all the trouble going to school at the beginning I learned 
more about my people. Maybe I would have anyway; because when you get 
older you see yourself and white kids; and you find out the difference. You try 
to forget it, and say there is none; and if there is you won’t say what it be. 
Then you say it’s my own people, and so I can be proud of them instead of 
ashamed.22  
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With her growing pride came an even more profound realization, one that 
transcended race altogether: “The greatest lesson I learned that year . . . was the 
lesson Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., tried to teach us all. Never judge people by the 
color of their skin. God makes each of us unique in ways that go much deeper.”23 
The recognition of herself as being not simply different than who she was socio-
culturally expected and conditioned to be, but as a distinct and wholly unique 
individual brought to fruition the kind of existential change in Ruby that Coles 
referenced and, in Arendtian terms, heralded her rebirth into a fully human life. 
Like any existential rebirth, Ruby’s undertaking of a second natality 
demonstrated her extraordinary courage. As discussed in chapter 3, courage is 
necessary for several reasons; one of those reasons is that “who” we are—the 
authentic, individuated self—sits in contradistinction to what is expected of us as a 
community member, be that psychologically, theologically, sexually, legally, 
aesthetically, economically or so on. Choosing to eschew some aspect of those 
standards makes the actor, at least to some degree, an outsider. No one can fully 
anticipate ahead of time what response such outsider status may provoke from those 
who remain within the ascribed societal boundaries, although the crowds waiting 
outside of school for Ruby on that first day certainly offered a strong indication. 
Therefore, it was probably not a surprise when the white owners of the neighborhood 
grocery store barred Ruby’s family from shopping in their market or when Abon lost 
his job and her paternal grandparents were displaced after the “owner of the land 
they’d sharecropped for 25 years said everyone knew it was their granddaughter 
causing trouble in New Orleans, and asked them to move.”24 At the same time that 
the family was enduring these negative responses, Ruby noted that “[p]eople from 
around the country who’d heard about me on the news sent letters and donations. A 
neighbor gave my dad a job painting houses. Other folks baby-sat for us, watched 
our house to keep away troublemakers, even walked behind the marshal’s car on my 
way to school.”25  
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While it was Ruby’s assessment that her family could not have made it 
through such a difficult time without the kindness shown by these many strangers, 
neighbors and friends, Ruby received a very special kind of support from Barbara 
Henry. Mrs. Henry was Ruby’s first-grade teacher. The position at William Frantz was 
her first job in New Orleans and, having recently moved to the city with her husband, 
she was excited for the opportunity. However, “her enthusiasm turned to stunned 
anxiety as she found herself facing the scenes now so well documented.”26 While the 
crowds outside of the school required Mrs. Henry to have a police escort between 
her car and the building, she had no such protection once she was inside. There, the 
school’s principal was openly prejudiced and adversarial, and the other teachers 
ignored her except for the times they made malicious comments about her 
willingness to teach an African-American child.27 Despite all of these difficulties, Mrs. 
Henry remained committed to her new job, and her commitment did not waiver even 
after she learned that the parents of the white children had decided to boycott the 
school and that Ruby was going to be her only student.  
Together, Mrs. Henry and Ruby created their own space of appearance in the 
classroom they shared; we know it was such a space because it fulfilled Arendt’s 
mandate that those who are within it reveal themselves “not merely like other living or 
inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly.”28 In this case, Ruby revealed 
herself to Mrs. Henry as being smart, resilient, brave and sensitive. “She was a petite 
pioneer,” said Mrs. Henry. “How could you not fall in love with a child like her?”29 At 
first, Ruby could not see Mrs. Henry for who she was explicitly. All she could see was 
that her teacher was young and white; having not previously spent time with any 
white people, Mrs. Henry made Ruby nervous. However, as they worked on each 
day’s lessons, Ruby began to recognize that her teacher was dedicated, loving, kind, 
considerate and worthy of admiration. Over time, Ruby grew so attached to her that 
she began to imitate Mrs. Henry’s mannerisms, including the Boston accent that 
soon overpowered Ruby’s Southern drawl.30   
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Like all existential actors within the space of appearance, Ruby and Mrs. 
Henry relied on illocutionary acts like promising and forgiving.31 Making promises 
binds existential agents to certain courses of actions; in other words, “promising 
looks forward as it seeks to establish islands of security in an otherwise uncertain 
and unpredictable future.”32 Forgiveness is backwards-looking, and offers release 
from the unforeseeable and unintended outcomes of action. One of the most 
important promises made between Ruby and Mrs. Henry was one that was never 
spoken. Specifically, in Ruby’s entire first year at William Frantz, neither she nor Mrs. 
Henry missed a single day of school. In the classroom, they sat side-by-side or 
worked together at the blackboard. Since it wasn’t safe for Ruby to go to the cafeteria 
or the playground, they ate lunch together at their desks and then pushed those 
desks aside so that they could stretch or do jumping-jacks. In short, through their 
actions, they each promised the other that no matter what had to be endured, it 
would not be endured alone. Maybe because of the unique quality of their 
relationship, it does not seem as though Ruby and Mrs. Henry needed to offer each 
other forgiveness. However, as Ruby recounts, forgiveness was central to the story:      
From her window, Mrs. Henry always watched me walk into school. One 
morning when I got to our classroom, she said she’d been surprised to see 
me talk to the mob. “I saw your lips moving,” she said, “but I couldn’t make 
out what you were saying to those people.” 
“I wasn’t talking to them,” I told her. “I was praying for them.” Usually I prayed 
in the car on the way to school, but that day I’d forgotten until I was in the 
crowd. Please be with me, I’d asked God, and be with those people too. 
Forgive them because they don’t know what they’re doing.33 
By the start of the spring term, a few first graders had returned to William 
Frantz, and Mrs. Henry insisted that they have class with Ruby. The principal refused 
the request until Mrs. Henry suggested that they call the superintendent of schools to 
discuss the matter. At that point, the principal relented and allowed the other children 
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to come to Ruby’s classroom for part of the day.34 These visits continued until June 
when Ruby said good-bye to Mrs. Henry for the summer. When Ruby returned to 
William Frantz the next fall for second grade, she found herself in a fully integrated 
class. The protesters were gone, but so was Mrs. Henry. Her unexpected absence 
devastated Ruby, and no one was willing to ease the little girl’s distress by telling 
Ruby where she had gone nor, for that matter, acknowledging what had occurred the 
previous year: “Years later I found out she [Mrs. Henry] hadn’t been invited to return 
to William Frantz, and she and her husband had moved back to Boston. It was 
almost as if that first year of school integration had never happened. No one talked 
about it. Everyone seemed to have put that difficult time behind them.”35  
While it was true that Ruby had indeed lost Mrs. Henry, and that many other 
people were undoubtedly trying to live down the merciless actions they had taken the 
previous year, what Ruby did not yet realize was that her words and deeds had not 
been forgotten. To the contrary, they had been reified in three important works: John 
Steinbeck’s 1962 book Travels with Charley: In Search of America; Norman 
Rockwell’s 1963 painting “The Problem We All Live With;” and Robert Cole’s 1967 
study Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage and Fear.  
 
Steinbeck and the Cheerleaders  
In the book Travels with Charley: In Search of America, Pulitzer Prize-winning author 
John Steinbeck recounted the approximately 10,000 mile road trip he took with his 
poodle in a customized camper he named after Don Quixote’s horse, Rocinante. The 
final leg of Steinbeck’s journey brought him to a region of the country he dreaded 
visiting, seeing it as a place filled with pain, confusion, bewilderment and fear: the 
South. Steinbeck believed that the problems endemic to the South were rooted in the 
racial inequality that was being newly inflamed by the issue of public schools 
desegregation. As it turned out, Steinbeck would arrive in New Orleans, Louisiana in 
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time to witness a pivotal moment in the desegregation process: Ruby’s first day at 
the William Frantz Elementary School.  
What caught Steinbeck’s attention that morning at William Frantz was not, 
however, the little girl dressed in white nor the Deputy U.S. Marshals who 
accompanied her and her mother. Instead, his sights turned towards another faction, 
“a group of stout middle-aged women who, by some curious definition of the word 
‘mother,’ gathered every day to scream invectives at children.” 36 The women 
Steinbeck described were the Cheerleaders who, beginning on that first morning in 
November, took turns unleashing their denigrating monologues filed with venom and 
bile, and then “simpered in happy, almost innocent triumph when they were 
applauded.”37 When the clapping of their appreciative fans was not sufficient, the 
women rushed home to see their performance broadcast on television and brought 
newspaper clippings to pass around, “reading them aloud with little squeals of 
delight.”38  
Although what he witnessed in New Orleans raised a “weary, hopeless 
nausea” in Steinbeck, he still felt a responsibility to recount the antics of the 
Cheerleaders.39 His purpose in doing so was not, however, to communicate any 
greater historical or phenomenological meaning concerning their actual words or 
deeds. After all, Steinbeck’s description of the Cheerleaders makes it clear that these 
women were not existential agents but, instead, “crazy actors playing to a crazy 
audience.” 
Anyone who has been near the theater would know that these speeches were 
not spontaneous. They were tried and memorized and carefully rehearsed. 
This was theater. I watched the intent faces of the listening crowd and they 
were the faces of an audience. When there was applause, it was for a 
performer.40   
As such, penning descriptions of the Cheerleaders’ performance was not an act of 
reification in the Arendtian sense of the word. Instead, when Steinbeck wrote about 
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the Cheerleaders, it was in order to use them as illustrative examples of the 
normative standards that were accepted and, most literally applauded, in New 
Orleans.  
Steinbeck had come to realize that the standards embodied by the 
Cheerleaders had dire consequences beyond the continued receipt of a substandard 
education by minority children in segregated schools. Steinbeck illustrated theses 
consequences in passages concerning the Coopers, the only African-American 
family who lived in Salinas, California, where he grew up.41 One of the Cooper’s three 
sons was in Steinbeck’s class in school, while the others were a year ahead and a 
year behind him, respectively. The oldest of the boys was a star athlete who excelled 
at pole-vaulting. The middle son was academically gifted and topped the class in 
mathematics and Latin. The youngest boy had a talent for music, composing original 
pieces at an early age.42 Beyond these specific talents, Steinbeck identified 
something more basic. 
I realize now that there was something else about the Coopers that set them 
apart from other Negroes I have seen and met since. Because they were not 
hurt or insulted, they were not defensive or combative. Because their dignity 
was intact, they had no need to be overbearing, and because the Cooper 
boys had never heard that they were inferior, their minds could grow to their 
true limits.43 
Steinbeck went on to immediately offer this contrast: “I have seen plenty since and 
have felt the shattering waves of violence and despair and confusion. I have seen 
Negro children who really cannot learn, particularly those who in their gelatin plate of 
babyness have been told they were inferior.”44  
Steinbeck’s story about the Cooper boys gives us insight into that which he 
was seeking to reify, seeking to make sense of and to preserve, and why it was 
important to do so. In the end, Steinbeck was not interested in the courage 
demonstrated by little Ruby Bridges as she endured the assault leveled day after day 
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by the Cheerleaders.45 Nor was he engaged by the bestial, barnyard noises of those 
women. Instead, it was the underlying normative standards of which they were 
embodied exemplars—standards, which if not challenged, retard the potential of an 
entire subset of the population. Thus, Steinbeck was meaningfully expanding on 
Arendt’s definition of remembrance and reification. He did so not by seeking to 
understand what it meant that Ruby Bridges integrated the William Frantz 
Elementary School, but what it would have meant if she hadn’t, if the moral 
limitations of a tradition—those which Alasdair MacIntyre names as injustice, 
cowardice, mob rule, ignorance and the like—were left unchallenged and the 
Cheerleaders were, therefore, allowed to continue being the bearers and makers of 
tradition.   
 
Rockwell Gets Real 
Travels with Charlie was on the New York Times Best Seller list for a year, and 
occupied the top spot for a nonfiction work during the week of 21 October 1962. 
Inspired by what he read in that travelogue, Norman Rockwell painted “The Problem 
We All Live With,” which depicted Ruby in her white dress and bow, carrying her 
school supplies.46  She is shown walking conspicuously out-of-step between two 
rows of faceless, Deputy U.S. Marshals; her own face is placid. On the wall behind 
her is evidence of the outrage her actions are causing: splattered fruit and graffiti 
reading “Nigger” and “KKK.” The painting was the first of its kind by the artist, who 
was best known for his idyllic renderings of small-town America that graced 322 
covers of The Saturday Evening Post between 1916 and 1963. At the age of 70 and 
free from the constraints of the Post’s editorial policies, which disallowed the 
depiction of minorities in anything other than service industry positions, Rockwell 
began exploring the darker aspects of life in America, thus offering his own brand of 
social commentary on the issues of civil rights, poverty and religious intolerance.     
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When “The Problem We All Live With” appeared in the 14 January 1964 issue 
of Look magazine, Rockwell’s rendering of the events in New Orleans invited much 
response of its own. Letters poured into Look; one missive representative of those 
received from writers opposed to desegregation called Rockwell “a traitor to the white 
race, and a traitor to the illustrious white founders of this country.”47 Conversely, 
another letter requested a reproduction of the painting for Louis L. Redding, an 
African-American who had been a member of the NAACP legal team that had argued 
the Brown v. Board of Education case in front of the Supreme Court.48 The painting 
was also shown in a Soviet newspaper article which trumpeted the headline, “Behind 
the Free World’s Façade: Democracy, American Style” and was followed by an 
article that, by today’s standards, reads as if it is satire: “The [American] papers 
report that even the youngest students attending these [integrated] schools have 
already learned to understand and spell the words most important for them: ‘boycott’ 
and ‘freedom.’”49 The range of responses did not discourage Rockwell from his new 
interest in civil rights. His 1965 work Murder in Mississippi (Southern Justice) 
illustrated the murder of civil rights workers in Mississippi. In 1967’s New Kids in the 
Neighborhood, he depicted the next frontier of desegregation: the suburbs.50    
The same year Rockwell produced New Kids in the Neighborhood, he made it 
clear in a letter that he wrote to fellow artist and friend, Joe Mugnaini, that the change 
in his work was about more than simply finding a new audience in Look magazine, 
which had continued to print Rockwell’s more socially conscious images. Instead, he 
drew a distinction between works representative of that which was normatively 
accepted and those which exemplified unique individuals differentiating themselves 
from those standards: “As I stated, I am interested in the human predicament. When I 
was doing the Saturday Evening Post covers it was from the general human interest 
viewpoint, but now I seem to be more excited and interested in the current problems 
in America and the world today. I don’t know the answer, but I am trying.” Rockwell 
went on to express his methodology as such: “I guess that my philosophical 
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approach to life is that I am fascinated with the human individual and his complicated 
environment, and I am trying to say something to help.”51 
Just as Steinbeck meaningfully expanded Arendt’s definition of remembrance 
and reification through his choice to communicate something important about the 
currently accepted normative standards of the community, instead of reifying Ruby’s 
actual words and deeds, Rockwell’s work helps us to understand Arendt’s concept of 
transfiguration. As discussed in the previous chapter, transfiguration allows a reified 
object to become the vehicle through which the story of an existential agent can be 
reenacted for “a ‘fresh audience’ that will draw its conclusions based on present 
concerns.”52 In this case, the reified object was Steinbeck’s book Travels with 
Charlie, as well as the news reports that ran in the papers and on televisions. Out of 
those “dead letters” the “living spirit” of Ruby’s words and deeds were resurrected in 
such a manner that Rockwell could become a spectator, witnessing the events in 
New Orleans even though he was not physically present at the point when and where 
they originally occurred. What Rockwell then chose to reify was the actions of the 
little girl who, in keeping with journalistic policies adopted to protect her, Steinbeck 
never even identified by name.53  
The result of this transfiguration, of this reenactment, was that multiple years 
after the actual event, and working in a studio located 1,500 miles away from New 
Orleans, Rockwell crafted the iconic image of Ruby’s first day at William Frantz 
Elementary School. In doing so, he serves to remind us that while we do privilege 
eyewitness accounts in circumstances such as testimony in court hearings, we have 
a simultaneous tradition of accepting interpretations of actions and events from 
people who were not physically present at the moment they originally occurred. We 
see this quite obviously in religious iconography. After all, we would not discount the 
socio-historical and phenomenological power of Leonardo da Vinci’s painting The 
Last Supper simply because da Vinci did not actually break bread with Jesus and the 
apostles. We recognize a similar kind of power in Rockwell’s reification of Ruby.  
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Robert and Ruby 
Despite the fact that both Steinbeck and Rockwell’s work received much attention, 
Ruby’s entrance into the public realm had not, as her mother hoped, turned out to be 
a catalyst for ongoing opportunity in the young girl’s life. Instead, the desire to forget 
the pain and strife that had surrounded desegregation in New Orleans brought with it 
a concomitant amnesia concerning the central role Ruby had played in the event. So, 
with no recognition and no fanfare, Ruby completed her schooling at William Frantz 
and then attended an integrated high school. After graduation, Ruby became a travel 
agent, got married and had four sons. In 1993, Ruby returned to William Frantz, but 
she was not there to give a speech or accept an award. Ruby was there to volunteer. 
Her brother had been murdered in a drug-related shooting; his young daughters 
attended William Frantz and Ruby wanted to be available to them as they struggled 
to recover from their father’s death.54  
What Ruby discovered when she returned to her old school was that it had 
entered a new era of segregation. William Frantz had become a substandard, 
underfunded, inner-city school attended almost exclusively by poor, African-American 
children from the local housing projects. Distressed by what she saw, Ruby started 
The Ruby Bridges Foundation with the hope of securing resources to help the 
students. Modest gains were made though the Foundation, but the big opportunities 
Ruby and her mother had long hoped for did not begin to materialize until 1995. 
That’s when Robert Coles published the picture book The Story of Ruby Bridges and 
reporters began, for the first time in more than 30 years, to make inquiries into what 
happened to the little girl who’d been accompanied to first grade by U.S. Marshals. 
As Ruby stated, “No one expected to find me back at my old school.”55  
The Story of Ruby Bridges did not mark the first time Coles had written about 
Ruby. His 1967 book Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage and Fear detailed his 
regular visits with Ruby and the three other girls who were sent to McDonogh No. 19 
Elementary School. Coles began meeting with each of them after he passed William 
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Frantz one morning in 1960 on his way to a medical conference from Keesler Air 
Force base, where he was the captain in charge of a neuropsychiatric unit. 
Witnessing the histrionics of the mob outside of the school, Coles decided to contact 
the NAACP to offer assistance; according to Ruby, “Dr. Coles felt that it would be 
easier for me to endure the stress if I had someone to talk to outside of my family.”56  
During the time that Coles was working with Ruby, he was studying material 
written by psychoanalysts including Harold Searles, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and 
Erik Erikson.57 However, Coles was also deeply attracted to the writing of Walker 
Percy who, as both an author and a physician, drew from works by Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger and William James in order to incorporate issues central to existentialism, 
phenomenology and philosophy of language into his work.58 Coles was especially 
interested in the descriptions he found in Percy’s novels concerning “moments when 
we step out of the ordinary round of experience, moments he [Percy] calls ‘rotations,’ 
in order to gain new perspectives and regain authentic selfhood.”59  
Children of Crisis bears the mark of these various influences. It is a rigorous 
study grounded in “direct, sustained observation of individual human beings living in 
a significant and critical period of history.”60 However, it also reflects Coles’s growing 
realization concerning the availability of such moments of existential insight to all 
people regardless of their economic standing, education level and, in Ruby’s case, 
age; as such, they offer “powerful proof that no systematic explanation of behavior 
will suffice, no cultural or psychological or biological theory can fully account for such 
moments of illumination.”61 In the end, it was this realization that forced Coles to 
change his entire frame of reference from one that was heavily influenced by Freud 
to one that seems to echo insights from The Human Condition, including the 
relationship between speech, action and agency, as well as the need for both 
courage and forgiveness. Patrick J. Ryan explains this shift as follows:  
Coles described children as “moral protagonists and antagonists.” One of his 
most powerful protagonists was Ruby Bridges, who unflinchingly faced angry 
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mobs of racist whites to become the first African-American child to attend a 
white school in Louisiana. Coles understood Ruby’s courage through the 
Freudian concept of “ego-ideal,” though he no longer interpreted it as a 
prediscursive, unconscious structure of the mind, nor Ruby as merely the 
product of her condition. For Coles, the ego-ideal derived from the human 
agency required to practice and speak. Ruby knowingly gave “moral life” to 
existing bodies of thought—the Christian meanings of forgiveness, humility, 
and courage. She emerges as a hero of her own life, and a political actor 
within a movement that used the possibilities of childhood to transform the 
racial hierarchy of a nation.62  
Coles also went beyond what is offered in The Human Condition by making it 
evident that Ruby’s heroic actions were embodied expressions which, counter to 
claims made by Arendt, were effectively and affectively available to him as an 
observer. These bodily expressions were not, however, the ones you might expect to 
see from a child in Ruby’s position, such as clinging to the adults who cared for and 
protected her or being haunted by nightmares. Instead, day after day, Ruby 
“marched rather firmly and stolidly” right into the school building; she rarely looked at 
the protesters except for the “slightest of hurried, backward glances.”63 Furthermore, 
“Ruby slept well, studied well at school, [and] played regularly after school.”64 
Nonetheless, Ruby did manifest her ordeal through one set of irrepressible physical 
expressions.  
Although she always told Dr. Coles that her appetite remained good, in truth, 
Ruby’s intake decreased greatly. She avoided all foods—even those she had 
previously favored—unless they were processed and prepackaged. She refused to 
share her portion of any acceptable items, yet she would not consume them if she 
was alone.65 These changes engaged Coles in a way which caused him pay closer 
attention to the specifics of Ruby’s situation in order to better understand that which 
he was witnessing. In doing so, Coles came to understand that Ruby’s occasional 
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glances back into the crowd of protesters were more than just an unreflective 
reaction to the commotion outside the school. Instead, they were “specifically 
directed and significant.”66 Ruby was looking for the woman who routinely and loudly 
declared her intention to murder the little girl by choking her or by poisoning her food, 
the latter clearly being a threat which, as Ruby’s actions made clear, she was unable 
to dismiss.67 Years later, however, Ruby attempted to do just that, recounting the 
same episode as follow:  
At home, there was a period of time when I had trouble eating, too. All I 
wanted were potato chips and sodas. My parents told Dr. Coles about it, and 
he tried to talk to me. Then he remembered the woman in the crowd outside 
school each morning who said she was going to poison me. Dr. Coles thought 
I was afraid the woman would really do it. I’m not sure if I was afraid of that or 
not. Perhaps I was just a picky eater.”68 (48-49) 
In this case, it is hard to believe that Ruby suddenly, and for no reason, became so 
discriminating about what she would consume, especially when she adds that, once 
the school year was over and she no longer faced the protesters, her appetite 
returned to normal. As such, we are left with a case where the immediate 
observations and subsequent interpretation of an existential agent’s words and 
deeds by an observer are likely more precise than the recollection offered by that 
agent forty-five years after the original event.   
 After publishing Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage and Fear, Coles wrote 
four more volumes documenting how children and their families cope with periods of 
profound change. In 1973, volumes 2 and 3 were awarded the Pulitzer Prize for 
General Non-Fiction along with Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans 
in Vietnam by Frances FitzGerald. Coles then went on to develop his theories in 
more than fifty additional books and one thousand articles; those texts that reference 
Ruby can be found throughout his extensive canon and include The Moral Life of 
Children, The Political Life of Children, The Spiritual Life of Children, The Call of 
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Service: A Witness to Idealism, Lives of Moral Leadership, Handing One Another 
Along: Literature and Social Reflection and Lives We Carry with Us: Profiles of Moral 
Courage.69 However, in 1995, Coles reified Ruby’s words and deeds in a very 
different media than he had previously employed: The Story of Ruby Bridges, a 
picture book intended for children between the ages of five and nine.70 With that 
work, Coles demonstrated the rightness of an argument he made in his book The 
Moral Intelligence of Children, an argument that again is very much in accord with 
Arendt: “Stories from real life as well as stories from movies, from literature, can stir 
and provoke the moral imagination. Didactic and theoretical arguments don’t work 
well; narratives, images, observed behavior all do.”71  
In The Call of Stories, Coles substantiated his argument concerning the 
unique ability of narratives to aid in shaping our evaluative framework, and 
foreshadowed insights central to the Narrative Practice Hypothesis discussed in the 
previous chapter. Specifically, Coles elucidated how reading and responding to a 
character in a story allows us to inhabit his expectations, energy and emotions, as 
well as recognize and consider what occurs when that inner life is translated 
externally into action. Through this process, aspects of the character become 
integrated into our cognitive process, and influences how we interpret information, 
solve problems, control our behavior and make sense of the behavior of others. In 
other words, Coles explains, characters in stories “don’t only occupy lives inside of 
books, but live in countless minds.”72 He continues this line of thought by stating that  
The whole point of stories is not “solutions” or “resolutions” but the 
broadening and even a heightening of our struggles—with new protagonists 
and antagonist introduced, with new concerns or apprehension or hope, as 
one’s mental life accommodates itself to a series of arrivals: guests who have 
a way of staying, but necessarily of staying out.”73  
In summation, Coles recounted the words of one of his students, who said that 
stories “become my images and sounds, part of me. You don’t do that with theories. 
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You don’t do that with a system of ideas. You do it with a story, because in a story—
oh, like it says in the Bible, the word becomes flesh.”74  
Much as Steinbeck’s work had allowed the events at William Frantz to be 
reenacted for Norman Rockwell, Coles’s book seemed to do the same thing for a 
whole new generation of spectators. This time, however, the amount and variety of 
interpretive works created in response far exceeded anything produced previously. In 
1998, The Wonderful World of Disney debuted the made-for-television movie Ruby 
Bridges: A Real American Hero. Ruby recounted her own story in several media, 
including Through My Eyes, published in 1999 and Ruby Bridges Goes to School: My 
True Story, published in 2009. Additionally, Lori McKenna’s 2000 album Paper, 
Wings & Halo featured the tribute song “Ruby’s Shoes.” In 2006, the Alameda Unified 
School District in California opened the Ruby Bridges Elementary School. The 
Children’s Museum of Indianapolis, one of the largest children’s museums in the 
world, created a permanent exhibit in 2007 entitled “The Power of Children: Making a 
Difference.” The exhibit “takes visitors on a journey through the lives of three children 
who faced profound trials and emerged as heroes of the 20th century. The stories of 
Anne Frank, Ruby Bridges, and Ryan White exemplify for children and adults how 
every individual can make a difference.”75 In acknowledgement and celebration of the 
50th anniversary of the integration of the William Frantz Public School in 2010, the 
Norman Rockwell museum—which had founded its collection in 1975 with the 
purchase of “The Problem We All Live With” and where Ruby Bridges Hall served as 
a Trustee—mounted an installation of the reference photos, preparatory sketches 
and paintings, and letters of reaction from the public related to the painting. 
Concomitantly, the piece, toured the United States as part of the exhibition “American 
Chronicles: The Art of Norman Rockwell.”76  
As part of the anniversary tour, the painting spent multiple months hanging 
on the wall outside of the Oval Office, which is the official workspace of the President 
of the United States. It was there at the request of Barak Obama who was clearly not 
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interested in the piece because it marked a monumental, late-career shift in 
Rockwell’s portfolio and “had encouraged the cognoscenti . . . to give the elderly 
statesman of American illustration a second look.”77 Instead, he was engaged by the 
larger socio-historical meaning of what Rockwell depicted. He shared this sentiment 
with Ruby when she visited on 15 July 2011: “I think it’s fair to say that if it wasn’t for 
you guys, I wouldn’t be here today.”78 The comment President Obama made to Ruby 
underscored the importance of the actions taken by the heroes of civil rights 
movement including those who, like Ruby, were only children at the time. 
Additionally, it reminds us of the enduring power of interpretive works created in 
response to the actions of existential agents—paintings, sculptures, statues and, of 
real interest in this study, poems, plays, historiographies and biographies. After all, it 
is probably equally fair to say that without The Story of Ruby Bridges, which brought 
the events at William Frantz Elementary School to a whole new generation of 
spectators who reevaluated, reinterpreted and newly reified what had occurred in 
light of present circumstances, Ruby may not have ever found herself as an honored 
guest at the White House. Instead, she may have remained nothing more than a 
volunteer quietly working to better the school she had once attended.  
 
Conclusion 
Much like the African-American teenager photographed outside Little Rock Central 
High School, Ruby Bridges was also “asked to be a hero.”79 I sought to make it clear 
through my analysis that while Arendt was dismissive of the girl in the picture, Ruby 
most certainly answered the call to serve as a bearer and maker of tradition, fulfilling 
along the way each and every criteria explicated by Arendt: Ruby was conditioned to 
the accepted socio-cultural norms of her community, critically reflected on that 
inherited tradition, found the courage to begin a story of her own, found herself in the 
company of other existential agents within a space of appearance, made promises 
and offered forgiveness. I then employed key examples of the media through which 
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Ruby’s actions were memorialized to both illustrate and expand on Arendt’s theory of 
remembrance and reification.  
Specifically, Travels with Charley: In Search of America demonstrated 
Steinbeck’s decision to articulate the shared expectations, values and beliefs against 
which an existential agent acts in opposition. In doing so, he presented readers with 
the implicit choice of siding with the Cheerleaders whose actions, in accord with what 
Axel Honneth terms Mißachtung or “disrespect,” inhibit subjugated people from 
realizing their full potential.80 Or, readers could engage an alternative normative 
framework illustrated by the treatment offered to the Cooper boys by the residents of 
Salinas, treatment that allowed their minds to “grow to their true limits.”81  
From our vantage point, making a decision between the Cheerleaders and 
the Coopers may seem all but morally obvious. However, it is important to remember 
that, for many people reading Steinbeck’s book at the time of its publication, it may 
have served as a necessary social simulator: 
Just as flight simulators allow pilots to train safely, stories safely train us for 
the big challenges of the social world. Like flight simulators, fiction [and, I 
would argue, the other narrative genres used for reification] project us into 
intense simulations of problems that run parallel to those we face in reality. 
And, like a flight simulator, the main virtue of fiction is that we have a rich 
experience and don’t die at the end.82   
In the case, those who read Travels with Charley may not have ended up outside of 
a school screaming at small children because they would have been allowed to test-
drive the possibility that those students weren’t actually be burr-headed, slop-eating 
Congolese rapists but, instead, burgeoning pole-vaulters, mathematicians and 
composers. As such, Steinbeck’s book may, as some have suggested, come at just 
the right historical moment to help us evolve towards a more just, cooperative and, 
ultimately, successful social structure.83 
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While Norman Rockwell’s painting “The Problem We All Live With,” offers us 
an example of Arendt’s concept of transfiguration, it also encourages us to think 
about how that concept relates to the process of participatory-sense making. As 
discussed in chapter 5, those who study participatory sense-making have focused on 
face-to-face, dyadic encounters and have left unanswered the question of whether 
meaning can arise when a third-person or observational stance is taken by one of the 
participants. In the case of Arendt’s existential agent and witnessing spectator, I 
stated that a third-person or observational stance did constitute a sufficient level of 
interaction for participatory sense-making because it is a special circumstance in 
which the dynamic between the agent and the spectator mimics the basic form of a 
conversation. Ruby Bridges and John Steinbeck are illustrative of this kind of 
interaction, even though Steinbeck’s focus did shift away from the agent, herself. 
Furthermore, it was my contention that this inherently conversational dynamic is 
enhanced by being temporally extended, situated within a supporting framework and 
constructed in such a manner as to invite the participation of others.  
In general, it can be assumed that the participation of others would occur 
through face-to-face, dyadic encounters; the only aberration suggested here, if it may 
even be considered as such, can lie in the fact that the locus of sense-making would 
be predetermined to center on what the spectator had previously witnessed. For 
example, it is easy to imagine Steinbeck being absorbed in conversation with his wife 
about what he saw in New Orleans, and for that interaction to meet all of the basic 
criteria for participatory sense-making. However, that kind of encounter is not at all 
what has been described in the foregoing discussion on transfiguration. As a result, it 
invites future study into the question of whether an interpretive work can serve as a 
conduit to an interaction between an agent and a new spectator in the manner Arendt 
describes. In other words, did Travels with Charley serve to locate Rockwell at 
William Frantz on a November morning in 1960 with enough sufficiency for him to 
have an encounter with Ruby analogous to the one in which Steinbeck was engaged 
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that day? If not, what necessary corrections must be made to Arendt’s construction of 
the concept of transfiguration in order to create a more coherent account of a 
catalytic event’s reenactment before a new audience? 
Finally, it was Goethe who said, “The world only goes forward because of 
those who oppose it.”84 While I agree that acts of opposition are necessary in order to 
revitalize the social world, they are not sufficient in and of themselves; instead, I have 
sought to demonstrate that the reification of those catalytic words and deeds by 
others is equally necessary. After all, Ruby’s integration of William Frantz would not, 
as Robert Coles asserts, have forwarded the progress of the world that day in 
November if, by some unknown act, everyone present was suddenly rendered 
unable to remember or recount what had occurred. Or, to put it another way, it is not 
difficult to imagine that countless words and deeds with the potential to change the 
world are enacted on a daily basis. Unless, however, they are remembered and 
reified, their fleeting and ephemeral nature causes them to disappear as if they had 
never been and, therefore, before they would have had any meaningful effect on the 
broadly accepted normative standards of the community in which they were enacted.  
Coles’s work furthered this point by demonstrating that, as Arendt rightly 
argued, the media in which the words and deeds of existential agents are 
memorialized greatly impacts their potential level of cultural salience and subsequent 
entrenchment. Specifically, Coles recounts Ruby’s actions multiple times in the 
almost thirty years following the publication of Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage 
and Fear in 1967. While it may be assumed that those works were impactful for the 
small subset of individuals who engage sociological or psychological texts, it was not 
until he reified her story in the form of a literary narrative—and, more exactly, in what 
Hutto terms a “folk psychological narrative”—that her actions could be reevaluated 
and reinterpreted in light of present circumstances. The result was that Ruby’s story 
spawned many more interpretive works. Most of those works were aimed at children 
still in the process of developing their basic evaluative framework and, therefore, 
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when a child interacts with that material in ways that are actively supported by her 
caregivers, it shapes her understanding of that which should be considered right, 
normal and acceptable. In this case, that includes the understanding that even very 
young children can be heroes in the Arendtian sense of the word.     
To conclude this project, it is worth briefly returning to the theoretical material 
for which Ruby’s story served as an illustrative example: the text of The Human 
Condition. There, Arendt reminds us that consideration of the exigencies of existence 
must be ongoing in light of “our newest experiences and our most recent fears.”85 
This, she explains, means foregoing “the heedless recklessness or hopeless 
confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty” 
and, instead, “to think what we are doing.”86 Yet, even for those of us who devote 
ourselves to such endeavors, thinking about what we are doing is not enough. 
Instead, a life of the mind must be an embodied, embedded, extended and enacted 
experience made manifest in the world through our very words and deeds and, when 
called upon to do so, in our capacity to bear witness to the actions of others.
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